NPT stronger after Iraq
In: The bulletin of the atomic scientists: a magazine of science and public affairs, Band 47, Heft 8, S. 12-13
ISSN: 0096-3402, 0096-5243, 0742-3829
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In: The bulletin of the atomic scientists: a magazine of science and public affairs, Band 47, Heft 8, S. 12-13
ISSN: 0096-3402, 0096-5243, 0742-3829
World Affairs Online
In: The round table: the Commonwealth journal of international affairs, S. 139-154
ISSN: 0035-8533
Factors in the inability of the fourth NPT review conference to achieve a consensus final document.
In: Bulletin of the atomic scientists, Band 46, Heft 6, S. 38-39
ISSN: 1938-3282
In: The bulletin of the atomic scientists: a magazine of science and public affairs, Band 46, Heft 7, S. 38
ISSN: 0096-3402, 0096-5243, 0742-3829
In: Millennium: journal of international studies, Band 16, Heft 3, S. 565-566
ISSN: 1477-9021
In: Scottish journal of political economy: the journal of the Scottish Economic Society, Band 34, Heft 1, S. 97-103
ISSN: 1467-9485
In: Arms Control, Band 6, Heft 1, S. 82-96
In: Scottish economic & social history, Band 5, Heft 1, S. 94-95
In: Arms control: the journal of arms control and disarmament, Band 6, Heft 1, S. 82-96
ISSN: 0144-0381
World Affairs Online
In: Arms Control, Band 5, Heft 3, S. 1-12
In: Millennium: journal of international studies, Band 13, Heft 1, S. 92-93
ISSN: 1477-9021
In: Review of international studies: RIS, Band 8, Heft 2, S. 69-88
ISSN: 1469-9044
The 1980 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference will chiefly be remembered for the inability of the delegates to agree on a final document. There were several visible reasons for this, some related to the immediate political concerns of the participants, some linked to the nature of the treaty itself. The statements of the participating states indicated that they held differing conceptions of the purposes of the treaty, and possessed very diverse views on the action that should be taken to achieve them. Four sets of assertions dominated the discussions: that the nuclear states had not fulfilled their obligation to negotiate measures of nuclear disarmament as specified in Article VI of the treaty; that the advanced industrial states had not fulfilled their obligations to assist and encourage the global development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy contained in both Articles IV and V of the treaty; that the attempts by the United States government to discharge its obligations under the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act by threatening to terminate fuel supply contracts to both treaty parties and non-parties, unless they accepted International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on all their nuclear installations, was inequitable and improper (the same accusation was also directed at Canada); and that the major danger of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and Africa originated in the threats posed to the states in these regions by the regimes in Israel and South Africa. One issue on which there did appear to be agreement, however, was that the safeguards regime foreshadowed by Article III of the treaty had functioned satisfactorily, in that no Feaches of it had been reported to the Review Conference by the IAEA. Yet the differing interpretations of the balance of rights and obligations contained in the treaty masks a much deeper set of issues: what precisely is the problem of nuclear proliferation, to what extent is the predominant diplomatic rhetoric of nuclear non-proliferation discussions unrepresentative of the real concerns and interests of the participants, what was and is the relationship between nuclear weapons and nuclear power, and does the NPT itself address (or was it ever intended to address) the problem of nuclear proliferation in the form in which it seems likely to be encountered in the 1980s?
In: International affairs, Band 59, Heft 1, S. 94-95
ISSN: 1468-2346
In: Review of international studies: RIS, Band 8, Heft 2, S. 69-88
ISSN: 0260-2105
World Affairs Online
In: Bulletin of the atomic scientists, Band 37, Heft 1, S. 26-32
ISSN: 1938-3282