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AbstractIn electoral systems with districts that vary in magnitude, the number of seats to be filled in each district will be even or odd. We argue that such a variation has crucial political consequences, called the 'odd–even effect'. In low‐magnitude districts, elections are more competitive when the district magnitude is odd than even; the incentives for coordination are thus stronger in the former scenario than in the latter. Employing quasi‐experimental data from 780 districts in Spain's lower house elections, we show that the number of parties is smaller in low‐magnitude districts with an odd number of seats than in low‐magnitude districts with an even number of seats. The elite‐ and voter‐level mechanisms driving the odd–even effect are examined using data on mobilisation efforts and wasted votes at the district level.

En este artículo se examina el sistema de financiación de las comunidades autónomas en España desde la economía y la ciencia política. Tras definir los principios básicos del federalismo fiscal y su relación con las preferencias políticas de los ciudadanos, discutimos los problemas del modelo vigente y sus posibles reformas en tres escenarios de federalismo débil, moderado y potente. El sistema de financiación autonómico en España se compara con el de cuatro países federales: Alemania, Canadá, EE. UU. y Suiza. Se adopta una perspectiva propositiva dirigida a la formulación de recomendaciones políticas.

While electoral reforms clearly affect how seats are (re)distributed among parties immediately after their adoption, they do not significantly change the (re)distribution of votes among parties. As political knowledge is positively related to turnout, we argue that the effect of majoritarian electoral reforms on the number of parties is contingent upon the turnout in the last election prior to the reform. Specifically, the lower the turnout level in the previous election, the more effective the majoritarian reform will be. However, the psychological effect of proportional reforms relies on the interplay between elites and voters and is highly uncertain. The argument is tested using aggregated data from 43 major electoral reforms worldwide from 1945 to 2020 and individual data from the first election held in New Zealand after the 1993 electoral reform.

This paper explores an alternative mechanism for understanding the drivers of the nomination of women for elective office in single-member electoral systems. Previous research has generally examined two sources of gender-based politics: party ideology, with leftist parties being more female-friendly than rightist parties, and the strategic nomination of candidates depending on whether the party is expected to win or lose in the district, with women more likely to be used as 'sacrificial lambs' in hopeless contests. We argue that the nomination of male and female candidates across districts reflects an interdependence of party strategies – in particular, the actions of the main opposition party. We hypothesise that when the trailing party is not committed to gender equality, its equilibrium strategy in a given district is the nomination of a candidate of the same gender as that of the front-running party. Secondary data from 1,017 single-member Australian districts and more than 2,000 candidates from 2001–2019 confirm our hypothesis.

Using data from the Electoral Integrity Project, we measure the level of gerrymandering according to country expert surveys in Lower House elections in 54 democracies from the second half of 2012 until the first half of 2015. We show that majoritarian systems are more prone to gerrymandering than mixed-member and above all in Proportional Representation (PR) systems. When majoritarian systems are employed in large countries, gerrymandering is exacerbated. Per capita GDP and the age of electoral systems do not significantly affect gerrymandering.

The conditions under which losers are willing to challenge the results of elections remain an open question. Using data from the Electoral Integrity Project for 66 democratic and non-democratic countries in 2012 and 2013, we measure how parties or candidates react once votes have been cast and one of them is declared the winner. Do they accept or challenge the results? This measure allows us to examine the causal mechanisms that account for the self-enforcing nature of democracies. Our findings show that losers' consent increases with free and fair elections and in more economically developed countries, while income inequality is not relevant. Additionally, the impact of free and fair elections is particularly important in more economically developed countries.

This paper argues that wasted votes in founding elections decrease when countries have a previous democratic experience before the current democratic period. This historical-institutionalist argument is tested with national election results in 22 founding elections in third-wave European, Asian, Latin American and African democracies. The results demonstrate that having a democratic past clearly increases coordination and then reduces the percentage of wasted votes in the founding election, controlling for the electoral system. [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.]

Objectives. This study examines the impact of competitiveness, winning, and ideological congruence on evaluations of democratic principles, institutions, and performance. We posit that winning matters most. Individuals will hold favorable views toward democracy when it produces the outcomes they desire, independent of other contextual factors associated with elections.Methods. We use cross‐sectional multiple regression models to analyze survey data from Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States.Results. We find that the psychological effect of being an election winner at the national level greatly boosts evaluations of democracy, as measured with a host of different indicators, while competitiveness and congruence do not systematically affect these evaluations.Conclusions. This study sheds light on what factors boost regime support among the populace by sorting out the relative impact of being in a competitive district, winning (at the local and national level), and having a representative with a similar ideological outlook.