Suchergebnisse

AbstractWe evaluate standard assumptions in the estimation of dynamic oligopoly models with laboratory data. Using an entry/exit game, we estimate structural parameters under the assumption that the data are generated by a Markov‐perfect equilibrium and subsequently predict counterfactual behavior. If behavior was collusive, however, the assumption would be violated and one would mispredict counterfactuals. The laboratory allows us to compare predicted behavior to true counterfactuals implemented as treatments. Our main finding is that prediction errors due to collusion are modest in size. We also document a different deviation from equilibrium behavior (inertia) that can lead to large prediction errors.

Chapter 1. Introduction -- Chapter 2. Durable-strategies Dynamic Games: Theory and Solution Techniques -- Chapter 3. Durable-strategies Dynamic Games of Investments -- Chapter 4. Dynamic Environmental Games: Anthropogenic Eco-degradation under Strategies Lags -- Chapter 5. Durable-strategies Cooperative Dynamic Games -- Chapter 6. Eco-degradation Management under Durable Strategies: Efficiency Maximization and Sustainable Imputation -- Chapter 7. Random Horizon Dynamic Games with Durable Strategies -- Chapter 8. Asynchronous Horizons Durable-strategies Dynamic Games -- Chapter 9. Stochastic Durable-strategies Dynamic Games.