To study the behavior of judges, one must first consider whether judges are just like any other political actor (e.g., legislators) or whether, because of their affiliation with the judiciary, law constrains their behavior to some extent. Research aimed at considering the extent to which judges are constrained by the law is sparse, and conclusions resulting from such research are mixed. In this article, the authors explore the extent to which law constrains judges by focusing on the decision to dissent rather than concur when Supreme Court justices write separately. The authors find that, although law matters, it does not constrain.
Abstract This article studies a simple procurement problem (Laffont and Tirole,1993) where the regulator faces a cash‐in‐advance constraint. The introduction of such a constraint not only reduces the amount of public good provided but also limits the instruments available to the regulator. The wealth constraint could change the optimal regulatory contract from a two‐part tariff, where the quantities produced depend on the firm's cost, to a less efficient fixed fee where the firm produces the same quantity whatever its cost.
At the moment, constraint programming technology is a powerful tool for solving combinatorial search and combinatorial optimization problems. To use this technology, any task must be formulated as a task of satisfying constraints. The role of the concept of global constraints in modeling and solving applied problems within the framework of the constraint programming paradigm can hardly be overestimated. The procedures that implement the algorithms of filtering global constraints are the elementary "building blocks" from which the model of a specific applied problem is built. Algorithms for filtering global constraints, as a rule, are supported by the corresponding developed theories that allow organizing high-performance computing. The choice of a particular software library is primarily determined by the extent to which the set and method of implementing global constraints corresponds tothe level of modern research in this area. The main focus of this article is focused on an overview of global constraints that are implemented within the most popular constraint programming libraries: Choco, GeCode, JaCoP, MiniZinc.
Abstract. The rational choice assumption is already disputable at the individual level of decisionmaking. At the level of collective decision‐making unitary rational action is an unrealistic assumption. It neglects the transitivity of collective preferences issue, the logic of collective action and freeriding, the agency problem, and the human tendency to agree with each other irrespective of the facts. While unitary rational action is rejected as a basis for theorizing on international relations and war, the idea of decision‐making under constraints seems as valid in the interstate context as in economics. The most important constraints on national security decision‐making are the anarchical character of the international system and the corresponding need for self‐help, the security and the territorial delimitation dilemmas, the presence or absence of plausible blueprints for victory, and the presence or absence of domestic constraints on bellicosity. A simple explanatory model of war built on these ideas is suggested and tested with dyadic data for the 1962–1980 period. In addition, there is some discussion of why collective security is doomed to fail, and why hegemony rather than balance improve the prospects of peace.
ABSTRACTThis paper demonstrates that Kornai's original concept of the soft budget constraint (SBC) as a theoretical innovation in micro‐theory disguises income redistributions that are essentially macroeconomic relationships. The SBC also postulates a competitive market economy as the benchmark of hard budget constraint (HBC) and efficiency. A recent formal theory explains the SBC as a component of profit‐maximizing strategic behaviour. From this perspective, the SBC can be integrated into the new microeconomics, but it loses its specific institutional connotation and its macroeconomic dimension. The SBC is thus included in ubiquitous market‐type relationships, particularly complete (optimal) contractual arrangements.
The rational choice assumption is already disputable at the individual level of decision-making. At the level of collective decision-making unitary rational action is an unrealistic assumption. It neglects the transitivity of collective preferences issue, the logic of collective action and freeriding, the agency problem, and the human tendency to agree with each other irrespective of the facts. While unitary rational action is rejected as a basis for theorizing on international relations and war, the idea of decision-making under constraints seems as valid in the interstate context as in economics. The most important constraints on national security decision-making are the anarchical character of the international system and the corresponding need for self-help, the security and the territorial delimitation dilemmas, the presence or absence of plausible blueprints for victory, and the presence or absence of domestic constraints on bellicosity. A simple explanatory model of war built on these ideas is suggested and tested with dyadic data for the 1962-1980 period. In addition, there is some discussion of why collective security is doomed to fail, and why hegemony rather than balance improve the prospects of peace. (European Journal of Political Research / AuD)
SUMMARYThe 'softening' of the budget constraint appears when the strict relationship between the expenditure and the earnings of an economic unit (firm, household, etc.) has been relaxed, because excess expenditure will be paid by some other institution, typically be the paternalistic State. The higher the subjective probability that excess expenditure will be covered by external assistance, the softer the budget constraint. The main focus of the paper is on the firm. There are several ways of 'softening' the budget constraint: subsidies, tax‐exemptions, soft credits and so on. The softness weakens price responsiveness, leads to losses in efficiency and under certain conditions may generate excess demand. The paper examines the 'soft budget constraint' syndrome in Hungary, Yugoslavia, and China, i.e. in the economies pioneering in the introduction of market‐oriented decentralization reforms. Socialist economies exhibit a rather extreme degree of this phenomenon, which to a lesser degree can be observed in mixed economies as well.ZUSAMMENFASSUNGDie "Aufweichung" der Budgetrestriktionen zeigt sich, wenn der enge Zusammen‐hang zwischen den Ausgaben und Einnahmen einer Wirtschaftseinheit (Firma, Haus‐halt usw.) sich auflockert, weil die Mehrausgabe von einer anderen Institution, im typischen Falle vom paternalistischen Staat gedeckt wird. Je höher die subjektive Wahrscheinlichkeit ist, dass die Mehrausgabe durch eine aussenstehende Hilfsquelle gedeckt wird, um so weicher ist die Budgetrestriktion. Im Mittelpunkt dieser Abhand‐lung steht das Unternehmen. Es gibt mehrere Möglichkeiten zur "Aufweichung" der Budgetrestriktion: Subventionen, Steuerfreiheit, weiche Kredite usw. Die Weiche schwächt die Preissensibilität, führt zu Verlusten in der Wirksamkeit, und unter gewissen Umständen kann eine Mehrnachfrage herbeigeführt werden. Die Abhand‐lung untersucht das Phanomen der "weichen Budgetrestriktion" in Ungarn, Jugosla‐wien und China, das heisst in den Wirtschaften, die in der Einführung von marktorien‐tierten Dezentralisationsreformen bahnbrechend sind. Die sozialistischen Wirtschaften weisen einen ziemlich hohen Grad dieses Phänomens auf, das in geringerem Masse auch in gemischten Wirtschaften zu beobachten ist.RÉSUMÉL'adoucissement" de la contrainte budgétaire apparaît lors du relâchement de la stricte relation entre les dépenses et les recettes d'une unitééconomique (entreprise, ménage…). Cela survient quand l'excés de dépenses est pris en charge par une autre institution, l'exemple type en étant l'Etat‐Providence. II existe plusieurs façons "d'adoucir" la contrainte budgétaire: les subventions, les abattements fiscaux, les crédits bonifiés, etc. Cet adoucissement affaiblit la capacityé de réponse par les prix, il conduit à des pertes d'efficacité, et, dans certaines conditions, peut engendrer un excès de demande. On peut contempler le stade ultime de ce phénomène dans les économies socialistes, mais les économies mixtes en présentent certains symptômes.L'auteur examine le syndrôme de "l'adoucissement" de la contrainte budgétaire en Hongrie, en Yougoslavie et en Chine, c'est‐à‐dire dans les économies socialistes qui, les premierès, ont tenté une certaine décentralisation économique.
Despite the significant contributions of cities to our nation's economy and the everyday life of most Americans, local government leaders are faced with significant constraints on their ability to lead and govern. This article presents a novel framework of constraints facing city leadership focused on legal (what they are allowed to do), fiscal (what they have resources to do), and political constraints (what they want to do). A model is constructed to analyze the impact of these constraints on local action regarding minimum wage and hypothesize that greater constraints will result in less policy action within cities. Using multivariate regression, the authors find that political constraints and economic factors are the most significant determinants of whether a city pursues policy leadership.
AbstractIn application of operations research models in the area of logistics, important constraints are typically encountered in the form of limitations on the funds appropriated. A supply system must be operated within whatever budgeted funds are appropriated by Congress. In the present article, various possible types of budget constraints are discussed as well as their impact on certain types of operations research models. The possible misallocations that can result from the setting of specific budgets designated for particular purposes are discussed. The confusion existing in the literature concerning the type of constraints that are actually encountered versus those that are imposed upon the mathematical models is pointed out as well as the typical inconsistency of budget constraints and steady‐state models. The difference between a steady‐state budget and a transition‐phase budget is clarified.
