Suchergebnisse

This essay seeks to assess (1) the likelihood that the Russian Federation will collapse in the foreseeable future and (2) the possible forms that such a dissolution might take. The latter question is extremely important, since it may determine whether a fragmented Russia would join the EU or bring the world its second nuclear war. Finally, we seek (3) to offer some preliminary advice for policy makers (Russian and Western) and political scientists studying the issue. The following section launches our study with a discussion of some methodological issues involved in assessing future developments through political science theory and accumulated 'historical wisdom'. The next section examines the 'lessons' to be drawn from the collapse of the USSR and extrapolates them to today's Russia. The essay then turns to a section discussing the need to 'expect the unexpected', to go beyond the important exercise of empirical extrapolation to consider other theoretically possible scenarios of dissolution. The concluding section steps back to offer a tentative evaluation of the probabilities of different scenarios. It also offers some preliminary recommendations to policy makers.

Under plurality rule, presidents may be elected with narrow support whenever there are more than two "serious" candidates. Even under majority-runoff rules, the eventual winner may have received the backing of only a small minority in the first round. This article shows that majority runoff rules tend to be associated with an "effective" number of presidential candidates greater than three. The effective number for plurality is, on average, less; however, a nontrivial share of such elections have resulted in close multicandidate races. The article proposes an alternative "double complement rule," which is derived as the arithmetic average of majority runoff and plurality criteria. This rule stipulates that a front-runner with less than a majority of the votes wins without need of a second round if the shortfall of the runner-up from a majority of votes is more than double the leading candidate's shortfall from a majority. Possible effects and desirable conditions of this rule are assessed in light of the existing debate about electoral methods. © 1994, SAGE Periodicals Press. All rights reserved.

UNDER PLURALITY RULE, PRESIDENTS MAY BE ELECTED WITH NARROW SUPPORT WHENEVER THERE ARE MORE THAN TWO 'SERIOUS' CANDIDATES. EVEN UNDER MAJORITY-RUNOFF RULES, THE EVENTUAL WINNER MAY HAVE RECEIVED THE BACKING OF ONLY A SMALL MINORITY IN THE FIRST ROUND. THIS ARTICLE SHOWS THAT MAJORITY RUNOFF RULES TEND TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH AN 'EFFECTIVE' NUMBER OF PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES GREATER THAN THREE. THE EFFECTIVE NUMBER FOR PLURALITY IS, ON AVERAGE, LESS; HOWEVER, A NONTRIVIAL SHARE OF SUCH ELECTIONS HAVE RESULTED IN CLOSE MULTICANDIDATE RACES. THE ARTICLE PROPOSES AN ALTERNATIVE 'DOUBLE COMPLEMENT RULE,' WHICH IS DERIVED AS THE ARITHMETIC AVERAGE OF MAJORITY RUNOFF AND PLURALITY CRITERIA. THIS RULE STIPULATES THAT A FRONT-RUNNER WITH LESS THAN A MAJORITY OF THE VOTES WINS WITHOUT NEED OF A SECOND ROUND IF THE SHORTFALL OF THE RUNNER-UP FROM A MAJORITY OF VOTES IS MORE THAN DOUBLE THE LEADING CANDIDATE'S SHORTFALL FROM A MAJORITY. POSSIBLE EFFECTS AND DESIRABLE CONDITIONS OF THIS RULE ARE ASSESSED IN LIGHT OF THE EXISTING DEBATE ABOUT ELECTORAL METHODS.

The mechanical effect of electoral systems, identified by Maurice Duverger, can be estimated by means of a quantitative model. The model predicts the range within which the effective number of parties in a district should fall for a given magnitude (number of seats) of the district. At the national level, a related model predicts the effective number of parties based on the effective magnitude and the number of seats in the national assembly. The institutional variables considered—magnitude and assembly size—define a great portion of the structural constraints within which a given country's politics must take place. The model developed provides a good fit to data in spite of its having been developed from outrageously simple starting assumptions. © 1993, American Political Science Association. All rights reserved.

In 1983 we published a book entitled The Baltic States: Years of Dependence 1940-1980.1 The present article represents an update chapter which reviews the years 1980–1986. Compared to the late 1970s and the early 1980s, a period of stagnation, 1987 was a singularly difficult time for writing recent Soviet and Baltic history. CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev was trying to overcome the general stagnation in which the Soviet Union found itself, and the outcome of his increasingly dramatic effort remains uncertain. Hence, the historical perspective for our interpretation of recent events is missing. Will economic and technological growth in the USSR be achieved without appreciable political changes, or will liberalization be the price for technological progress? If liberalization is needed, will Gorbachev be able to pay the price, or will he maintain the past mix of authoritarian and totalitarian features even at the cost of continued economic stagnation? If Gorbachev chooses liberalization, will more conservative bureaucratic forces eventually topple him? If the Soviet leadership opts for continued economic stagnation, will the Soviet population continue to be submissive indefinitely? As before, Baltic history in the 1980s continues to depend on the interplay of local aspirations with decisions made in Moscow. © 1989, Taylor & Francis Group, LLC. All rights reserved.

In 1983 we published a book entitled The Baltic States: Years of Dependence 1940-1980.1The present article represents an update chapter which reviews the years 1980–1986. Compared to the late 1970s and the early 1980s, a period of stagnation, 1987 was a singularly difficult time for writing recent Soviet and Baltic history. CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev was trying to overcome the general stagnation in which the Soviet Union found itself, and the outcome of his increasingly dramatic effort remains uncertain. Hence, the historical perspective for our interpretation of recent events is missing. Will economic and technological growth in the USSR be achieved without appreciable political changes, or will liberalization be the price for technological progress? If liberalization is needed, will Gorbachev be able to pay the price, or will he maintain the past mix of authoritarian and totalitarian features even at the cost of continued economic stagnation? If Gorbachev chooses liberalization, will more conservative bureaucratic forces eventually topple him? If the Soviet leadership opts for continued economic stagnation, will the Soviet population continue to be submissive indefinitely? As before, Baltic history in the 1980s continues to depend on the interplay of local aspirations with decisions made in Moscow. © 1989, Taylor & Francis Group, LLC. All rights reserved.

The insights gained while carrying out a book-length study of electoral systems are applied to evaluate existing electoral systems and to suggest guidelines for changes, if necessary. © 1989.

Attempts to predict the number of political parties emerging in democracies have usually been based on one of two seemingly incompatible approaches: (1) the 'institutional' approach (e.g., Duverger's Law and Hypothesis) focuses on the nature of the electoral system and also on the number of seats per district; (2) the 'ideological' approach stresses the nature and extent of social cleavages. This article attempts a synthesis by showing that election system and cleavage type interact to affect the number of parties, with the former factor determined in part by the latter. Our most striking finding, however, is that the effective number of parties tends to be obtained by adding 'one' to the number of issue dimensions. Within this broader framework, Duverger's Law emerges as a special case for polities with a single issue dimension, and Duverger's Hypothesis is replaced by a much more quantitative prediction as to the effective number of parties. Copyright © 1985, Wiley Blackwell. All rights reserved

How proportional are the results of electoral systems designed to ensure proportional representation? How large is the deviation from proportionality for relative majority systems? Does a given system favor large, small or medium‐sized parties? Are some parties consistently advantaged? Is the system predictable or erratic? Plotting the percentage of seats–percentage of votes ratio versus percentage of votes for all parties, is found to be a simple and yet powerful graphical method to answer such questions. Application of such "proportionality profiles" to West European multi‐party systems leads to a typology of electoral systems based on their actual effect (rather than their formal procedure or intended effect). District magnitude, the number of rounds, and nationwide adjustment rules are found to be more important than formal seat distribution rules such as d'Hondt or Sainte‐Laguë. Copyright © 1980, Wiley Blackwell. All rights reserved

Second chamber sizes (in terms of seats) tend to increase with increasing population like first chamber sizes. Population seems to affect first chamber size directly, while the size of the first chamber goes on to affect second chamber size. When selected on the basis of territorial sub-units, the second chamber size tends to be around the geometric mean of first chamber size and the number of sub-units. From the viewpoint of representing the total population and the constituent sub-units, the European Parliament is more akin to a first chamber and its size has been approaching the cube root of population typical of first chambers. The Council of the European Union (CEU) is more akin to a second chamber and its size, in terms of qualified majority voting (QMV) votes, was approaching the size typical of second chambers at a given population. However, the Treaty of Nice has boosted the CEU to a size comparable to that of the European Parliament (EP), which may not be functional. Analogies to domestic first and second chambers suggest that the optimal size for the 27-country CEU might be 150 to 190 seats (Nice proposes 345), while that for the EP might be around 780 seats (Nice proposes 732). (European Journal of Political Research / FUB)

We illustrate the power of "logical models" (Taagepera, 2007) by offering a three-parameter model of the relationship between the effective number of parties and electoral turnout that makes use of the constraints on what parameter values are internally coherent given boundary conditions to specify functional form, and seeks not optimal curve fitting but rather a direct model testing. In our model, one parameter reflects an effect that generally acts to increase turnout as the effective number of parties increases, another an effect that generally acts to decrease turnout as the effective number of parties increases, while a third parameter allows for baseline variation in turnout across countries (or within countries across elections). We fit this model to district-level data from 237 elections held in 17 countries, representing a wide range of electoral system types generating multi-party contests, with over 20,000 district-election observations. The basic intuition, that turnout rises to a peak as the effective number of parties increases and then falls slowly, fits our data pretty well. © 2013 © 2013 Elections, Public Opinion & Parties.

We illustrate the power of "logical models" (Taagepera, 2007) by offering a three-parameter model of the relationship between the effective number of parties and electoral turnout that makes use of the constraints on what parameter values are internally coherent given boundary conditions to specify functional form, and seeks not optimal curve fitting but rather a direct model testing. In our model, one parameter reflects an effect that generally acts to increase turnout as the effective number of parties increases, another an effect that generally acts to decrease turnout as the effective number of parties increases, while a third parameter allows for baseline variation in turnout across countries (or within countries across elections). We fit this model to district-level data from 237 elections held in 17 countries, representing a wide range of electoral system types generating multi-party contests, with over 20,000 district-election observations. The basic intuition, that turnout rises to a peak as the effective number of parties increases and then falls slowly, fits our data pretty well. © 2013 © 2013 Elections, Public Opinion & Parties.

We provide a schematic history of contemporary Estonian political parties, 1987-99, in which we specify dates of party origin and subsequent fissions and fusions of some fifty movements and parties, and we briefly discuss some important factors and features in party formation. Our analysis begins with the seminal 1987-94 period that marked the rebirth of Estonian democracy, with an extension to two subsequent parliamentary elections (1995 and 1999). We argue that the early phase of Estonian party competition generally exemplifies what we call "kaleidoscopic parties": parties that form around leaders rather than durable issues and lack any organizational permanency or any real voter attachment. However, the rate of formation of new groups has decreased, and the major parties may be becoming more stable than in the past. While there is some evidence of a left-right patterning now emerging in the political debate in Estonia, the parties have not aligned themselves along such a left-right continuum.

We provide a schematic history of contemporary Estonian political parties, 1987-99, in which we specify dates of party origin and subsequent fissions and fusions of some fifty movements and parties, and we briefly discuss some important factors and features in party formation. Our analysis begins with the seminal 1987-94 period that marked the rebirth of Estonian democracy, with an extension to two subsequent parliamentary elections (1995 and 1999). We argue that the early phase of Estonian party competition generally exemplifies what we call "kaleidoscopic parties": parties that form around leaders rather than durable issues and lack any organizational permanency or any real voter attachment. However, the rate of formation of new groups has decreased, and the major parties may be becoming more stable than in the past. While there is some evidence of a left-right patterning now emerging in the political debate in Estonia, the parties have not aligned themselves along such a left-right continuum.