Who's afraid of Syrian nationalism? National and state identity in Syria
In: Middle Eastern studies, Band 42, Heft 2, S. 179-198
ISSN: 1743-7881
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In: Middle Eastern studies, Band 42, Heft 2, S. 179-198
ISSN: 1743-7881
In: Israel affairs, Band 12, Heft 1, S. 86-106
ISSN: 1743-9086
In: MERIA: Middle East Review of International Affairs, Band 10, Heft 2, S. [np]
In: Israel affairs, Band 12, Heft 4, S. 684-697
ISSN: 1743-9086
In: Middle East quarterly, Band 13, Heft 4, S. 61-66
ISSN: 1073-9467
As fighting flared up in Lebanon in July 2006, the White House singled out Syrian president Bashar al-Assad's regime for blame. "The root cause of that current instability is terrorism and terrorist attacks on a democratic country. And part of those terrorist attacks are inspired by nation states, like Syria and Iran," President George W. Bush said on July 18. What a difference six years makes. When Bashar alAssad rose to power in June 2000, many observers greeted his accession with skepticism if not derision. Journalists and analysts portrayed Bashar as a likable young man but lacking the leadership qualities needed to survive in Damascus's Byzantine power structure. Most believed he did not have his father's charisma, maturity, life experience, and self-control. Former German chancellor Gerhard Schroder called his talks with Bashar "ghastly," and retired U.S. assistant secretary of state Edward S. Walker, Jr., described Bashar's rhetoric as "garbage." Some also said he lacked the killer instinct needed to oversee the coercive and even violent nature of Syrian politics. But Bashar has survived his first six years and become increasingly bold. Even as Syria faces domestic crisis and appears to be on a collision course with the United States, France, and many Arab states, Bashar has retrenched rather than adjusted his chosen course. He is neither committing political suicide nor acting illogically. Rather, he assesses threats to his regime to be less severe and his position to be more secure than many outside Syria believe. He calculates that persistent resistance to U.S. pressure wins the domestic and wider Arab support needed to ensure regime survival and gambles that, even if White House threats have substance, he can outlast the Bush administration and emerge victorious from his diplomatic clash. Rather than mitigate his international defiance, he will maintain it.
In: Orient: deutsche Zeitschrift für Politik, Wirtschaft und Kultur des Orients = German journal for politics, economics and culture of the Middle East, Band 47, Heft 4, S. 460-483
ISSN: 0030-5227
World Affairs Online
In: Middle East review of international affairs. Journal, Band 10, Heft 2, S. 84-102
ISSN: 1565-8996
World Affairs Online
In: Israel affairs, Band 12, Heft 1, S. 86-106
ISSN: 1353-7121
World Affairs Online
In: Middle East quarterly, Band 13, Heft 4, S. 61-66
ISSN: 1073-9467
In: The Washington quarterly, Band 28, Heft 3, S. 115-131
ISSN: 1530-9177
In: Internationale Politik: das Magazin für globales Denken, Band 60, Heft 12, S. 98-101
ISSN: 1430-175X
World Affairs Online
In: MERIA: Middle East Review of International Affairs, Band 9, Heft 3, S. [np]
In: The Washington quarterly, Band 28, Heft 3, S. 115-131
ISSN: 0163-660X, 0147-1465
World Affairs Online
In: Middle East review of international affairs. Journal, Band 9, Heft 3, S. 12-26
ISSN: 1565-8996
World Affairs Online
In: Internationale Politik: das Magazin für globales Denken, Band 60, Heft 12, S. 98-101
ISSN: 1430-175X