Suchergebnisse

Du Principe fédératif de P.-J. Proudhon présente le point de vue classique que la liberté est sauvegardée par la dispersion fédérate du pouvoir. Bien qu'il soit naturel de l'étudier à la lumière des programmes contradictoires de ses critiques, notamment Marx et Lénine, ce n'est pas seulement dans un contexte socialiste que sa prétention a de l'intérét. La liaison entre fédéralisme et liberté a constamment été réfutée par les politologues occidentaux. Sans défendre ici le point de vue de Proudhon, l'auteur soutient que les critiques du fédéralisme n'ont pas abordé la notion de » liberté « que Proudhon avail à l'esprit: une liberté politique qui requiert d'être replacée dans le contexte des théories » républicaines classiques « du dix-huitième siècle et même d'avant cette période. La liberté, pour Proudhon, englobe la re-politisation d'un état dans lequel le pouvoir exécutif est devenu excessif; la liberté est sauvegardée par le fédéralisme, prétend-il, dans la mesure où l'application du fédéralisme permet aux communautés régionales de retrouver une vie politique interne. Bien que ces propositions d'institutions soient sous plusieurs aspects bien imparfaites, sa thèse propose des arguments à l'appui de l'idée que les divisions des loyautés dans un système fédéral pent être tout spécialement reliée à la liberté entendue dans son sens politique.

Georges Sorel was of course a critic of "citizenship" in the sense current then as now. But behind his ideal picture of industrial organization there lay a conception of citizenship which derived from an older tradition. This conception in turn modified the themes which Sorel drew from a second tradition, that of thought about "industry." The result was a vision of industrial organization which displaced civil association by taking some of its typical features for itself. What is represented by notions such as the "myth of the general strike" is not, as some have held, a romantic reaction against modern organization but, on the contrary, a thoroughly modern doctrine of organization as the "sublimation" of civil life which continues to pose problems of relevance today.

My object in this paper is to compare two texts in the history of ideas which are, on the face of it at least, very different from one another. John Henry Cardinal Newman'sDevelopment of Christian Doctrineremains one of the classic expositions of an evolutionary thesis; T. S. Kuhn'sStructure of Scientific Revolutionsalready ranks as a near-classic statement of a revolutionary case. The contrast is, I think, not quite as stark as may appear at first sight: though Kuhn writes of revolutions, his concern, no less than Newman's, is nevertheless with "development"; and though his subject matter is the history of science, his concern too is, or once was, with "dogma." What I most want to stress, however, is not this verbal correspondence, which may as it stands be intriguing rather than convincing, but a series of substantive parallels which flow from a mode of argument common to both these texts: the extensive use of political imagery in defining the structures of ideas in question and in explaining the character of their history.

Hayek soutient que le libéralisme de sa « Grande Société » correspond aux conceptions mises de l'avant par Popper dans The Open Society and Its Enemies. Par ailleurs, Popper prétend voir une affinité entre sa propre pensée et divers travaux qui se situent dans la même tradition que celle à laquelle appartient Hayek. Il appert cependant que les choses sont plus complexes qu'elles n'apparaissent à première vue car la « Grande Société » et la « Société ouverte » représentent des courants distincts et, sous certains aspects, contradictoires de la pensée libérate. De plus, la signification politique de chacun de ces concepts est ambigiie. L'auteur tente de démontrer comment la diversité de la tradition libérate a été masquée par un manque de discernement dans l'utilisation de certains mots et par l'emprunt erroné de certains thèmes scientifiques.

A critique of current liberal political philosophy, with particular focus on F. A. Hayek's Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol I: Rules and Order (London: 1973), & K. R. Popper's The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol I: The Spell of Plato (see SA 12:2/64A8668). Recent liberal political thinking has rested on the notions of the "Great" & "Open" Societies. Authors are not in full agreement about the meaning of these terms: Hayek's "Great Society" is not the same as G. Wallas's. Popper's "Open Society" differs from H. Bergson's. More significantly, the "Great Society" & the "Open Society" are confused by some theorists: closely considered, they are quite distinct from one another. Hayek's "Great Society" rests on a principle of dispersal (or divided labor), Popper's "Open Society" on a principle of plurality (or diverse opinion): since the former conception is derived from a sociological picture, & the latter from a methodological doctrine, the two are not logically equivalent. What Hayek & Popper do share is an attempt to encompass political phenomena within scientific categories: neither the "Great Society" (drawn from social science) nor the "Open Society" (drawn from scientific method) does justice to the complexity of political liberalism. AA.

Modern politics is often said to be fundamentally secular, and many who do not say so may find the proposition too obvious to need stating. In a sense, perhaps, it is obvious; but what does it mean? No doubt it is valuable to have a term to describe a society without religion, or one in which common affairs are not religiously directed. But it is odd to suppose that the sheer absence of a characteristic can serve effectively to define a type of society; for one thing, we would need to know what kind of religion was absent, or in what respects religion was lacking, before we could assess what significance this absence could be said to have; for another, to define a society by the absence of a certain feature would seem to point to an intense preoccupation with its presence or absence, yet it is precisely the lack of preoccupation with religion that is held to characterize secular man. A fortiori, it is odd to suppose that secularity not only serves to distinguish broadly among kinds of societies—those with and without religion—but that it also determines the principal features of social and political behavior, to such an extent that one can speak of a secular political culture as a distinct and well-marked type.

Intro -- Table of Contents -- Title page -- Copyright page -- Introduction -- Republics, flags and ways of life -- What to make of patriotism? Four initial questions -- 1: Community, Loyalty and Partiality -- Community, identity and patriotic attachment -- Loyalty -- Patriotism, partiality and morality -- Conclusion -- 2: Nationalism, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism -- Nations and nationalism -- Nationalism: for and against -- Cosmopolitanism -- Constitutional patriotism -- 3: The Republican Alternative -- Between civic humanism and liberalism -- Republican particularity -- Republican universalism? -- Beyond the republic -- Honorific republicanism -- 4: Justice for Our Compatriots -- Coercion as a source of special concern -- Benefit-based arguments -- Conclusion: A Subsidiarity Defence -- Making sense of 'association' -- Subsidiarity -- The patriotic society and its enemies -- References -- Index -- End User License Agreement

A letter concerning toleration / Locke -- From the Second treatise (in Two treatises of government, 2nd edn, 1698) / Locke -- From An essay concerning human understanding (4th edn, 1700) / Locke -- The argument of the Letter concerning toleration, briefly considered and answered / Proast -- From A second letter concerning toleration (1690) / Locke -- From A third letter concerning toleration in defence of the Argument of the letter concerning toleration, briefly considered and answered (1691) / Proast -- From A third letter for toleration (1692) / Locke -- From A second letter to the author of the three Letters for toleration (1704) / Proast -- From A fourth letter for toleration (1704) / Locke