Rivalry and superior dispatch: an analysis of competing courts in medieval and early modern England
In: Public choice, Band 147, Heft 3-4, S. 497-524
ISSN: 1573-7101
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In: Public choice, Band 147, Heft 3-4, S. 497-524
ISSN: 1573-7101
Many economists argue that a pure market economy cannot come about because people will always have incentives to use coercion (Cowen and Sutter, 2005; Holcombe, 2004). We maintain that these economists leave out an important factor in social change. Change can come about by altering incentives or preferences, but since most neoclassical economists ignore changing preferences, they too quickly conclude that change is impossible. History shows that social change based on changes in preferences is common. By recognizing that preferences need not be constant, political economists can say much more about changing the world.
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In: Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, 13(2) Summer: 31–52, 2010
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In: Review of Austrian Economics, Forthcoming
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In: THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: LAW AND ECONOMICS OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS, Edward J. Lopez, ed., Independent Institute, 2010
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In: ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, Francesco Parisi, Richard Posner, eds., 2010
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In: Business and Society Review, Band 113, Heft 3, S. 403-419
ISSN: 1467-8594
ABSTRACTThis article examines some of the reasons why banks and insurance companies have been accused of discrimination, and shows that this is by and large a false accusation. Economic analysis demonstrates that racial discrimination is not a profit‐maximizing strategy. Actually, unwise public policies are actually precluding many consumers from the market.
In: The quarterly review of economics and finance, Band 48, Heft 3, S. 541-566
ISSN: 1062-9769
In: Politicka Ekonomie, Band 10, Heft 1, S. 22-34
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In: The independent review: journal of political economy, Band 9, Heft 4, S. 543-549
ISSN: 1086-1653
A comment on Randall G. Holcombe's article, "Government: Unnecessary but Inevitable" (2004), points out problems with his theoretical arguments. It is maintained that Holcombe neither shows that anarchy must break down nor that government will remain limited. His contention that state formation is inevitable after the breakdown of anarchy is also challenged, noting that he never spells out the process by which individuals might form a government. Holcombe tends to rely on ideology rather than constitutional constraints as the most important check on government & he offers no solution to the problematic possibility that stronger authoritarian states that concentrate on their military could take over societies that have preemptively created limited governments. Although Holcombe's argument is an advance over that of public-choice economists who view the formation of government as a voluntary social contract, it is concluded that he is too pessimistic about anarchy & too optimistic about government. 21 References. J. Lindroth
In: LAW AND ECONOMICS: ALTERNATIVE ECONOMIC APPROACHES TO LEGAL AND REGULATORY ISSUES, Margaret Oppenheimer, Nicholas Mercuro, eds., pp. 374-392. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004
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In: Managerial Finance, Band 30, Heft 5, S. 57-71
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In: The Oxford Handbook of Austrian Economics
In: in "Property Wrongs: The Law and Economics of Takings," ed. Bruce Benson, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010
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In: Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance (2007)
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