Suchergebnisse

Reprinted in part from Political science review and Michigan law review. ; Mode of access: Internet.

This work refers to the constitutional accusation in political trial or "impeachment" to make effective the principle of constitutional responsibility of certain public servants, highlighting its origin and its characteristics in our legal system, to then address the issue related to the accusation such as the called "previous question", recognized by the constitutional organic legislator, as one more means of guaranteeing constitutional supremacy. ; Este trabajo se refiere a la acusación constitucional en juicio político o "impeachment" para hacer efectivo el principio de responsabilidad constitucional de determinados servidores públicos, destacando su origen y sus características en nuestro ordenamiento, para luego abordar el tema conexo a la acusación como es la denominada "cuestión previa", reconocida por el legislador orgánico constitucional, como un medio más de garantizar la supremacía constitucional.

For years, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Court of Justice) and national constitutional courts – particularly the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht; FCC) – have engaged in what developmental psychologists might term 'parallel play'. The courts have played alongside each other, but not with each other. They have shared an interest in the same object (ultimate legal supremacy), and each has seen that object as its own. Many EU law scholars have celebrated this unsettled state of affairs, labelling it 'constitutional pluralism'. But constitutional pluralism is unsustainable, and just as children grow out of parallel play, so too must Europe's courts. The FCC's reference to the Court of Justice in the Gauweiler case not only has profound implications for the survival of the Eurozone, but the case also seems to signal the end of an era: Europe's two most powerful courts must finally confront the incompatibility of their positions on the issue of Kompetenz-Kompetenz.

The practical effects of the principle of primacy of EU law are well established in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). However, the highest national courts have had difficulties in coming to terms with the principle. Does the primacy of EU law also entail the 'supremacy' of EU law, and what is the significance of this for national sovereignty? There seems to be no coherence in the academic discussion on how to use the terms primacy and supremacy and what they actually entail. This article presents a reconceptualization of the way in which the terms primacy and supremacy could be understood in EU law. It is argued that they are two distinct concepts: primacy refers to actual conflicts between a national norm and an EU norm in situations concerning individual rights, whereas supremacy refers to the structural relation between the EU's and the Member States' legal orders that manifests itself as institutional conflicts of competence. This article maps out the primacy–supremacy debate, assesses the proposed conceptualization in light of recent European and national case law, and positions the argument in relation to constitutional pluralism, the leading theory of European constitutionalism.

La Corte Constitucional creada por la Constitución Política de 1991, entró en actividad el 17 de febrero de 1992, desde entonces se han dado numerosos cambios en el estado y la sociedad, se materializó, una revolución jurídica muy importante en la tradición política colombiana. Ante lo anterior, es menester un balance del rol del Tribunal Constitucional colombiano como intérprete y guardián de la supremacía constitucional. Esta magna tarea, es por momentos, difícil o al menos controversial, en razón a que sus pronunciamientos definen nuevos conceptos dejando sin piso jurídico las existentes o se reafirman los actuales conceptos bajo nuevos postulados, ello ha provocado la renovación del orden jurídico, lo cual trae controversias con otros sectores del Estado e incluso con sectores de la opinión pública. ; Since February 17, 1992, when the Constitutional Court created in the Political Constitution of 1991 started activities, numerous changes have been occurring in the State and the society; a major legal revolution became visible in the midst of Colombian political tradition. Hence, a balance of the Constitutional court's role as interpreter and guardian of constitutional supremacy is considered necessary; this is the task the present article wishes to accomplish. This great duty is, at moments, difficult or at least controversial, given that its pronouncements define new concepts that may lead to legal loopholes in existent ones or bolster current concepts under new tenets, provoking a renovation in the legal order and leading to debates with other State institutions, even with public opinion

Does the supremacy provision of Article VI of the U.S. Constitution undermine the legal force of international law in the United States? Recently, there has been some debate on this issue arising out of the claim that if the U.S. Constitution is "the supreme law of the land," and that only constitutional officers of the United States, in keeping with their responsibilities to uphold the Constitution, can decide what is international law for the U.S. Such debates are not new to the history of the world. For much of world history, national rulers have claimed that their legal authority derives from some supreme source, be it: God, tradition, or, in more recent democratic times of which the Constitution is a part, the people.

Should the Supreme Court have the last word when it comes to interpreting the Constitution? The justices on the Supreme Court certainly seem to think so--and their critics say that this position threatens democracy. But Keith Whittington argues that the Court's justices have not simply seized power and circumvented politics. The justices have had power thrust upon them--by politicians, for the benefit of politicians. In this sweeping political history of judicial supremacy in America, Whittington shows that presidents and political leaders of all stripes have worked to put the Court on a pe.

In Argentina, the bodies responsible for ensuring constitutional supremacy are several (concurrent or complex). Both the judiciary, the Congress and the executive, and even other bodies that do not fit as such (e.g.: courts for the prosecution of judicial magistrates), they can and must to some extent fulfil a task of constitutional protection, by rules and acts. Final work in the area of the Judicial Organisation of the Specialisation in Judicial Activity and Administration of Courts and Colegiate Courts, Faculty of Legal and Social Sciences (UNLP). Faculty of Legal and Social Sciences ; En la República Argentina los órganos encargados de velar por la supremacía constitucional son varios (sistema concurrente o complejo). Tanto el Poder Judicial como el Congreso y el Poder Ejecutivo, e incluso otros órganos que no se insertan propiamente en ninguno de aquéllos (ej.: tribunales de enjuiciamiento de magistrados judiciales), pueden y deben cumplir en alguna medida una tarea de tutela constitucional, por sobre normas y actos. Trabajo final de la materia Organización Judicial de la Especialización en Actividad Jurisdiccional y Administración de Juzgados y Tribunales Colegiados, Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Sociales (UNLP). Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Sociales

Scholarly consensus sees EU supremacy as "necessarily bidimensional": the supranational dimension necessarily stands alongside the national dimension, which rejects the absolute and unconditional supremacy of EU law. I argue that this view of bidimensional supremacy is conceptually flawed and descriptively inaccurate. On the conceptual side, I identify the fallacy of symmetry (the idea that national and supranational perspectives on supremacy are similar in nature and equally reductionist), the fallacy of selection (the view that bidimensionalism alone can overcome what it perceives as an inevitable subjective bias in the choice between national and supranational supremacy claims), and the fallacy of construction (an originally shared popular sovereignty theory, which turns out to be riddled with biases that disrupt the equilibrium within the internally divided sovereign). On the interpretative side, I suggest that the empirical evidence in support of bidimensional supremacy is weaker than it is generally assumed. I then offer an interpretation of the PSPP judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court, which holds a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union to be ultra vires, unlawful and thus non-binding. PSPP presents a problem of German origins and cast, rather than one stemming from the inner structure of EU constitutionalism. At most, PSPP represents a contingent, rather than necessary, and thus unexceptional instance of bidimensional supremacy.

The scientific basis of the supremacy of the Constitution is an important issue of the practice and theory of constitutionality. This preoccupation is related to the role of the Constitution in the normative system, in the hierarchization of the norms, as well as to the place of the constitutional law in the legal system. The supremacy of Constitution has as main consequence the compliance of entire law with the constitutional norms. Guaranteeing of the observance of this principle is essential for the rule of law, is primarily an attribute of the Constitutional Court of Romania, but also an obligation of the legislator to receive by texts adopted, within its content and form, the constitutional norms.

Reseña de: Keith E. WHITTINGTON, Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy. The Presidency, the Supreme Court, and Constitutional Leadership in U.S. History, Prínceton University Press, Prínceton, Oxford, 2007, 303 pp.