Suchergebnisse

Abstract
Around the world, many liberal democracies are facing in recent years serious challenges and threats emanating inter alia from the rise of political populism. Such challenges and threats are feeding an almost existential discourse about the crisis of democracy, and recent legal and political developments in Israel aimed at weakening the power of the Supreme Court and other rule of law institutions have also been described in such terms. This Article primarily intends to explore the relevance of the discourse surrounding the decline of liberal democracy, and its possible relevance for Israeli democracy, by examining the principal similarities and differences between specific legislative and administrative measures recently taken or contemplated in Israel and in two Central European states: Poland and Hungary. We focus on three sets of illiberal measures adopted or contemplated in Hungary, Poland, and Israel: (i) measures directed at limiting the power of the judiciary; (ii) measures intended to restrict the operation of civil society organizations; and (iii) measures directed at curbing dissent to governmental policies and at influencing the discourse in the media and academia. Although Israeli democratic institutions still retain much of their independence and vitality, we nonetheless find some degree of similarity between measures taken or contemplated by Hungary, Poland, and Israel, despite the many differences between their legal systems, historical contexts, political cultures, and the distinct stages of backsliding they seem to experience.

AbstractThis article evaluates acceptance of the Tallinn Rules by states on the basis of eleven case studies involving cyberoperations, all occurring after the first Tallinn Manual was published in 2013. Our principal findings are that (1) it is unclear whether states are ready to accept the Tallinn Rules; (2) states show uneven interest in promoting legal certainty in cyberspace; and (3) a growing need for coordinated response to cyberattacks may induce states to consider more favorably the Tallinn Rules.

By introducing a new 'debate' section, theReviewhopes to contribute to the reflection on current ethical, legal, or practical controversies around humanitarian issues. This section will expose readers to the key arguments concerning a particular contemporary question of humanitarian law or humanitarian action.For this first debate, theReviewasked two members of its Editorial Board,Professor Marco SassòliandProfessor Yuval Shany, to debate on the topic of equality of states and armed groups under international humanitarian law.Professor René Provostcomments on this debate, adding a third dimension to the discussion.The crucial question is whether it is realistic to apply the current legal regime to non-state armed groups. How can armed groups, with sometimes very limited means and low levels of organization, meet the same obligations as states? What are the incentives for armed groups to respect rules that their opponents have enacted? Why should they respect any rules when the very fact of taking arms against the state already makes them 'outlaws'?All participants in this discussion share an aspiration to ensure better legal protection for all those affected by armed conflicts. Professors Sassòli and Shany have agreed to present two 'radically' opposed stances, Professor Sassòli maintaining that equality should be reconsidered and replaced by a sliding scale of obligations, and Professor Shany rebutting this assertion. Professor Provost then reflects on the stances put forward by the two debaters and invites us to revisit the very notion of equality of belligerents.The debaters have simplified their complex legal reasoning for the sake of clarity and brevity. Readers of theReviewshould bear in mind that the debaters actual legal positions are more nuanced than they may appear in this debate.

Abstract
'The same rights that people have offline must also be protected online' is used in recent years as a dominant concept in international discourse about human rights in cyberspace. But does this notion of 'normative equivalency' between the 'offline' and the 'online' afford effective protection for human rights in the digital age? This is the question at the heart of this article. We first review the development of human rights in cyberspace as they were conceptualized and articulated in international fora and critically evaluate the normative equivalency paradigm adopted by international bodies for the online application of human rights. We then attempt to describe the contours of a new digital human rights framework, which goes beyond the normative equivalency paradigm. We offer in this connection a typology of three 'generations' or modalities in the evolution of digital human rights – the radical reinterpretation of existing rights, the development of new rights and the introduction of new right and duty holders. In particular, we focus on the emergence of new digital human rights, present two prototype rights (the right to Internet access and the right not to be subject to automated decision) and discuss the normative justifications invoked for recognizing these new digital human rights. We propose that such a multilayered framework corresponds better than the normative equivalency paradigm to the unique features and challenges of upholding human rights in cyberspace.

This article is the result of an international research project organized by the Federmann Cyber Security Research Center at Hebrew University to consider the feasibility of establishing an international attribution mechanism for hostile cyber operations, as well as the usefulness of such a body. The authors observe that, at present, states wielding significant cyber capability have little interest in creating such a mechanism. These states appear to be of the view that they can generate sufficient accountability and deterrence based on their independent technological capacity, access to expertise and to offensive (active defense) cyber tools, political clout, security alliances, and other policy tools, such as sanctions. However, countries with limited technological capacity and less ability to mobilize international support for collective attribution are more amenable to the prospect. To date, proposals to establish an international attribution mechanism have not acquired momentum. However, the authors suggest that progress remains possible by focusing on the three logical constituencies for such a body—States with limited technological, intelligence, and diplomatic capacity; States interested in generating broad collective attribution of attacks perpetrated against them; and international and regional organizations operating a cyber-related sanctions regime. Such a focus, combined with greater granularity, would significantly improve the prospects for the establishment of an international attribution mechanism and its eventual utilization by the international community.