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This article seeks to provide a set of pointers for methodological reflections on Foucauldian-inspired analyses of the exercise of power. Michel Foucault deliberately eschewed methodological schemata, which may be why so little has been written on the methodological implications of his analyses. While this article shares the premise that we should refrain from a standardized methodology, it argues that providing broad pointers for analyses informed by the critical ambition and conceptual framework offered by Foucault is both desirable and possible. The article then offers some reflections and general guidelines on how to strengthen the methodological quality of Foucauldian analyses. We argue that the quality of Foucauldian-inspired analysis of modern power may gain from methodological reflections around four pointers: curiosity, nominalism, conceptual grounding and exemplarity.

Résumé Depuis quelques décennies, l'imputabilité supporte de plus en plus d'objectifs politiques, juridiques et administratifs variables. Dans le présent article, nous nous intéressons à l'aspect administratif de l'imputabilité et étudions les risques potentiels d'un passage de la mesure de la performance à l'apprentissage. Si cette évolution est foncièrement positive dans ses intentions, nous soutenons qu'elle peut constituer une nouvelle source de surcharge gouvernementale. Nous proposons quatre explications à cette possibilité. Premièrement, les approches basées sur l'apprentissage ont plus de chances de compléter que de remplacer la mesure de la performance. Deuxièmement, davantage de données, et non moins, vont s'avérer nécessaires pour respecter les obligations en matière d'imputabilité, en raison du premier point. Troisièmement, les coûts de mise en conformité risquent d'augmenter car l'apprentissage exige davantage de participation et de dialogue. Quatrièmement, l'imputabilité en tant qu'apprentissage risque de produire une mentalité basée sur « le changement pour le changement », ce qui augmenterait encore la surcharge du gouvernement. Nous conclurons par quelques commentaires sur les moyens de limiter les conséquences indésirables de cette évolution. Remarques à l'intention des praticiens Les administrateurs publics doivent identifier et évaluer les avantages et les coûts (humains, politiques et économiques) des régimes d'imputabilité. Si les régimes de mesure de la performance axés sur les résultats augmentent la transparence et améliorent le rapport qualité-prix dans de nombreux cas, ils ont aussi des effets secondaires indésirables. Les régimes d'imputabilité sensibles à l'apprentissage s'avèrent propices à l'amélioration de la qualité, mais ils peuvent aussi devenir de nouvelles sources de surcharge pour le gouvernement. Dans le présent article, nous examinons les problèmes potentiels de cette évolution et analysons la façon dont les gestionnaires et les praticiens peuvent limiter ces risques potentiels. Les gestionnaires publics doivent s'interroger sur le niveau d'imputabilité qui s'impose effectivement. Plus précisément, ils ont tout intérêt à délimiter la portée des régimes d'imputabilité employés, à effectuer une évaluation coûts-avantages de ceux-ci et à consulter ceux qui sont soumis à ces régimes s'ils souhaitent mettre en place un modèle adapté.

Over the last few decades accountability has accommodated an increasing number of different political, legal and administrative goals. This article focuses on the administrative aspect of accountability and explores the potential perils of a shift from performance measurement to learning. While this is inherently positive in its intentions, we argue that it might constitute a new source of government overload. We propose four explanations for why this may be so. First, a learning approach is more likely to supplement than replace performance management. Second, more rather than less data will be needed to comply with accountability requirements, because of the first point. Third, the costs of compliance are likely to increase because learning requires more participation and dialogue. Fourth, accountability as learning may generate a 'change for the sake of change' mentality, creating further government overload. We conclude with some comments on limiting the undesirable consequences of such a move. Points for practitioners Public administrators need to identify and weigh the (human, political and economic) benefits and costs of accountability regimes. While output-focused performance measurement regimes increase transparency and improve value for money in many cases, there are also undesirable side-effects. Accountability regimes attuned to learning appear conducive to quality improvement, but may also become new sources of government overload. This article examines the potential problems of such a move, and considers how these possible perils might be limited by managers and practitioners. Public managers must ask themselves just how much accountability is actually necessary. More specifically, they may want to delimit the scope of the accountability regimes employed, undertake a cost–benefit evaluation of these, and consult those subjected to such regimes, in order to ensure a suitable design.

This paper examines the economic and social thought that has evolved around the Lisbon strategy, which aimed to turn the European Union into the world's most competitive knowledge economy by 2010. It argues that a new regime of rationality has emerged in which economic and social objectives, which were previously thought to be at odds with one another, have become increasingly aligned. The supposed antinomy between economic efficiency and social security has been gradually replaced by a Rawlsian-inspired understanding of social justice in which the individual right to self-development and employment is seen to go hand-in-hand with economic innovation and competitiveness. This alignment, which is expressed through the worshipping of the Nordic welfare model in general and the notion of flexicurity in particular, seems to have a strong depoliticizing effect.

In the European Union (EU), employment policy is a prerogative of the member states. Therefore the EU's ability to govern in this area depends on its capability to involve national governments and relevant stakeholders in a collaborative effort to formulate and implement shared policy objectives. Drawing an analytical distinction between cooperation, coordination and collaboration, the article analyses the formulation and implementation of EU employment policies. It concludes that while the formulation of policy objectives and the discussion of national policy approaches do involve elements of collaboration, the implementation phase mainly consists in the less demanding forms of cooperation and coordination.

In the European Union (EU), employment policy is a prerogative of the member states. Therefore the EU's ability to govern in this area depends on its capability to involve national governments and relevant stakeholders in a collaborative effort to formulate and implement shared policy objectives. Drawing an analytical distinction between cooperation, coordination and collaboration, the article analyses the formulation and implementation of EU employment policies. It concludes that while the formulation of policy objectives and the discussion of national policy approaches do involve elements of collaboration, the implementation phase mainly consists in the less demanding forms of cooperation and coordination. ; In the European Union (EU), employment policy is a prerogative of the member states. Therefore the EU's ability to govern in this area depends on its capability to involve national governments and relevant stakeholders in a collaborative effort to formulate and implement shared policy objectives. Drawing an analytical distinction between cooperation, coordination and collaboration, the article analyses the formulation and implementation of EU employment policies. It concludes that while the formulation of policy objectives and the discussion of national policy approaches do involve elements of collaboration, the implementation phase mainly consists in the less demanding forms of cooperation and coordination.

Books reviewed:Alan Walker and Chack‐kie Wong (eds), East Asian welfare regimes in transition: From Confucianism to globalizationRobin Lovelock, Karen Lyons and Jackie Powell (eds), Reflecting on Social Work – Discipline and ProfessionStephan Leibfried and Michael Zürn, Transformations of the State?

Purpose: The increasing uptake of performance auditing (PA), which entails both the facilitation and the control of government policies, has seriously challenged state auditors' claims that they are apolitical. This article aims to understand how supreme audit institutions (SAIs) operate to maintain and nurture the political neutrality and legitimacy of their PA. Design/methodology/approach: The authors draw on Suchman's typology on legitimacy (1995) to analyze the PA reports of two countries with a long history of both performance auditing and accusations of political interference, namely Canada and Denmark. Documentary analysis and interview methods are employed. Findings: This study shows how the two SAIs have been pursuing pragmatic, moral and cognitive legitimacy through the professionalization and standardization of both the form and the content of their PA reports. Engaging and maintaining the dialogue with the audited administration, triangulating recognized social science methods, and emphasizing the "public interest" basis of PA reflect some of the tools adopted to navigate the "grey zone" between objective, relevant and politically sensitive audits. Research limitations/implications: The paper's explorative approach limits the possibility for robust testing of the causal forces impinging on SAIs' choices of legitimation strategies. Nevertheless, variations between the Canadian and Danish SAIs in the strategic use of some legitimacy tools such as the media suggest a difference in the role of Public Accounts Committee in the two countries that can be investigated in future research. Originality/value: Much research exists questioning the political neutrality of PA, yet there has not been much discussion on how SAIs have been able to develop and preserve the prevalent legitimacy of their PA amid the criticism. More specifically, our research reveals the tendency of both the Canadian and Danish SAIs to strategically underline the "public interest" dimension of their performance audits in an attempt to increase both their legitimacy and political neutrality.

AbstractTo address complex social problems, such as long-term unemployment, local authorities in many countries are developing "holistic" or "integrated" services, where multiple actors and professions collaborate with a view to better meet the needs of the individual citizen. By breaking with existing practices and regulations, collaborative services must be legitimized in new ways so as to appear acceptable not only in the eyes of the public and politicians, but also to caseworkers and the long-term unemployed persons. This article examines the multifarious and sometimes neglected efforts to make these collaborative services legitimate in the eyes of this plurality of stakeholders on multiple levels of governance. Our study indicates three distinct but mutually interrelated spheres of audience that require partly conflicting justification work. We also find that the narrow pursuit of justification work to ensure legitimacy with one audience may potentially jeopardize the justification work in the other two.