Suchergebnisse

A portrayal of the bill-to-law provisions of Latin American constitutions as extensive game forms shows presidential veto powers to be richer, more varied, and more regionally distinctive than hitherto appreciated. Small details and apparent redundancies are surprisingly consequential, the distribution of institutional advantages is both counterintuitive and incompatible with any simple pattern or overall measure of 'presidential power', and regional peculiarities turn out to have been rather well designed to encourage democratic responsibility and executive-legislative agreement more than executive dominance or interbranch deadlock. Tables, Figures, References. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright 2006.]

A portrayal of the bill-to-law provisions of Latin American constitutions as extensive game forms shows presidential veto powers to be richer, more varied, and more regionally distinctive than hitherto appreciated. Small details and apparent redundancies are surprisingly consequential, the distribution of institutional advantages is both counterintuitive and incompatible with any simple pattern or overall measure of 'presidential power', and regional peculiarities turn out to have been rather well designed to encourage democratic responsibility and executive-legislative agreement more than executive dominance or interbranch deadlock.

What happens when married men face their gay/bisexual needs?This astonishing volume offers an intimate look into the lives and thoughts of bisexual men. Already married to women, these men are undeniably attracted to other men. Their struggle with conflicting needs, desires, and loyalties is not filtered through theories or evoked in brief interviews. It comes straight from their own keyboards. The stories told in Bisexual and Gay Husbands are taken from an Internet mailing list, which allows people to speak freely and in anonymity, yet also encourages the development of a tightly knit communi

For the US House of Representatives, Cox and McCubbins discover tiny majority-party roll rates and offer them as evidence of majority-party agenda control. However, the observed roll rates are approximately what would result from chance alone or from chance constrained in several natural ways. Besides that, we show that rolls themselves are not evidence of any lapse in partisan agenda control and may even occur as the intended consequence of agenda setting by the majority party. Innovations include a solution to the combinatorial problem of counting all possible rolls, the associated computations, hypothetical examples of strategically advantageous self-induced rolls, and a review of likely real examples of the same.