Suchergebnisse

Observers have argued that the window of opportunity allowing for the adoption of transitional justice methods in Eastern Europe had closed by mid-1990s, both because by then the public had lost interest in the topic and because former communist officials and secret political police officers retained their political clout and it to block an honest reassessment of the recent past. However, it was only toward the end of the decade that Poland adopted lustration, opened secret archives and investigated a number of communist-era atrocities, proving that, if there is political will, justice delayed might not amount to justice denied. This article examines three methods post-communist Poland has employed in order to come to terms with the communist past -lustration, secret file access and court proceedings- and offers four different explanatory factors that, when taken together, can explain the country's reluctance to pursue the politics of memory more resolutely.

Since 1989, lustration has figured prominently among the methods post-communist Eastern Europe used to deal with its recent past. While to date the literature has recognized that countries like the former Czechoslovakia, Germany, Albania and, more recently, Poland, have screened electoral candidates and/or members of the judiciary, the army and the police forces, in order to remove officials with a tainted past from post-communist politics, Romania has been dismissed as a country which consistently rejected lustration. However, calls for the removal of communist officials and secret political police agents were voiced soon after the Revolution of December 1989, and the measures they called for were more comprehensive both in terms of the social categories subjected to and the time period of the ban. This article is the first in-depth analysis to examine the lustration demands included in the Timişoara Declaration, explain the reasons why they received a cold shoulder from formations spanning the entire political spectrum, and map the negotiations between political parties and the civil society for the renewal of the political class. Romania missed the window of opportunity to legislate lustration because of such factors as its bloody exit from communism, the inability of the pro-democratic opposition to wrestle power from the successor of the Communist Party, and its predominantly subject political culture.

The result of the Romanian parliamentary & presidential elections of November, 2004 was that the pro-democratic opposition won the presidency, formed the government, & presided over a peaceful transfer of power. This article discusses the elections, & the context within which they took place, in detail. The major political parties are identified & discussed, beginning with the Social Democrats, whose incumbent presidential candidate suffered a surprising loss in the elections. Next, the major presidential candidates are discussed in turn. The results of the presidential elections, including the runoff between the final two candidates, are discussed next. The parliamentary elections are also discussed; this section also considers the developments of the months leading up to those elections. The final section considers several pitfalls that the new governing coalition must avoid to remain united long enough to translate its campaign promises into practice. 3 Tables. T. K. Brown

Transitional justice in post-communist Romania has made little progress since the Council for the Study of Securitate Archives was set up in early 2000. This article discusses several factors that might explain the failure of giving citizens access to the files compiled by the communist-era secret political police and of publicly identifying the former political police agents and informers.

Explains the failure of the Romanian democratic opposition to become a credible alternative to the National Salvation Front & to introduce democratic reforms as partially due to mental constructs, assumptions, & presumptions that have undermined the ability of the democratic forces to bring change. This article shares ten myths held by the Romanian people & opposition politicians: (1) The leader is the party. (2) Party organization is unnecessary. (3) Strong parties are run from the top. (4) Alliances between parties are necessary for political survival. (5) Political success is about gaining offices. (6) The Social Democrats are the enemy. (7) The other democratic parties are doing better than the Social Democrats. (8) Self-criticism is harmful. (9) Image is everything. (10) The parties know what the people need. Each myth is discussed & analyzed. Opposition parties in Romania do have some strength, & with thorough analysis & strategies, they could accomplish some worthwhile changes in the 2004 elections. 1 Table. L. A. Hoffman

Examines two seemingly mistaken verdicts of the National Council for the Study of Securitate Archives, the agency in charge of unmasking former Securitate (Romanian political police) collaborators; case study of investigations of presidential candidate Ilie Iliescu and parliamentary candidate of the Transylvanian Hungarian minority Ludovic Rakoczi; 2000 elections.