Zonal Disarmament and Inspection: Variations on a Theme
In: Bulletin of the atomic scientists, Band 18, Heft 7, S. 4-10
ISSN: 1938-3282
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In: Bulletin of the atomic scientists, Band 18, Heft 7, S. 4-10
ISSN: 1938-3282
In: American journal of international law: AJIL, Band 56, Heft 1, S. 234-235
ISSN: 2161-7953
In: American journal of international law: AJIL, Band 55, Heft 4, S. 1015-1016
ISSN: 2161-7953
In: Bulletin of the atomic scientists, Band 17, Heft 4, S. 130-133
ISSN: 1938-3282
In: Proceedings of the annual meeting / American Society of International Law, Band 55, S. 84-85
ISSN: 2169-1118
In: American journal of international law: AJIL, Band 54, Heft 3, S. 712-713
ISSN: 2161-7953
In: The annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Band 330, Heft 1, S. 11-18
ISSN: 1552-3349
The United States has for a long time treated its foreign relations as a series of crises and has concentrated too much on counteracting Soviet moves. The United States must instead try to develop a positive, independent policy, the aim of which should be to create a world order in which all nations would be able to live in peace, freedom, and justice. Such a policy cannot be improvised; it must be as thoroughly prepared as that which resulted in the creation of the United Nations. A large research effort, comparable perhaps to the Manhattan Project in the field of nuclear energy, would be necessary. To the extent that the United States should be able to formulate a foreign policy which would be favorable to the survival of the American people and to the survival of the human race, it would not have to worry about creating a favor able world opinion. An effective plan for world peace would create such a wave of enthusiasm around the world that even the Soviet Union would not find it advisable to be opposed.
In: American journal of international law: AJIL, Band 52, Heft 2, S. 229-240
ISSN: 2161-7953
The establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNBF) during the Middle Eastern crisis in November, 1957, has been generally accepted as being a proper exercise of the powers of the United Nations. Proposals have been made, however, to establish a more permanent force, either on a full-time or stand-by basis, for use in future emergencies.
In: American journal of international law, Band 52, S. 229-240
ISSN: 0002-9300
In: Nordisk tidsskrift for international ret, Band 23, Heft 1, S. 27-31
ISSN: 1875-2934, 1571-8107
In: Proceedings of the annual meeting / American Society of International Law, Band 46, S. 104-109
ISSN: 2169-1118
In: American journal of international law: AJIL, Band 40, Heft 1, S. 71-99
ISSN: 2161-7953
When the representatives of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States met at Yalta in February, 1945, the Soviet delegation raised the question of giving separate representation in the Assembly of the United Nations to the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic and to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The United States delegation agreed to support this claim at San Francisco, but reserved the right of the United States to put in a similar claim for three votes for itself and its possessions. The Soviet delegation raised no objection to the latter claim and the British delegation agreed to support both claims. No agreement was reached at the time with respect to the question of the participation of the two Soviet Republics at the San Francisco Conference itself. When the Yalta agreement was disclosed at the end of March objections were raised in different quarters against the principle of plural votes itself and very vehemently against the secrecy attached to the agreement. In order to pour some oil on the troubled waters the Government of the United States announced that the United States would not request for itself additional votes in the General Assembly. The United States delegation was directed, however, to cast the vote of the United States in favor of the admission of the Byelorussian and Ukrainian Republics and on April 27, 1945, the San Francisco Conference unanimously invited these Republics to become initial members of the United Nations. On April 30, 1945, it permitted them to take seats at the Conference immediately. The delegates of these republics at the Conference generally voted with the Soviet delegation but in a few instances their votes diverged. One might recall in that connection that while in the early days of the League of Nations the British Dominions followed quite closely the lead of the British delegation, twenty-five years later, at San Francisco, the British delegation found the Dominions sometimes among its most bitter opponents. It is quite possible that the position of the Soviet Republics might evolve along similar lines, though it might take some time.
In: American journal of international law: AJIL, Band 40, Heft 1, S. 239-240
ISSN: 2161-7953
In: American political science review, Band 38, Heft 6, S. 1192-1203
ISSN: 1537-5943
All the plans for future world organization, whether they envisage a world government or are limited to providing agencies for better collaboration between the peoples of the world, are built around two main conceptions—a small council and a larger assembly. But the different plans disagree widely upon the powers and the make-up of these bodies. The purpose of the present article is to analyze the difficulties relating to the structure of the larger body, the assembly, and to outline a tentative method for surmounting them.The structure of the different international organizations existing in the past was based on two principles: equality of representation and unanimity. That meant, first of all, that in the assemblies of nations the United States of America (population, 131 million) and Luxemburg (population, 300 thousand) had the right of equal representation. For instance, in the Conferences of the International Labor Organization, both countries have been equally entitled to appoint four delegates. Secondly, when an international assembly has tried to arrive at a Decision, not only the largest but also the smallest country could block such a Decision by casting a negative vote. While sometimes a little country has been forcibly persuaded to abandon its opposition, in many instances small countries have been able to frustrate the efforts of international assemblies and conferences otherwise unanimous.
In: American journal of international law: AJIL, Band 38, Heft 4, S. 694-700
ISSN: 2161-7953