Suchergebnisse

AbstractNegotiating with terrorists is possible, within limits, as the articles in this issue show and explore. Limits come initially in the distinction between absolute and contingent terrorists, and then between revolutionary and conditional absolutes and between barricaders, kidnappers and hijackers in the contingent category. Revolutionary absolute are nonnegotiable adversaries, but even conditional absolutes are potentially negotiable and contingent terrorists actually seek negotiation. The official negotiator is faced with the task of giving a little in order to get the terrorist to give a lot, a particularly difficult imbalance to obtain given the highly committed and desperate nature of terrorists as they follow rational but highly unconventional tactics. Such are the challenges of negotiating with terrorists that this issue of the journal explores and elucidates.

Examining information requirements according to the negotiation categories of structure, strategy, procedure, outcome, & behavior, this article calls for data on action types, results, & sources; determinants of target susceptibilities to action types; blockage & its costs; issues under consideration, changing proposals, & parties' changing positions on issues; parties' perceived payoffs & evaluations of win, loss, & deadlock; on parties' evaluation of their security points, & efforts to alter security points; on potential tradeoffs; & on available & evolving conceptions of justice. 56 References. Adapted from the source document.

This is an analysis of various strategies for the resolution of international disputes. There is a focus on the ripe moment for parties to begin to come to terms, a moment that must be understood by the principles as a mere opportunity for a possible resolution, rather than the specific prospect of a resolution itself. The article argues that the subjective & objective elements of a dispute must be identified through research & study before a ripe moment can be discovered. Another requirement is a state of stalemate, for it is through impasse that the realities of pain & the cost of further escalation become evident. A number of other prerequisites for the ripe moment are discussed, including the necessity of valid spokesmen, true vs false negotiation, & a sufficiently aggrieved conflict. 83 References. R. Young