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The paper deals with the impact of the first ruling of the Constitutional Court on glorification of terrorism (112/2016) in the interpretation of this offence by the Supreme Court, which demands hermeneutically requirements absent from the literality of art. 578 of the Criminal Code and that the Constitutional Court required in its previous case law on hate speech, recently reiterated in the ruling 35/2020 of the Constitutional Court. Firstly, the text addresses the initial description of the elements of this criminal figure by the Supreme Court and its characterization as public defence without incitement, as opposed to the definition of the crime of public provocation to terrorism in the 2008 Framework Decision of the European Union and the Council of Europe Convention for the prevention of terrorism of 2005, both requiring direct or indirect incitement to terrorism, intention to incite and generation of a risk.Secondly, the fundamental aspects of ruling 112/2016 are summarized.This judgement extrapolates the doctrine established in the ruling 235/2007 of the Constitutional Court on the justification of genocide to glorification of terrorism, relying on previous international texts as wellas on the case law from the ECtHR. Accordingly, this makes the constitutionality of punishing glorification of terrorism conditional on both, indirect incitement to terrorism - contradicting the legal doctrine of the Supreme Court that considers it public defence without incitement - and the existence of a risk for other people or for the system of liberties.The central part of the text focuses on the reception of this constitutional interpretation of glorification of terrorism in the legal doctrine of the Supreme Court arising from the aforementioned ruling 112/2016, dealing separately with the three elements required by this ruling: the intention to incite as «trend element» whose criminal relevance was denied in a widely known ruling (subsequently affirmed in the most recent case law though); indirect incitement to terrorism, based on the Convention, the Framework Decision and the recent 2017 Directive, despite another judgement considers that art. 578 CC does not require incitement but the aptitude to raise a potentiality of risk; and, finally, the risk itself that, on the one hand, is linked to the impact of expressions on social networks, mainly attending to the criterion of potential diffusion based on qualitative elements and, on the other hand, is characterized as an abstract and not specific, aptitude risk to create a favourable atmosphere to terrorism, which is estimated based on the elements listed in the Directive. Finally, in the context of a recapitulation of the elements that constitute the «application canon of constitutionality» of glorification of terrorism, the text concludes with an analysis of the ruling 35/2020 of the Constitutional Court, which reaffirms the need to assess the intention in the criminal prosecution of glorification by considering whether the conduct constitutes the exercise of freedom of expression or not, and a prospective reflection on the practical consequences of these constitutional leading cases on the application of the offence of glorification by the criminal courts. Summary:I. Introduction. II. Elements of the offence: public defence without incitement.III. The ruling 112/2016 of the Constitutional Court: glorificationof terrorism as hate speech. IV. Constitutional interpretation of glorificationof terrorism in the Supreme Court's legal doctrine: 1. The intentionto incite terrorism as a «trend element». 2. From indirect incitement tothe «aptitude» to generate risk. 3 The risk situation: a) The impact ofdissemination on social networks b) An abstract or aptitude risk. V. Theruling 35/2020 of the Constitional Court and concluding remarks. ; El trabajo estudia el impacto de la primera sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional sobre el enaltecimiento del terrorismo (STC 112/2016) en la interpretación de este delito por el Tribunal Supremo, al exigir por vía hermenéutica requisitos ausentes de la literalidad del art. 578 del Código Penal y que el Tribunal Constitucional ha exigido en su jurisprudencia anterior sobre el discurso del odio, recientemente reiterada en la STC 35/2020.Se aborda en primer lugar la descripción inicial de los elementos de esta figura delictiva por el Tribunal Supremo y su caracterización como apología sin incitación, contrastando con la definición del delito de provocación pública al terrorismo de la Decisión Marco de 2008 de la Unión Europea y del Convenio del Consejo de Europa para la prevención del terrorismo de 2005, que requieren incitación directa o indirecta al terrorismo, intención de incitar y generación de una situación de riesgo.A continuación, se resumen los aspectos fundamentales de la STC 112/2016 que, extrapolando a la apología del terrorismo la doctrina establecida en la STC 235/2007 sobre la justificación del genocidio y apoyándose en los anteriores textos internacionales y en la jurisprudencia del TEDH, condiciona la constitucionalidad del delito de enaltecimiento del terrorismo a que se produzca una incitación indirecta al terrorismo — entrando en contradicción con la doctrina del Tribunal Supremo que lo considera una apología sin incitación— y, en segundo lugar, a la existencia de una situación de riesgo para otras personas o para el sistema de libertades.La parte central del trabajo se dedica a la recepción de esta interpretación constitucional del enaltecimiento del terrorismo en la doctrina del Tribunal Supremo posterior a la mencionada STC 112/2016, tratando separadamente los tres elementos exigidos por dicha sentencia: la intención de incitar como «elemento tendencial» cuya relevancia penal se ha negado en una sentencia muy conocida aunque posteriormente se ha afirmado en la jurisprudencia más reciente; la incitación indirecta al terrorismo, sobre la base del Convenio, la Decisión Marco y la reciente Directiva de 2017, aunque alguna sentencia considera que el art. 578 CP no requiere incitación sino aptitud para hacer surgir una potencialidad de riesgo; y, finalmente, la situación de riesgo que, por una parte, se vincula al impacto de las expresiones en las redes sociales atendiendo mayoritariamente al criterio de la difusión potencial en función de elementos cualitativos y, por otra parte, se caracteriza como un riesgo abstracto y no concreto, de aptitud para crear un clima favorable al terrorismo, cuya presencia se estima en función de los elementos enumerados en la Directiva. Finalmente, en el contexto de una recapitulación de los elementos que integran el «canon aplicativo de constitucionalidad» del enaltecimiento del terrorismo, se analiza la STC 35/2020 que reafirma la necesidad de valorar la intención en el enjuiciamiento penal del enaltecimiento al ponderar si la conducta constituye ejercicio de la libertad de expresión, concluyendo con una reflexión prospectiva acerca de las consecuencias prácticas de la jurisprudencia constitucional analizada sobre la aplicación del delito de enaltecimiento por los tribunales penales.

La dificultad para conceptuar el terrorismo se ha venido traduciendo en unos tipos penales abiertos a la interpretación jurisprudencial. Ello ha provocado una distorsión entre la realidad, el plano legislativo y la aplicación judicial. En el presente artículo se hace un repaso por la evolución jurisprudencial del fenómeno terrorista con especial hincapié en los pronunciamientos más recientes sobre enaltecimiento del terrorismo.The difficulty in defining what constitutes terrorism has caused vague criminal concepts which need judicial interpretation.Due to this the terrorism phenomenon has suffered a distortion amongst reality, legislation and judicial enforcement. This paper work offers a review of jurisprudential developments about terrorism, focusing primarily on the glorification of terrorism.

El artículo problematiza el significante crisis de la educación en el marco de las disputas en la arena de la política educativa en el Uruguay contemporáneo. El análisis se ubica en el marco de un conjunto de estudios en desarrollo acerca de las disputas en torno al carácter público de la educación en Uruguay en los últimos veinte años: el significante "educación pública" es aquél con respecto al cual el discurso de la crisis cobra sentido. Se abordan los mecanismos de escandalización y las líneas de significación que convergen en la construcción del significante crisis de la educación, en particular los que se relacionan con los resultados de Uruguay en las evaluaciones estandarizadas internacionales y con las resistencias a los cambios y la labor proselitista de docentes y sindicatos docentes. Esto permite comprender la lógica desde la que se postulan alternativas que orientan la educación hacia el mercado como solución glorificada. Se pretende aportar, desde una perspectiva conceptual posfundacionalista, a la comprensión de la educación como un territorio en el que se disputa la construcción de posiciones hegemónicas cuyas implicancias trascienden largamente los ámbitos de la educación formal. ; The article problematizes the signifier "crisis of education" in the framework of the disputes in the educational policy arena in contemporary Uruguay. The analysis accompanies a set of studies under development about the disputes over the public character of education in Uruguay in the last twenty years: the signifier "public education" is the one in relation to which the discourse of the crisis makes sense. We address the mechanisms of scandalization and the lines of signification that converge in the construction of the signifier "crisis of education", particularly those related to Uruguay's results in international standardized evaluations and to the resistance to change and the proselytizing work of teachers and teachers' unions. This allows us to understand the logic behind the postulation of alternatives that orient education towards the market as a glorified solution. The aim is to contribute, from a post-foundationalist conceptual perspective, to the understanding of education as a territory in which the construction of hegemonic positions is disputed, the implications of which go far beyond the spheres of formal education.

RESUMEN: Vivimos en un mundo en constante cambio, que hace difícil que las distintas legislaciones estatales abarquen todas las conductas humanas penalmente reprochables, no solo por los numerosos supuestos posibles, sino por las diferencias entre las legislaciones existentes. En la actualidad, las tecnologías se han desarrollado hasta tal punto que, de manera prácticamente ininterrumpida, se desarrolla un intercambio de información que desemboca en situaciones que el legislador no ha previsto, y, por tanto, carentes de total cobertura. Es en ese punto donde introducimos los delitos de odio y enaltecimiento al terrorismo, delitos, que aunque muy diferentes, enmascaran un mensaje de ataque a individuos por razones políticas, ideológicas o religiosas, y, en definitiva, un ataque que requiere de especial protección por parte del Estado. Tal y como he mencionado antes, la velocidad a la que el ser humano avanza hace la tarea del legislador muy difícil, especialmente debido a los nuevos escenarios en los que estos delitos se están desarrollando, escenarios que no eran los inicialmente previstos en nuestra legislación penal. Así, a través de los supuestos prácticos, podremos comprobar cómo se penaliza el enaltecimiento al terrorismo en canciones o mensajes en las redes sociales, o cómo un posible discurso de odio desarrollado en un contexto que sin duda el legislador no contemplaba, esto es, las aulas de un colegio, puede ser susceptible de una respuesta penal de nuestra Justicia. ; ABSTRACT: We live in a world in constant change, with make difficult for the different state legislations to cover all human behavior criminally reprehensible, not only for the matters that are covered, but for the differences between the existing laws. At present, technologies have developed to such a part in which practically an uninterrupted manner, an exchange of information takes place that leads to situations, which the legislator does not contemplate in the different laws, lacking total coverage. At this point, where we introduce the crimes of hate and glorification of terrorism, crimes, although very different, introduce a message of attack against individuals for political, ideological, and religious reasons, and, in short, an attack that requires special protection from the State. As I mentioned before, the speed in which humans being advances makes the task of the legislator very difficult, especially due to the new stages in which these crimes are being developed, stages, which were not initially provided in our penal legislation. Thus, through practical examples, we can see how the glorification of terrorism is penalized in songs or messages on social networks, or how a possible hate speech development in a context that the legislator certainly did not contemplate, which is, a school classroom, could be susceptible to a penal response to our justice. ; Máster en Acceso a la Profesión de Abogado

Resolution 1624 (2005) of the Security Council of the United Nations does not define incitement to terrorism. By contrast, Council of Europe Convention n.º 196 on the Prevention of Terrorism (2005) characterizes public provocation to terrorism deliberately including indirect incitement and requiring both specific intent and a result of danger of commission of a terrorist offense. The Explanatory Report of the Convention refers to the case-law of the ECtHR to fix on the elements to be considered in the assessment of the danger, thus making it an interpretative parameter. The Framework Decision of the Council of the European Union has adopted since 2008 the same definition that the Convention as it is possible to speak of a European model of criminalization of incitement to terrorism that has been criticized for using a broad and open definition in conflict with the principle of legal certainty and not determining the nature of the danger caused by incitement. These criticisms have not prevented, however, that the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations has considered the definition of the Convention as a best practice in the fight against terrorism. After the Convention, the ECtHR has led to relevant developments of case-law on the indirect incitement as cases Leroy (2008) and Yavuz and Yayali (2013). The US approach that requires imminence and likelihood of danger is the benchmark for the critical positions with the European standard that is intended to extend universally in a draft international convention for the prevention of incitement to terror raising the issue if it is appropriate beyond the European context in which it has emerged. ; La Resolución 1624 (2005) del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas no define la incitación al terrorismo. Sí lo hace, por el contrario, el Convenio núm. 196 del Consejo de Europa de 2005 que caracteriza la provocación pública al terrorismo incluyendo deliberadamente la incitación indirecta, exigiendo una intencionalidad específica y un resultado de peligro de comisión de un delito terrorista. El Informe explicativo del Convenio remite a la jurisprudencia del TEDH para establecer los elementos a considerar en la apreciación de dicho peligro haciendo así de ella un parámetro interpretativo. La Decisión Marco del Consejo de la Unión Europea ha adoptado desde 2008 la misma definición que el Convenio por lo que cabe hablar de un modelo europeo de penalización de la incitación al terrorismo que ha sido criticado por utilizar un definición abierta y general en conflicto con el principio de seguridad jurídica y por la indeterminación de la naturaleza del peligro provocado por la incitación. Estas críticas no han impedido, sin embargo, que el Relator Especial de las Naciones Unidas haya considerado la definición del Convenio como una práctica óptima en la lucha contra el terrorismo. Con posterioridad al Convenio, el TEDH ha dado lugar a desarrollos jurisprudenciales relevantes sobre la incitación indirecta como los casos Leroy (2008) y Yavuz y Yayali (2013). El enfoque norteamericano que requiere inminencia y probabilidad del peligro es el referente de las posiciones críticas con el estándar europeo que se pretende extender universalmente en un proyecto de convenio internacional para la prevención de la incitación al terrorismo surgiendo la problemática de su adecuación más allá del contexto europeo en el que ha surgido.Resolution 1624 (2005) of the Security Council of the United Nations does not define incitement to terrorism. By contrast, Council of Europe Convention n.º 196 on the Prevention of Terrorism (2005) characterizes public provocation to terrorism deliberately including indirect incitement and requiring both specific intent and a result of danger of commission of a terrorist offense. The Explanatory Report of the Convention refers to the case-law of the ECtHR to fix on the elements to be considered in the assessment of the danger, thus making it an interpretative parameter. The Framework Decision of the Council of the European Union has adopted since 2008 the same definition that the Convention as it is possible to speak of a European model of criminalization of incitement to terrorism that has been criticized for using a broad and open definition in conflict with the principle of legal certainty and not determining the nature of the danger caused by incitement. These criticisms have not prevented, however, that the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations has considered the definition of the Convention as a best practice in the fight against terrorism. After the Convention, the ECtHR has led to relevant developments of case-law on the indirect incitement as cases Leroy (2008) and Yavuz and Yayali (2013). The US approach that requires imminence and likelihood of danger is the benchmark for the critical positions with the European standard that is intended to extend universally in a draft international convention for the prevention of incitement to terror raising the issue if it is appropriate beyond the European context in which it has emerged.

This paper aims at studying the aspects of and the reasons behind the poet glorifying his poetry and, consequently, himself. The two examples chosen here are Al-Muttanabi, the famous Abbasid poet and Shakespeare, the Elizabethan poet. The researchers discuss the common features that distinguish the poetry of both poets especially in relation to the theme of glorification of poetry. This comparative study has chosen examples from Al-Mutanabbi's poetry (the Diwan; the collection of his poems) and Shakespeare's sonnets (18-126). The researchers have found out that the two poets glorify their poetry while praising an outstanding powerful character in order to make profit or gain a social status or a governmental position. Ironically speaking, they end up hinting at the fact that their poetic lines are immortal and only through their panegyric poetry the concerned patron is immortalized.

Political, economic, and military issues in the Asia-Pacific region; 4 articles. Topics include prospects for peace, wealth, power, and instability, US role, regional arms purchases, and glorification of war in Japanese education.

Education and Nationalism in MexicoAbstract; Introduction; Nationalism in the Mexican Educational System; Historical Landmarks; Curriculum Issues; Non-Religious Orientation; Glorification of Indigenous Roots; A Common Heroical History; Civic Rites and Traditions; Conclusion; References; Index; Blank Page

Argues that despite glorification of Black culture, many activists believe their work toward lasting social and economic change is far from finished; based on interviews conducted since 1993, and data from the 1980s and 1990s, chiefly.

Speeches articulated by politicians are often vehicles towards achieving their ultimate goals. That's why there is always tendency to find out the potential ideologies indicated by the discursive strategies and rhetorical devices which these politicians employ to express their political viewpoints. This study adopted a critical discourse analysis (CDA) approach to cognitively analyze the typical discursive characteristics underlying Iranian and American presidents' speeches at the UNGA (2013). The findings revealed that the most frequent of the strategies employed by Obama were polarization, self-glorification, positive self-presentation, negative-other presentation and victimization while the most prominent ones used by Rouhani were metaphor, vagueness, negative-other presentation and national self-glorification. The intricate, undeniable relationships existing between language, power and ideology is also what had been clear through the analysis of the lectures transcription.

In Communist Yugoslavia there was a developed process of joint memory control
through the glorification of war as ?the originator of the nation?. The
symbol of the soldier?s readiness to sacrifice himself at the altar of the
homeland became the subliminal memory of war, but also one of the clearest
reflections of the present, which has created ideas of the past. In the
process of creating the identity of the Yugoslav community, the key elements
were represented by different types of memorialization of World War II and
the glorification of sacrificing fallen Partisans. The official public memory
as a model of society interpreted the present through the past. In that
sense, the official policy of recollections encouraged the belief that the
future would be better than the past and that the temporary present was just
one of the stages of the progress.

Abstract. Parents vary in the extent to which they want their children to feel empathy toward different groups. In the current investigation, we tested whether Jewish–Israeli mothers' motivation to have their children feel group-based empathy toward members of their ingroup (Jews) and outgroup (Arabs) differed as a function of the types of group identification mothers experience with their own group – namely attachment to and glorification of Israel. We found that the more mothers identified with Israel, both in terms of attachment and glorification, the more they wanted their child to feel empathy toward ingroup members. However, only to the extent that mothers glorified their group, did they want their child to feel less empathy toward outgroup members. Our findings point to potential importance of considering mothers' group identity as related to the transmission of intergroup empathy and the perpetuation of intergroup conflict across generations.

Mémoire de la première guerre mondiale au sein des jeunes droites roumaines de l'entre-deux-guerres À première vue, la Première Guerre mondiale constitue l'alpha et l'oméga des jeunes droites, notamment de la Garde de fer fasciste, en termes d'idéologie et d'organisation. À y regarder de plus près, toutefois, on y relève deux failles. La plus patente consiste dans la rupture générationnelle entre ces droites et les classes d'âge concernées par la guerre : le fascisme roumain tend à minimiser les réalisations de la génération précédente pour valoriser sa propre mission. La glorification et le mimétisme de la chose militaire ne renvoient pas chez les gardistes à la glorification des « grands hommes » mais à celle de l'anonyme, du soldat inconnu. Enfin, trois exemples de commémoration légionnaire de la Grande Guerre permettent de vérifier cette captation de la mémoire au service d'un dynamisme projectif.