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This article reports a comprehensive overview of new data on the levels of individual membership of political parties in twenty contemporary European democracies. Among the patterns noted in the data is the contrast between large and small democracies, as well as that between new and older democracies. However, the most striking feature to be noted is the sheer extent and consistency of membership decline through to the end of the 1990s. Not only have levels of party membership continued to decline as a proportion of the electorate, a trend which was already apparent at the end of the 1980s, there is now also compelling evidence of a major decline in the absolute numbers of party members across all the long-established European democracies. As these data clearly reveal, parties in contemporary Europe are rapidly losing their capacity to engage citizens.

Recent waves of social protests have brought a renewed interest in the notion of political legitimacy. The increasing adoption of party regulation as a means to secure legitimacy, however, leads to several paradoxes. One such paradox is the fact that those who establish the rules about political parties are representatives of the political parties themselves. Despite this existing contention, the relationship between political legitimacy and party regulation has received little scholarly attention. Addressing this relationship, our special issue brings together articles that seek to answer questions about the potential and actual effects of legal rules. Drawing on rich empirical evidence, the underlying message of the contributions is that while rules are important, they do not give the whole story. After presenting the research included in the volume, we emphasise that regulation in itself does not necessarily promote political legitimacy. Therefore the adoption of additional rules, whether to constrain or liberate party behaviour, is not sufficient to legitimise those in power. Rather, we argue that the more important factor to consider is that of implementation.

Despite the growing amount of party regulation, we still have a limited understanding of the effect that party laws have on party systems and political competition. Notwithstanding predictions that incumbent parties adopt rules which favour their own position, found in both the cartel party thesis and the rational actor view of politics, we continue to witness the frequent appearance of new political parties, some of which successfully enter parliament. Using comparative electoral data and a newly built dataset on party regulation in post-war Europe, we trace the changes in the rules governing political parties and explore the effect of party regulation on the number of successful new entrants. Overall, we find that more regulation significantly decreases the number of successful new entries, while high electoral volatility and the legacy of post-communism increase the amount of successful new party entries in the legislature. Our analysis further shows that the existence of public funding and the payout threshold have no effect on the permeability of party systems. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

Despite the growing amount of party regulation, we still have a limited understanding of the effect that party laws have on party systems and political competition. Notwithstanding predictions that incumbent parties adopt rules which favour their own position, found in both the cartel party thesis and the rational actor view of politics, we continue to witness the frequent appearance of new political parties, some of which successfully enter parliament. Using comparative electoral data and a newly built dataset on party regulation in post-war Europe, we trace the changes in the rules governing political parties and explore the effect of party regulation on the number of successful new entrants. Overall, we find that more regulation significantly decreases the number of successful new entries, while high electoral volatility and the legacy of post-communism increase the amount of successful new party entries in the legislature. Our nalysis further shows that the existence of public funding and the payout threshold have no effect on the permeability of party systems.

An introduction to the European Journal of Political Research's Political Data Yearbook of 2004 examines the elections results of 34 countries, the changing composition of cabinets & the major issues of 2004. Tables, References.

Opens with an overview of political developments around the world for 2003, citing the Iraq war & EU enlargement as two high-profile issues. After a brief look at changes in cabinet compositions, the format of the 2003 Yearbook is described. Relevant data on national elections, cabinets, referenda, institutional changes, & key issues are offered in each contribution. 2 Tables. J. Zendejas

Intro -- Title -- Copyright -- Table of contents -- INTRODUCTION Regulating Political Parties: European Democracies in Comparative Perspective -- CHAPTER 1 Democracy and the Legal Regulation of Political Parties -- CHAPTER 2 Dilemmas of Regulating Political Finance, with Special Reference to the Dutch Case -- CHAPTER 3 Lessons from the Past: Party Regulation in the Netherlands -- CHAPTER 4 The Constitutionalization of Political Parties in Post-war Europe1 -- CHAPTER 5 Party Laws in Comparative Perspective -- CHAPTER 6 Explaining Legislative Conflict over the Adoption of Political Financing Law in the European Union -- CHAPTER 7 The SGP Case: Did it Really (Re)Launch the Debate on Party Regulation in the Netherlands? -- CHAPTER 8 Will it All End in Tears? What Really Happens when Democracies Use Law to Ban Political Parties -- CHAPTER 9 Ethnic Party Regulation in Eastern Europe -- CHAPTER 10 On the Engineerability of Political Parties: Evidence from Mexico -- About the authors -- Index.