More is not always better. Effect of educational expenditures on education quality and social mobility in Switzerland
In: European journal of political economy, S. 102407
ISSN: 1873-5703
105 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: European journal of political economy, S. 102407
ISSN: 1873-5703
In: Kyklos: international review for social sciences, Band 73, Heft 4, S. 605-642
ISSN: 1467-6435
SUMMARYThis paper studies the effect of the Swiss federal debt containment rule on public debt. Using the synthetic control method, we provide evidence that the introduction of the federal rule in 2003 has reduced public debt ratio in Switzerland by 2.5 percentage points on average until 2010. By exploiting possible mechanisms, we find no evidence that the reduction in debt ratio was driven by a debt relocation to sub‐government levels or cutbacks in investment expenditure. On one hand, we argue that the positive impact of the fiscal rule is based on its design features, namely its precise but cyclically adjusted target, the comprehensive scope to prevent budget loopholes, and the strict sanction mechanism. On the other hand, we also discuss the generalizability of our findings to other countries and contend that its direct democratic authorization has contributed to its political enforcement and viability.
In: Kyklos, Band 73, Heft 4, S. 605-642
SSRN
Dieses Gutachten untersucht die finanzpolitische Steuerung des Zweckverbands grosse Kulturbetriebe Luzern. Es wird evaluiert, ob sich der Zweckverband für die Verbundaufgabe der Kulturförderung als Finanzierungs- und Führungsinstrument eignet. Für die Beurteilung wenden wir dabei das ökonomische Konzept der fiskalischen Äquivalenz an.
BASE
Föderalismus und Finanzausgleich sind Dauerbrenner in der politischen Debatte in der Schweiz. Weniger bekannt ist, dass die Kantone gegenüber ihren Gemeinden ebenfalls Finanzausgleichssysteme kennen. Je nach Kanton sind die Systeme sehr unterschiedlich ausgestaltet. Im Folgenden werden die finanzpolitischen Wirkungen des Finanzausgleichs im Kanton Basel-Landschaft untersucht und mit dem Finanzausgleich auf Bundesebene verglichen.
BASE
In: Public choice, Band 144, Heft 1-2, S. 293-321
ISSN: 1573-7101
Policymakers often propose strict enforcement strategies to fight the shadow economy and to increase tax morale. However, there is an alternative bottom-up approach that decentralises political power to those who are close to the problems. This paper analyses the relationship with local autonomy. We use data on tax morale at the individual level and macro data on the size of the shadow economy to analyse the relevance of local autonomy and compliance in Switzerland. The findings suggest that there is a positive (negative) relationship between local autonomy and tax morale (size of the shadow economy). Adapted from the source document.
In: Public choice, Band 144, Heft 1, S. 293-322
ISSN: 0048-5829
In: Public choice, Band 144, Heft 1-2, S. 293-321
ISSN: 1573-7101
This paper investigates spatial spillovers in local spending decisions between the center and the surrounding local communities by using panel data of the canton of Lucerne during the 1990s. Due to the geographical fragmentation with a major central city and some 100 small suburban local communities within a distance from 4 to 55 kilometers to the center this area represents a particularly useful database in order to test the relevance of spatial interactions in a small metropolitan area. The empirical evidence confirms strategic interactions among suburban governments and the central city only for public education, health and environmental spending. There are no spatial interactions with the central city for overall government spending.
BASE
Policymakers often propose strict enforcement strategies to fight the shadow economy and to increase tax morale. However, there is also a bottom-up approach such as, for example, decentralizing the political power to those who are close to the problems. Thus, this paper analyses the relationship between local autonomy and tax morale or the size of the shadow economy. We use data on tax morale at the individual level and macro data of the size of the shadow economy to systematically analyse the relevance of local autonomy and compliance in Switzerland, a country where the degree of federalism varies across different cantons. The findings suggest that there is a positive (negative) relationship between local autonomy and tax morale (size of the shadow economy).
BASE
The paper compares decision-making on the centralisation of public goods provision in the presence of regional externalities under representative and direct democratic institutions. A model with two regions, two public goods and regional spillovers is developed in which uncertainty over the true preferences of candidates makes strategic delegation impossible. Instead, it is shown that the existence of rent extraction by delegates alone suffices to make cooperative centralisation more likely through representative democracy. In the non-cooperative case, the more extensive possibilities for institutional design under representative democracy increase the likelihood of centralisation. Direct democracy may thus be interpreted as a federalism-preserving institution.
BASE
Policymakers often propose strict enforcement strategies to fight the shadow economy and to increase tax morale. However, there is also a bottom-up approach: decentralizing the political power to those who are close to the problems and give them a direct political say. This paper analyses the impact of direct democracy and local autonomy on tax morale and the size of the shadow economy. We use two different data sets on tax morale at the individual level (World Values Survey and International Social Survey Programme), and macro data of the size of the shadow economy to systematically analyse the effects of institutions in Switzerland, a country where participation rights and the degree of federalism vary across different cantons. The findings suggest that direct democratic rights and local autonomy, have a significantly positive effect on tax morale and the size of the shadow economy.
BASE
Policymakers often propose strict enforcement strategies to fight the shadow economy and to increase tax morale. However, there is also a bottom-up approach: decentralizing the political power to those who are close to the problems and give them a direct political say. This paper analyses the impact of direct democracy and local autonomy on tax morale and the size of the shadow economy. We use two different data sets on tax morale at the individual level (World Values Survey and International Social Survey Programme), and macro data of the size of the shadow economy to systematically analyse the effects of institutions in Switzerland, a country where participation rights and the degree of federalism vary across different cantons. The findings suggest that direct democratic rights and local autonomy, have a significantly positive effect on tax morale and the size of the shadow economy.
BASE
In: JEBO-D-21-01808
SSRN
In: CESifo Working Paper 1087
According to the Leviathan-Model, fiscal federalism is seen as a binding constraint on a revenue-maximizing government. The competitive pressure of fiscal federalism is supposed to reduce public sector size as compared to unitary states. However, empirical results concerning the Leviathan hypothesis are mixed. This study uses a state and local-level panel data set of Swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998 to empirically analyze the effect of different federalist institutions on the size and structure of government revenue. Because of the considerable tax autonomy of sub-national Swiss governments, it is possible to investigate different mechanisms by which fiscal federalism may influence government size. The results indicate that tax exporting has a revenue expanding effect whereas tax competition favors a smaller size of government. Fragmentation has essentially no effect on the size of government revenue for Swiss cantons. The overall effect of revenue decentralization leads to fewer tax revenue but higher user charges. Thus, revenue decentralization favors a smaller size of government revenue and shifts government revenue from taxes to user charges.