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This paper investigates the political determinants of corporatist and pluralist employers' associations and reflects on the origins of the varieties of capitalism in the early decades of the 20th century. We hypothesize that proportional, multiparty systems tend to enable employers' associations to develop into social corporatist organizations, whereas nonproportional, two-party systems are conducive to the formation of pluralist associations. Moreover, we suggest that federalism tends to reinforce incentives for pluralist organization. We assess our hypotheses through quantitative analysis of data from 1900 to the 1930s from 16 nations and case studies of the origins of peak employers' associations in Denmark and the United States. Our statistical analysis suggests that proportional, multiparty systems foster, and federalism works against, social corporatist business organization; employers' organization is also greater where the mobilization of labor, traditions of coordination, and economic development are higher. These factors also largely explain pre-World War II patterns of national coordination of capitalism. Case histories of the origins of employers' associations in Denmark and the United States further confirm the causal importance of political factors. Although Danish and American employers had similar interests in creating cooperative national industrial policies, trajectories of associational development were constrained by the structure of party competition, as well as by preindustrial traditions for coordination.

Does the organization of business matter for social policy development in the advanced capitalist democracies? Conventional welfare state analysis has given this significant question scant attention. We argue, however, that the representational power of business, coordination across business interest units, and integration of associations in corporatist policy-making forums, or what we call thesocial corporatist organization of business, should result in greater support and participation by employers in social policy formation and implementation. We test our arguments with models both of 1980–98 pooled time-series data on within- and across-country variation in spending on active labor market programs and of extensive firm-level survey data from Denmark and the United Kingdom. We find that the centralization and coordination of employers as well as the integration of employer organizations in corporatist policy-making forums are strongly associated with shares of national income devoted to active labor market policy. We find, moreover, that the degree of employer organization conditions active labor market policy responses to "de-industrialization" and increases in general unemployment. At the firm level, membership in an employer association has a significant positive effect on employer participation in active labor market programs in corporatist Denmark but not in the pluralist United Kingdom.

We outline & test the argument that globalization contributes to the electoral success of the new far Right in Western Europe. We also draw on the theory of embedded liberalism to advance & test the hypothesis that a comprehensive, generous, & employment-orientated system of social protection lessens the economic insecurities attendant to internationalization &, in turn, weakens support for far-Right parties. In an empirical analysis of national elections in 16 European polities from 1981 to 1998, we find that the universal welfare state directly depresses the vote for radical right-wing populist parties & conditions the linkages between capital mobility, trade openness, & foreign immigration, on the one hand, & electoral support for the new far Right, on the other. In conclusion, we consider our findings' implications for understanding the domestic political effects of globalization & sources of right-wing populism as well as for policy reforms that promote political economic stability in an era of international integration. 4 Tables, 2 Appendixes, 56 References. Adapted from the source document.

The authors argue that the organization of employers shapes social policy support among firms and, in turn, affects social policy outcomes. Specifically, the authors argue that the centralization and cohesion of employer groups and economic cooperation across enterprises positively affects social welfare provision. Empirically, the authors assess the impacts of business organization on social welfare effort in 15 developed democracies between the 1970s and 1990s; the authors also provide analysis of the impact of employer organization on active labor market policy. The authors find that the organization of employers is one of the most important determinants of overall social welfare effort. The authors also find that employer organization affects the development of active labor market policies, and it influences the degree to which social democratic parties pursue active labor market programs. The authors conclude with a discussion of the findings' implications for theories of social corporatism and the welfare state.

Dimensions of governmental redistribution of income in capitalist democracies in the 1970s are analyzed, using data from a posttransfer & posttax measure of income inequality, combined with a primary income inequality measurement of 13 countries. A comparison of the results with average annual % growth in real gross national product reveals a positive zero-order r of .224. Governmental redistribution in the nations studied is extensive. Factors responsible for this redistribution include Wc political mobilization & union organization; other factors proposed in recent research are briefly discussed, though further study is needed to determine their validity. Proposed as method for future research is generation of time-series data on distributions of primary & other components of final income. 7 Tables, 45 References. R. McCarthy.

It is argued that previous attempts to test Frances Fox Piven's & Richard A. Cloward's explanation of post-WWII increases in Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) caseloads (Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Social Welfare, New York: Vintage, 1971) have been incomplete. Short-term time-series analyses of national-level data for 1948 to 1977 give mixed support to Piven's & Cloward's explanation of AFDC caseload growth. Their hypotheses that Community Action Agency legal aid & counseling activities, black rioting, & additional disruptions involving sreet crime generated large AFDC roll increases are supported, but evidence of positive effects of unemployment on AFDC caseload increases contradicts their denial of "need." Evidence indicating that AFDC rolls may have expanded because of 1965 amendments to the Social Security Act is also noted. Implications of these findings for theory & research concerning welfare policy determination & policy consequences of direct action by the poor are discussed. 63 References. Modified HA.

We examine the roles of democratic politics and political institutions in shaping social welfare spending in 18 contemporary capitalist democracies. We explore the social spending consequences of government partisanship, electoral competition and turnout, and the self-interested behaviors of politicians and bureaucrats, as well as such relatively durable facets of political institutions as neocorporatism, state centralization, and traditionalist policy legacies. Pooled time series analyses of welfare effort in 18 nations during the 1960–82 period show that electoral turnout, as well as left and center governments increase welfare effort; that the welfare efforts of governments led by particular types of parties show significant differences and vary notably with the strength of oppositional (and junior coalitional) parties; and that relatively neocorporatist, centralized, and traditionalistic polities are high on welfare effort. Overall, our findings suggest that contrary to many claims, both partisan and nonpartisan facets of democratic politics and political institutions shape contemporary social welfare effort.