Suchergebnisse

Throughout the second half of the 20th century, Indonesia's trade policies favoured the modern manufacturing sector relative to agriculture. Within agriculture, they favoured import-competing sectors at the expense of export-competing sectors. Rice is the most important import-competing agricultural sector and, until 2000, assistance to rice growers came mainly from input subsidies. The extent of subsidies to rice and other import-competing agriculture varied with foreign exchange availability and the government's budgetary circumstances: 'good' times produced more interventionist policies and 'bad' times produced less government intervention. Since the mid-1980s, the aggregate bias in favour of manufacturing has declined greatly and agriculture is now only lightly taxed relative to manufacturing. This change resulted from the reduction in manufacturing protection that has characterised this period and from the increased protection of rice and sugar occurring after 2000. We attempt to explain the political forces underlying these changes in trade policy.

Trade and investment reforms in Laos since the mid-1980s have boosted natural resource-based exports, underpinning recent economic growth. A high proportion of the proceeds from these exports accrue directly to the government. Over the 8 years preceding 2

Trade and investment reforms in the Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) since the mid-1980s have boosted natural resource-based exports, underpinning recent economic growth. A high proportion of the proceeds from these exports accrue directly to the government. Over the 8 years preceding 2011, total government revenue increased from 11% to over 19% of gross domestic product, due almost entirely to revenues derived from mining and hydropower. The effect on the Lao people depends on how the government uses these revenues. This paper examines how the Lao PDR's export-led growth can be channeled into directions that deliver the greatest benefit to the Lao people.

Trade and investment reforms in the Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) since the mid-1980s have boosted natural resource-based exports, underpinning recent economic growth. A high proportion of the proceeds from these exports accrue directly to the government. Over the 8 years preceding 2011, total government revenue increased from 11% to over 19% of gross domestic product, due almost entirely to revenues derived from mining and hydropower. The effect on the Lao people depends on how the government uses these revenues. This paper examines how the Lao PDR's export-led growth can be channeled into directions that deliver the greatest benefit to the Lao people.

The relationship between the effects of food aid and those of the completion of the Uruguay Round of the GATT are studied in this paper, focussing upon the food aid recipient countries, taking Bangladesh as an illustrative example. The magnitudes of these effects depend crucially on the policy environment within the food aid recipient country itself, particularly the government's policy with respect to commercial food imports, as well as the way food aid donors respond to the Round. When the quantity of Bangladesh's commercial food imports is controlled by the government, the benefits derived from food aid are smaller, and the negative effects of the Uruguay Round will be larger, than when these imports are liberalised.

In Indonesia, the negative health impact of COVID‐19 and the initial, direct loss of employment have been largest in urban, not rural areas. But the second‐round effects on labor markets have been very different. They have included a huge, empirically documented migration of newly unemployed urban workers from urban to rural areas, in urgent search of employment, food, and safety from the pandemic. We call this "de‐urbanization." It placed the migrating workers in economic competition with the least skilled agricultural workers, expanding their numbers by almost 8%. By increasing the supply of unskilled farm labor, de‐urbanization depressed farm workers' real wages. Because the demand for farm labor is inelastic, the total wage income of these workers, aggregated across all unskilled farm laborers, declined. The households relying on this source of income are by far Indonesia's poorest. Similar outcomes may occur in other pandemic‐affected developing countries with large agricultural sectors.

This paper deepens the economic analysis of the effects of land consolidation – reduction of land fragmentation. It does this in the context of rural Vietnam, studying whether land consolidation promotes or hinders the Vietnamese government's policy objectives of encouraging agricultural mechanization and stimulating the off-farm rural economy. The analysis views land consolidation as a form of technical change, making it possible to apply the rich insights developed in the economic literature on that subject. This treatment reveals that the economic impacts of land consolidation depend partly on its factor bias and partly on the degree to which labor is substitutable in production for other factors. At a theoretical level, if a technical change is factor neutral, it will reduce off-farm labor supply and slow rural structural transformation away from agriculture; if it is labor-augmenting and the elasticity of substitution between factors is low enough, the opposite effects are predicted. The paper studies these issues empirically for rice production in Vietnam, focusing on the impact that consolidation of rice land has on rice production, machinery use, and labor allocation. The findings confirm that land consolidation raises both farm productivity and farm income and stimulates increased machinery use. It also reduces farm labor supply, lowers labor intensity in farming, and thereby releases more farm labor to off-farm development, consistent with government policy objectives. Based on these findings, the paper concludes that land consolidation should be encouraged through development of land ownership rights and the promotion of land rental markets.

Thailand's export-oriented automotive industry is a recognized economic success story. How did it happen and what lessons might other countries draw? This paper argues that the success of the industry was based on three factors. First was the substantial public investment in port facilities and related infrastructure, beginning in the 1990s, that constituted the Eastern Seaboard economic corridor. Second was the exchange rate depreciation that followed the 1997-1999 Asian Financial Crisis, making manufacturing production for export more profitable. The third factor was two key policy changes adopted by the Thai government shortly after the crisis, and partly in response to it: (a) abolition of restrictions on foreign ownership and (b) abolition of local content requirements. Neighboring countries, including Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, also experienced the crisis and were potential competitors in attracting foreign investment in automotive production for export. But they did not adopt these two key reforms.