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The Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 shook the foundations of the global economy. What began as a localised currency crisis soon engulfed the entire Asian region. What went wrong and how did the Asian economies, long considered 'miracles', respond? How did the United States, Japan and other G-7 countries react to the crisis? What role did the IMF play? Why did China, which suffers from many of the same structural problems responsible for the crisis, remain conspicuously insulated from the turmoil raging in its midst? What explains Asia's remarkable recovery just three years after the crisis? In what fundamental ways did the Asian crisis serve as a catalyst to the current thinking about the 'new international financial architecture'? What lessons can be learnt from the crisis by other emerging economies? This book provides answers to all the above questions and more. It gives a comprehensive account of how the international economic order operates, examines its strengths and weaknesses, and what needs to be done to fix it. The book will be vital to students of economics, international political economy, Asian and development studies.

We now have a fairly good understanding of the economic causes of the 1977 Asian financial crisis. There is as yet, however little understanding of the politics behind the crisis. Not only did various political systems in Asia play a significant role in fomenting the crisis, they have also demonstrated remarkable capacities in dealing with its aftermath. Nowhere is this more evident than in the far-reaching economic reforms implemented by the Kim Dae-Jung administration in South Korea. The key to Korea's success in weathering the crisis lay in the decisive leadership of Kim Dae-Jung & in the "developmental state" structures & institutions he inherited -- both of which exemplify the autonomy of a putatively democratic state from societal, especially elite, pressures. 25 References. Adapted from the source document.

Weak performance of strong states and role of democracy.

ABSTRACT The Chinese economy shows a remarkable resemblance to those of pre-crisis Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea and Malaysia - especially the asset bubbles, high reliance on banking intermediation, poor prudential supervision, and fragility of the financial system. Yet, China defied the common prediction and did not succumb to the financial crisis. What explains the China ability to withstand a major region-wide financial crisis? This study addresses this complex question, besides elaborating the reform measures China must implement to immune itself from future financial crises or its contagion effects.

Almost all the East Asian economies have recaptured the economic momentum disrupted by the 1997 financial crisis in the region. Although that momentum was slowed with the global economic downturn in 2001, the process of financial and corporate rebuilding and restructuring in response to the crisis has not.