EINZELBESPRECHUNGEN - 3. Politische Ökonomie - Democratic Choice and Taxation
In: Politische Vierteljahresschrift: PVS : German political science quarterly, Band 41, Heft 3, S. 611
ISSN: 0032-3470
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In: Politische Vierteljahresschrift: PVS : German political science quarterly, Band 41, Heft 3, S. 611
ISSN: 0032-3470
In: Canadian public policy: Analyse de politiques, Band 9, Heft 3, S. 414
ISSN: 1911-9917
In: International Tax and Public Finance, Band 5, Heft 2
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In: Carleton library series 260
"Regulatory Failure and Renewal develops a framework to understand the choice of regulatory instrument used in Canada for natural monopolies such as telephone companies, water utilities, streetcars, hydroelectricity, and railways from the 1880s to the 1930s. Using the transaction-cost literature pioneered by Oliver Williamson, John Baldwin examines the nature of contractual failure in Canada in natural monopoly cases, asking why initial forms of contracts between the state and private enterprise failed and why this failure so often resulted in the use of public enterprise. Baldwin outlines early attempts to deal with natural monopolies--from the use of a franchise contract to regulatory tribunals and finally to public enterprise--and compares Canadian experiences to US approaches, which turned more frequently to regulatory tribunals. This difference is due to Canada's more limited constraints on the state's ability to exercise coercive power, which sometimes leads to contractual failure that results in replacing franchise and regulatory frameworks with public enterprise. Regulatory Failure and Renewal demonstrates that public enterprise arose not so much as part of a purposive choice but because of reoccurring failures in the contractual process between the Canadian state and private enterprise."--
In: Cliometrica: journal of historical economics and econometric history, Band 16, Heft 3, S. 547-574
ISSN: 1863-2513
AbstractThe Redistribution Hypothesis predicts that franchise extension causes an increase in state-sponsored redistribution. We test this hypothesis by considering the relationship between franchise extension and selected aspects of fiscal structure at both central and local government levels in the UK from 1820 to 1913. We do so without imposing a priori restrictions on the direction of causality using a novel method for causal investigation of non-experimental data proposed by Hoover (2001). This method is based on tests for structural breaks in the conditional and marginal distributions of the franchise and fiscal structure time series preceded by a detailed historical narrative analysis. We do not find compelling evidence supporting the Redistribution Hypothesis.
In: CESifo Working Paper No. 8387
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Working paper
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5752
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Working paper
In: Public choice, Band 161, Heft 3-4, S. 471-497
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Public choice, Band 161, Heft 3, S. 471-497
ISSN: 0048-5829
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Working paper
In: Constitutional political economy, Band 23, Heft 3, S. 213-243
ISSN: 1572-9966
This paper is concerned with the effectiveness of Westminster parliamentary institutions in ensuring the stability of a nation's public finances. Our starting point and major hypothesis is that the governance structure embodied in Canada's parliamentary system has contributed importantly to the maintenance of fiscal stability. The fact that the Government of Canada, like the central government of many other modern democracies, has survived for over a century without default on its public debt means that in some meaningful sense, long run responsibility with respect to the nation's finances has in fact been achieved, and we show that this is in fact the case. Hence a more meaningful test of our main hypothesis requires the designation of specific sub-periods when the ideological background for political policy making changed and/or when the institutions and organizations for operationalizing policy varied in ways that either improved or discouraged responsible fiscal performance. We consider ideational and institutional factors that are predicted to either enhance or detract from accountability and fiscal stability, including central banking, the adoption of Keynesianism, inflation targeting and periods of minority government, and test for their effects on long run stability of the debt to GDP ratio using data for almost the entire history of the modern state from 1867 to 2008.
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Working paper
In: APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper
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Working paper
In: Public choice, Band 137, Heft 1, S. 369-402
ISSN: 0048-5829