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Abstract. In this article we try to disentangle the constraints between traditional lines of political polarization (left‐right placement) and newer distinctions (materialist/postmaterialist values) among mass publics. It is shown that voting or party preference is most clearly related to the left‐right placement of the respondents. However, this placement is directly and strongly dependent on the materialist/postmaterialist orientation, while background variables like education, income and age are linked to voting via this value orientation. The materialist/postmaterialist orientation appears to be the present‐day interpretation of the dominant political conflict in advanced industrial society. Although alignments and orientations count for a substantive part of the variance in voting, the power of these models to predict the actual vote of people turns out to be rather poor.

The understanding of what democracy means has never been the same for all people and nations. However, contemporary developments suggest a fundamental shift. Preferences for a- and anti-democratic political parties and authoritarian(-like) relationships between politics and civil society are gaining support. Remarkably, these developments originate and thrive in the midst of exactly those democratic structures rejected. We therefore ask if there is a new understanding of democracy, and we empirically identify a discernible category of people who support illiberal understandings of democracy. These citizens with disparaging views of democracy reject democratic processes and actors, and weakly support common norms of citizenship. Yet, they are active in politics. Because we find that it is actual participation which stimulates the understandings of democracy, our results suggest that instead of attempting to exclude citizens with illiberal understandings of democracy from political arenas, meeting them there can offer the opportunity to nurture more liberal democratic orientations.

Demands for the inclusion of children, the youngest citizens, in democratic decision making are increasing. Although there is an abundance of empirical research on the political orientations of adolescents, there is a paucity of research on younger children's orientations. Our panel study of more than 700 children in their first year of primary school shows that these young children already exhibit consistent, structured political orientations. We examine the distribution and development of political knowledge, issue orientations, and notions of good citizenship. We find achievement differences between subgroups at the beginning of the school year, and these differences do not disappear. Children from ethnic minorities and lower socioeconomic residence areas show relatively less developed political orientations, and they do not improve as much over the school year as other children. Furthermore, normative political orientations and cognitive orientations differ in their development. Adapted from the source document.

Large national databases are culled to analyze the orientations of the adherents of the main political parties in 12 Western European countries, 1973-1989. Although clear traces of ongoing deideologization as well as pluralization were expected, this proved to be inaccurate. Each of these processes seems to follow a different path of development in distinct countries & distinct party families. A general "decline-of-the-party" or an "end-of-ideology" is not found among adherents of the main parties in Western Europe. 3 Tables, 5 Figures, 1 Appendix, 21 References. Adapted from the source document.

Abstract. Values and ideologies seem to be changing rapidly in many countries of Western Europe. These developments imply a shift among the adherents of political parties. On the one hand, we expect to see a process of deideologization weakening the traditional ties between parties and their adherents. On the other hand, increasing pluralization is suggested by the ongoing process of individualization. In this study we analyze the orientations of the adherents of the main political parties in 12 Western European countries in the last two decades. We expect to find clear traces of ongoing deideologization as well as pluralization, but this expectation proves to be inaccurate. Neither deideologization nor pluralization can be accepted as a common feature of party adherents in advanced industrial societies. On the contrary. Each of these processes seems to follow a different path of development in distinct countries and in distinct party families. A general 'decline‐of‐the‐party' or an 'end‐of‐ideology' is not to be found among the adherents of the main parties in Western Europe in the last decades. The processes appear to be more complicated, with divergent developments in different countries.

An examination of the constraints between traditional lines of political polarization (Left-Right placement) & newer distinctions (materialist/postmaterialist values) among mass publics. Analysis of Dutch national survey data covering 1976-1981 shows that voting or party preference is most clearly related to the Left-Right placement of respondents (Ns not specified). However, this placement is directly & strongly dependent on materialist/postmaterialist orientation, while background variables (eg, education, income, & age) are linked to voting via this value orientation. The materialist/postmaterialist orientation appears to be the present-day interpretation of the dominant political conflict in advanced industrial society. Although alignments & orientations count for a substantive part of the variance in voting, the power of these models to predict the actual vote of people turns out to be rather poor. 1 Table, 3 Figures, 23 References. HA

Political participation has seen substantial changes in terms of both its structure and its scope. One of the most prominent venues of citizen engagement today is participation that relies on online means. Several approaches to online participation have attempted to understand its nature as a continuation of offline acts into the online realm, or as an independent form. In this article, we determine the place of online participation in the repertoire of political participation with greater precision. We ask whether, in particular, digitally networked participation (DNP) is an expansion of lifestyle politics, or whether there are empirical grounds to classify it as a new, independent mode of participation. We study a large variety of participatory activities using data from an online survey conducted among 2,114 politically active individuals in Belgium in 2017. We use an innovative measurement approach that combines closed‐ with open‐ended questions, which allows us to explore new forms of participation that have previously not been considered or measured. Our results show that DNP is a core part of today's activists' repertoire and a distinct mode of political participation that is clearly attractive to younger, critical citizens.