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This article seeks to provide a set of pointers for methodological reflections on Foucauldian-inspired analyses of the exercise of power. Michel Foucault deliberately eschewed methodological schemata, which may be why so little has been written on the methodological implications of his analyses. While this article shares the premise that we should refrain from a standardized methodology, it argues that providing broad pointers for analyses informed by the critical ambition and conceptual framework offered by Foucault is both desirable and possible. The article then offers some reflections and general guidelines on how to strengthen the methodological quality of Foucauldian analyses. We argue that the quality of Foucauldian-inspired analysis of modern power may gain from methodological reflections around four pointers: curiosity, nominalism, conceptual grounding and exemplarity.

Résumé Depuis quelques décennies, l'imputabilité supporte de plus en plus d'objectifs politiques, juridiques et administratifs variables. Dans le présent article, nous nous intéressons à l'aspect administratif de l'imputabilité et étudions les risques potentiels d'un passage de la mesure de la performance à l'apprentissage. Si cette évolution est foncièrement positive dans ses intentions, nous soutenons qu'elle peut constituer une nouvelle source de surcharge gouvernementale. Nous proposons quatre explications à cette possibilité. Premièrement, les approches basées sur l'apprentissage ont plus de chances de compléter que de remplacer la mesure de la performance. Deuxièmement, davantage de données, et non moins, vont s'avérer nécessaires pour respecter les obligations en matière d'imputabilité, en raison du premier point. Troisièmement, les coûts de mise en conformité risquent d'augmenter car l'apprentissage exige davantage de participation et de dialogue. Quatrièmement, l'imputabilité en tant qu'apprentissage risque de produire une mentalité basée sur « le changement pour le changement », ce qui augmenterait encore la surcharge du gouvernement. Nous conclurons par quelques commentaires sur les moyens de limiter les conséquences indésirables de cette évolution. Remarques à l'intention des praticiens Les administrateurs publics doivent identifier et évaluer les avantages et les coûts (humains, politiques et économiques) des régimes d'imputabilité. Si les régimes de mesure de la performance axés sur les résultats augmentent la transparence et améliorent le rapport qualité-prix dans de nombreux cas, ils ont aussi des effets secondaires indésirables. Les régimes d'imputabilité sensibles à l'apprentissage s'avèrent propices à l'amélioration de la qualité, mais ils peuvent aussi devenir de nouvelles sources de surcharge pour le gouvernement. Dans le présent article, nous examinons les problèmes potentiels de cette évolution et analysons la façon dont les gestionnaires et les praticiens peuvent limiter ces risques potentiels. Les gestionnaires publics doivent s'interroger sur le niveau d'imputabilité qui s'impose effectivement. Plus précisément, ils ont tout intérêt à délimiter la portée des régimes d'imputabilité employés, à effectuer une évaluation coûts-avantages de ceux-ci et à consulter ceux qui sont soumis à ces régimes s'ils souhaitent mettre en place un modèle adapté.

Recent concern with sustainable urban development has focused on the widespread development of new towns and the expansion of cities throughout China. In recent decades, an increasing number of planning and design professionals in the United States and Europe have undertaken consulting work in China. This study examines the first instance of a Chinese city funding an American academic planning unit to create a conceptual plan for a new town. The School of Planning from the University of Cincinnati was commissioned to prepare the conceptual plan for the Anyang Eastern New Town. Prior to the drafting of the plan, faculty and students visited the site on a reconnaissance and data gathering mission, undertook research and studio work, organized presentations, and navigated the labyrinthine bureaucracy at the local, provincial, and national levels. These experiences differ considerably from those encountered in places such as Shanghai and the southern coastal plain region. This article identifies a number of issues that play a key role in the success of projects involving American or European Universities in conjunction with the Chinese government, particularly provincial authorities. This paper provides a valuable reference for any organization involved in such undertakings.

Over the last few decades accountability has accommodated an increasing number of different political, legal and administrative goals. This article focuses on the administrative aspect of accountability and explores the potential perils of a shift from performance measurement to learning. While this is inherently positive in its intentions, we argue that it might constitute a new source of government overload. We propose four explanations for why this may be so. First, a learning approach is more likely to supplement than replace performance management. Second, more rather than less data will be needed to comply with accountability requirements, because of the first point. Third, the costs of compliance are likely to increase because learning requires more participation and dialogue. Fourth, accountability as learning may generate a 'change for the sake of change' mentality, creating further government overload. We conclude with some comments on limiting the undesirable consequences of such a move.Points for practitionersPublic administrators need to identify and weigh the (human, political and economic) benefits and costs of accountability regimes. While output-focused performance measurement regimes increase transparency and improve value for money in many cases, there are also undesirable side-effects. Accountability regimes attuned to learning appear conducive to quality improvement, but may also become new sources of government overload. This article examines the potential problems of such a move, and considers how these possible perils might be limited by managers and practitioners. Public managers must ask themselves just how much accountability is actually necessary. More specifically, they may want to delimit the scope of the accountability regimes employed, undertake a cost–benefit evaluation of these, and consult those subjected to such regimes, in order to ensure a suitable design.

This paper examines the economic and social thought that has evolved around the Lisbon strategy, which aimed to turn the European Union into the world's most competitive knowledge economy by 2010. It argues that a new regime of rationality has emerged in which economic and social objectives, which were previously thought to be at odds with one another, have become increasingly aligned. The supposed antinomy between economic efficiency and social security has been gradually replaced by a Rawlsian-inspired understanding of social justice in which the individual right to self-development and employment is seen to go hand-in-hand with economic innovation and competitiveness. This alignment, which is expressed through the worshipping of the Nordic welfare model in general and the notion of flexicurity in particular, seems to have a strong depoliticizing effect.

The paper draws on the economic theory of alliances to stress the importance of considering both benefits and costs arising from the 0interaction between member states of a military alliance in terms of defence expenditure on equipment. We expand the theory of alliances to incorporate the spills that stem from the obligations of each ally by introducing the notion of spill-outs and net spills, the latter measured as the difference between spill-in and spill-out effects. To assess the net spills contribution of each of the members to the alliance, we test for empirical evidence of net spills among a group of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, applying time-varying Dynamic Quantile Connectedness analysis. The results that stem from our model considering the cost of spill-outs suggest that there are strong incentives among the allies for free-riding behaviour. In line with our theoretical model, our empirical analysis shows that it is only during crisis period that NATO member-states contribute actively to the alliance, something that has become increasingly clear since the recent Russian invasion of Ukraine.

In the European Union (EU), employment policy is a prerogative of the member states. Therefore the EU's ability to govern in this area depends on its capability to involve national governments and relevant stakeholders in a collaborative effort to formulate and implement shared policy objectives. Drawing an analytical distinction between cooperation, coordination and collaboration, the article analyses the formulation and implementation of EU employment policies. It concludes that while the formulation of policy objectives and the discussion of national policy approaches do involve elements of collaboration, the implementation phase mainly consists in the less demanding forms of cooperation and coordination.