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We challenge the conventional definition of corruption through the analysis of legal forms of corruption, and by devoting special attention to influence induced by the private sector. This paper studies the determinants of the world pattern of legal and illegal corruption by proposing a simple theoretical model of endogenous corruption and related legal framework, and its thorough empirical test. Three types of equilibrium outcomes are identified: one based on illegal corruption, where the elite does not face any binding incentives to limit corruption; one centered around legal corruption, where the elite must incur a cost to legally protect corruption; and finally a no-corruption outcome, where the population is able to effectively react to corruption. Testable implications from the model are derived based on country-wide parameters. Crucially, we use a rich corporate survey, including 8,279 firms in 104 countries, tailored for this research, and featuring measures of legal corruption that are novel to the literature. The microdimension of the database enables improving on familiar shortcomings associated with the use of endogeneity-prone, country-wide indices of perceived corruption. The empirical results, making use of a broad range of proxies and sources, generally validate the model's explanations. Adapted from the source document.

Cover Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents Page -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Notes on Contributors and Editors -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- 1 Introduction -- PART I: THE PROBLEM AND ITS IDENTIFICATION -- 2 Measuring Corruption -- 3 Corruption Definition and Measurement -- 4 What are We Trying to Measure? Reviewing the Basics of Corruption Definition -- 5 Measuring Corruption – The Validity and Precision of Subjective Indicators (CPI) -- 6 Measuring the Immeasurable: Boundaries and Functions of (Macro) Corruption Indices -- 7 The Non-Perception Based Measurement of Corruption: A Review of Issues and Methods from a Policy Perspective -- 8 Perceptions, Experience and Lies: What Measures Corruption and What do Corruption Measures Measure? -- PART II: THE CASE STUDIES -- 9 Corruption Indices for Russian Regions -- 10 Corruption Risk Areas and Corruption Resistance -- 11 The Public as Our Partner in the Fight Against Corruption -- 12 Citizen Report Cards -- 13 Corruption and Patronage Politics: 'Harambee' in Kenya -- 14 Measuring Corruption: Exploring the Iceberg

In the context of global capitalism the so-called developing countries are considered 'commodities' in offer in the global economy as emerging markets or for foreign investment. Countries need to show they are potentially highly competitive with low risk. The value of country characteristics is set by globalised managerial discourses, based on postcolonial ideologies that rate cultures and societies in terms of linear notions of progress and civilisation. Cultures and behaviours are judged positively or negatively according to the position countries supposedly have in the evolution of world society. In this framework one element that countries need to eradicate or reduce in order to be seen as 'attractive' is corruption. Towards this aim international and national government and non-government organisations have put in place anti-corruption campaigns. In communications with the general public, these schemes represent actors and acts of corruption through discursive strategies that characterize world cultures and their links with corruption in terms of postcolonial ideologies. In this paper I focus on the implications of the metaphor 'culture of corruption' for rating countries, questioning its effectiveness in anti-corruption campaigns. I argue that anti-corruption instruments based on postcolonial ideologies corrupt representations of national cultures and peoples behaviours, instead of targeting local and global sectors that gain from institutionalised corruption. Through the analysis of anti-corruption cultural texts publicly available in Mexico I illustrate how the ideological misrepresentation of corruption fails its stated aim, to transform a 'culture of corruption' into a 'culture of legality'.

We draw on the background of regional and local governments in China to identify the source of endemic corruption in the behavior of officials in government bureaucracies. When personal advancement in a bureaucracy involves payment of bribes to superiors, corruption is the consequence of the need to finance the bribes. In order to pay the bribes, government officials need to receive bribes, which are sought from subordinates in the government bureaucracy and from private individuals. All individuals are not, of course, equally corrupt or corruptible and merit is also a basis for advancement. However, corruption is endemic if the heads of government bureaucracies are corrupt in the procedures and criteria for personal advancement in the government bureaucracy. [Copyright Elsevier B.V.]

This study aimed to provide basic information on overview of corruption and anti‐corruption legislation in Bangladesh. It indicates the impact of corruption on the economy, sector-wise corruption and how poor enforcement of existing laws has led to corruption. The proposed study analysis of the theoretical and conceptual interpretations of "corruption" and "corruption interaction", discussion of the reasons and conditions for the development of bribery interaction in these countries, as well as consideration of the official assessments of anti-corruption activity and the main directions of prevention and combating corruption from society. Within the structure of this article, we analyze mostly current official positions, investigative materials, hypothetical and theoretic forms and research perspectives, in which current structures and practices of bribery interaction in these countries are being problematized. This study also looks into the implementation of various reform initiatives including development of an impartial and fair system, establishment of code of ethics, reform in political parties, election process, legislations and government policies are crucial with anti-corruption measurements.

Corruption is conventionally measured in global indices as a one-dimensional problem—one score for every country—a practice that has profoundly shaped our conceptualization of corruption and its relationship with capitalism. What if we unbundle corruption into qualitatively distinct types and then measure them across countries? How will this approach change our understanding of corruption? This review article serves two purposes. First, it introduces a new framework for "unbundling corruption" into four varieties and highlights their differential economic effects. Based on this typology, I piloted a new cross-national measure of these four varieties of corruption in fifteen countries, using an expert, perception-based survey—the Unbundled Corruption Index (UCI)™. Second, I review six questions on corruption through the lens of unbundling corruption. Shifting our focus of corruption from its aggregated quantity to its quality not only changes our responses to commonly asked questions about corruption, it also prompts new questions.