Suchergebnisse

India is on the verge of becoming a great power & the swing state in the international system. As a large, multiethnic, economically powerful, non-Western democracy, it will play a key role in the great struggles of the coming years. Washington has recognized the potential of a U.S.-Indian alliance, but translating that potential into reality will require engaging India on its own terms. Adapted from the source document.

Die Gleich- bzw. Ungleichverteilung von Macht und die Wahrscheinlichkeit von Kriegen sind das Thema. Die Frage, wie Machtverteilung und Kriege einander beeinflussen, ist schwer zu beantworten, da Diplomatie und/oder Krieg keine klare Alternative darstellen. Die Schwierigkeit besteht u.a. darin, daß Gewalt Mittel der Diplomatie sein kann und Machtungleichheit nie zwischen zwei Staaten allein zu betrachten ist, sondern im Kontext des Staatensystems insgesamt. "The relation between the distribution of power and the likelihood of war depends, then, on whether the terms of possible compromise agreements that might be accepted in lieu of war influence the balance of power between the antagonists and therefore influence the probability that the agreement will be enforced - and if they do, it depends on how many states' interests will be effected by the outcome. Thus there can be no general answer to the question of what relation one should expect between the distribution of power and the likelihood of war, and reasoning that may be appropriate for understanding conflicts among the great powers during certain historical periods may not be relevant to conflicts that have only local or regional significance or to other periods." Die Komplexität der Probleme belegt zugleich die Grenzen formaler Methoden im Zusammenhang internationaler Politik. "(1) the issues discussed here are more complicated than they are often made out to be and are therefore difficult to explore without the aid if formal models, but (2) in constructing such models one must be careful about the assumptions one makes." "Many models assume that prior to war, any agreements states might make are enforceable but that once war begins no further negotiation is possible - and then proceed to analyze the implications of there propositions in a world of two states. As the current civil war in Yugoslavia graphically illustrates, these assumptions are not as innocuous as they appear. And even scholars who are likely to notice the significance of assuming that agreements between states are enforceable (e.g., those who identify themselves as 'realists') tend to overlook the fact that the nonenforceability of agreementdoes not have the same significance in a world of more than two states that is has when there are only two." (AuD-Nar)

The balance of power is one of the most influential ideas in international relations, yet it has never been comprehensively examined in pre-modern or non-European contexts. This book redresses this imbalance. The authors present eight new case studies of balancing and balancing failure in pre-modern and non-European international systems

This paper explores the array of shifting state strategies adopted by states in post-Soviet central Eurasia with regard to their relations with the US, China, India, & Europe & assesses the applicability of balance of power theory in trying to understand what has been happening. Russia would prefer to have US power balanced, but its neighbors would feel more comfortable if Russia's power were cut down to size; however, these states feel that their major threat is not domination but marginalization & the inability to improve their economic well-being. Whether their attempts to better their situation & to counter great state power through alliances among themselves or with other states can be viewed as efforts to balance power or threat is questioned. A thorough analysis of the past decade suggests that this is not the case. J. Stanton

The concept of balance, its place in history, and its contemporary application; 9 articles.

Every possible relation between the distribution of power and the likelihood of war has been defended somewhere in the literature on international politics: war is least likely if power is distributed equally, war is least likely if power is distributed unequally, and the distribution of power has no effect on the likelihood of war. I try to settle this dispute by examining the effect of expectations about the outcome of war on the choice between war and negotiation. I argue that each of these mutually contradictory propositions can be derived from some plausible set of premises and thus that which one is correct depends on which set of premises best describes a situation. The most important factors affecting the relation between the distribution of power and the likelihood of war are (1) whether the terms of a compromise agreement that might be accepted in lieu of war affect the distribution of power between the antagonists and therefore the probability that the agreement will be enforced and (2) how many states' interests will be affected by the outcome.