This paper analyzes how political institutions affect the execution of exchange‐rate policy. By focusing on policy‐makers' responses to the emergence of speculative pressure on their currencies, we argue that the effect of democratic institutions on exchange‐rate stability is likely to be conditioned by the officially announced exchange‐rate regime. Officially fixed exchange rates are the main instrument of autocrats to signal commitment to long‐term stability. Autocratic governments with strictly fixed exchange rates are thus more likely to defend their exchange rates than autocrats with an intermediate regime because the latter implicitly signal that they care less about monetary stability. In contrast, democrats defend more often in intermediately than in fully fixed official regimes by using a combination of external and internal adjustments, which reduce the negative effects of a devaluation on voters. Our analysis of 189 currency crises between 1975 and 1999 supports this conditional effect.
This article assesses the popular view that currency crises represent a prime example of the constraints that globalization imposes on government room to maneuver. We show that governments in fact have the possibility to respond to speculative pressure in different ways. Whether or not policymakers succumb to this pressure is not solely determined by economic factors but also a question of political considerations. Political preferences, institutions, and events significantly affect policy responses to currency crises. Our results suggest that national governments retain substantial short-run policy autonomy even in highly internationalized policy areas such as monetary and exchange rate policy.
Using panel data for 68 countries over the period 1975-2002 this paper examines how IMF programs, disbursed loans, and compliance with conditionality affect the risk of currency crises and the outcome of such crises. Specifically, we investigate whether countries with previous IMF intervention are more likely to experience currency crises. In a second step, we analyze the IMF's impact on a country's decision to adjust the exchange rate, once a crisis occurred. We find that IMF involvement reduces the probability of a crisis. Once in a crisis, IMF programs significantly increase the probability that the authorities devalue the exchange rate. The amount of loans and compliance with conditionality have no impact. Our results suggest that the IMF - contrary to the Fund's critics - does indeed fulfill its functions of promoting exchange rate stability and helping its members to correct macroeconomic imbalances.