Suchergebnisse

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Introduction: The Puzzle of Birthright Citizenship -- Part One. Birthright Citizenship and Global Inequality -- Part Two. From Global to Local: Overinclusion, Underinclusion, and Democratic Legitimacy -- Notes -- References -- Index

We are used to thinking about inequality within countries--about rich Americans versus poor Americans, for instance. But what about inequality between all citizens of the world? Worlds Apart addresses just how to measure global inequality among individuals, and shows that inequality is shaped by complex forces often working in different directions. Branko Milanovic, a top World Bank economist, analyzes income distribution worldwide using, for the first time, household survey data from more than 100 countries. He evenhandedly explains the main approaches to the problem, offers a more accurate

We use the latest available data from the World Income Inequality Database 3.4 and the Penn World Tables 9.0 to examine some of the core issues and concerns that have animated research on global inequality. We begin by reviewing the evidence on trends in within-country inequality, drawing out some of the implications of this for our thinking about inequality and economic development. We examine between-country inequality, computing updated estimates of trends in both unweighted and population-weighted between-country inequality. The data reveal that inequality between countries increased across the latter half of the twentieth century, then turned to decline measurably thereafter. We show that this decline is robust to a range of methodological and measurement decisions identified as important in previous research. We then examine estimates of true global inequality, situating these in relation to lower- and upper-bound estimates of global inequality. We conclude by noting the critical and contested role of globalization in inequality reduction.

This paper presents new findings on global inequality dynamics from the World Wealth and Income Database (WID.world), with particular emphasis on the contrast between the trends observed in the United States, China, France, and the United Kingdom. We observe rising top income and wealth shares in nearly all countries in recent decades. But the magnitude of the increase varies substantially, thereby suggesting that different country-specific policies and institutions matter considerably. Long-run wealth inequality dynamics appear to be highly unstable. We stress the need for more democratic transparency on income and wealth dynamics and better access to administrative and financial data.

This paper presents new findings on global inequality dynamics from the World Wealth and Income Database (WID.world), with particular emphasis on the contrast between the trends observed in the United States, China, France, and the United Kingdom. We observe rising top income and wealth shares in nearly all countries in recent decades. But the magnitude of the increase varies substantially, thereby suggesting that different country-specific policies and institutions matter considerably. Long-run wealth inequality dynamics appear to be highly unstable. We stress the need for more democratic transparency on income and wealth dynamics and better access to administrative and financial data.

This paper presents new findings on global inequality dynamics from the World Wealth and Income Database (WID.world), with particular emphasis on the contrast between the trends observed in the United States, China, France, and the United Kingdom. We observe rising top income and wealth shares in nearly all countries in recent decades. But the magnitude of the increase varies substantially, thereby suggesting that different country-specific policies and institutions matter considerably. Long-run wealth inequality dynamics appear to be highly unstable. We stress the need for more democratic transparency on income and wealth dynamics and better access to administrative and financial data.

This paper presents new findings on global inequality dynamics from the World Wealth and Income Database (WID.world), with particular emphasis on the contrast between the trends observed in the United States, China, France, and the United Kingdom. We observe rising top income and wealth shares in nearly all countries in recent decades. But the magnitude of the increase varies substantially, thereby suggesting that different country-specific policies and institutions matter considerably. Long-run wealth inequality dynamics appear to be highly unstable. We stress the need for more democratic transparency on income and wealth dynamics and better access to administrative and financial data. ; Fil: Gonzalez Alvaredo, Facundo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Ecole D'économie de Paris; Francia ; Fil: Chancel, Lucas. Ecole D'économie de Paris; Francia ; Fil: Piketty, Thomas. Ecole D'économie de Paris; Francia ; Fil: Saez, Emmanuel. National Bureau Of Economic Research; Estados Unidos. University of California at Berkeley; Estados Unidos ; Fil: Zucman, Gabriel. National Bureau Of Economic Research; Estados Unidos. University of California at Berkeley; Estados Unidos

This paper presents new findings on global inequality dynamics from the World Wealth and Income Database (WID.world), with particular emphasis on the contrast between the trends observed in the United States, China, France, and the United Kingdom. We observe rising top income and wealth shares in nearly all countries in recent decades. But the magnitude of the increase varies substantially, thereby suggesting that different country-specific policies and institutions matter considerably. Long-run wealth inequality dynamics appear to be highly unstable. We stress the need for more democratic transparency on income and wealth dynamics and better access to administrative and financial data.

Two of the biggest global challenges we face today are mitigating climate change and economic inequality. Some research suggests these goals are in conflict, based largely on the observation that a dollar spent at higher income levels is less carbon intensive than at lower income levels. We put this concern to rest. We quantify this effect in its most extreme manifestation, both within countries and between countries. We use a wide range of income elasticities of emissions (0.7–1.0) and scenarios from the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSP) with the highest (SSP4) and lowest (SSP5) between-country inequality. Within countries, even with assumptions of low elasticities (0.7) and aggressive inequality reduction (Gini coefficient of 0.55 to 0.30), emissions would realistically increase by less than 8%, which would likely occur over several decades. Income convergence between countries may reduce the emissions intensity of global income growth, because the energy intensity reductions from income growth in emerging economies, such as India and China, offsets the energy increasing effect of higher growth in developing countries. Given these findings, it seems a distraction for future research to dwell on this narrow framing when there are deeper under-explored linkages and synergies between reducing income inequality and climate change, such as the effect of reducing inequality on social norms, consumption and on political mobilization around climate policy.

Two of the biggest global challenges we face today are mitigating climate change and economic inequality. Some research suggests these goals are in conflict, based largely on the observation that a dollar spent at higher income levels is less carbon intensive than at lower income levels. We put this concern to rest. We quantify this effect in its most extreme manifestation, both within countries and between countries. We use a wide range of income elasticities of emissions (0.7–1.0) and scenarios from the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSP) with the highest (SSP4) and lowest (SSP5) between-country inequality. Within countries, even with assumptions of low elasticities (0.7) and aggressive inequality reduction (Gini coefficient of 0.55 to 0.30), emissions would realistically increase by less than 8%, which would likely occur over several decades. Income convergence between countries may reduce the emissions intensity of global income growth, because the energy intensity reductions from income growth in emerging economies, such as India and China, offsets the energy increasing effect of higher growth in developing countries. Given these findings, it seems a distraction for future research to dwell on this narrow framing when there are deeper under-explored linkages and synergies between reducing income inequality and climate change, such as the effect of reducing inequality on social norms, consumption and on political mobilization around climate policy.

The objective of this paper is to show that there is a trade-off between global inequality (between countries) and national inequality (within countries). We observed that when the former declines, the latter increases. Empirically, it is possible to observe a shift from higher global inequality to lower global inequality levels (and higher national inequality levels) since the last quarter of the previous century. From a historical perspective, my thesis is that when the main drivers of economic growth are technology and means of transportation, inequality is mostly between countries (higher global inequality). In contrast, when the main driver of economic growth is labour (and related factors such as human capital, skills, knowledge exploitation), then inequality is mostly within countries (higher national inequality). Limitations of data availability did not allow for testing these historical trends. However, the trends of global and national inequalities over the last three to four decades confirm such a thesis.

In Global Inequality and American Foreign Policy in the 1970s, Michael Franczak demonstrates how Third World solidarity around the New International Economic Order (NIEO) forced US presidents from Richard Nixon to Ronald Reagan to consolidate American hegemony over an international economic order under attack abroad and lacking support at home. The goal of the nations that supported NIEO was to negotiate a redistribution of money and power from the global North to the global South. Their weapon was control over the major commodities—in particular oil—that undergirded the prosperity of the US and Europe after World War II.Using newly available archival sources, as well as interviews with key administration officials, Franczak reveals how the NIEO and "North-South dialogue" negotiations brought global inequality to the forefront US national security. The challenges posed by NIEO became an inflection point for some of the greatest economic, political, and moral crises of 1970s America, including the end of "Golden Age" liberalism and the return of the market, the splintering of the Democratic Party and the building of the Reagan coalition, and the rise of human rights in US foreign policy in the wake of the Vietnam War. The policy debates and decisions toward the NIEO were pivotal moments in the histories of three ideological trends—neoliberalism, neoconservatism, and human rights—that formed the core of America's post-Cold War foreign policy