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Theories of policy responsiveness assume that political decision-makers can rationally interpret information about voters' likely reactions, but can we be sure of this? Political decision-makers face considerable time and information constraints, which are the optimal conditions for displaying decision-making biases—deviations from comprehensive rationality. Recent research has shown that when evaluating policies, political decision-makers display biases related to heuristics—cognitive rules of thumb that facilitate judgments and decision-making—when evaluating policies. It is thus likely that they also rely on heuristics in other situations, such as when forming judgments of voters' likely reactions. But what types of heuristics do political decision-makers use in such judgments, and do these heuristics contribute to misjudgements of voters' reactions? Existing research does not answer these crucial questions. To address this lacuna, we first present illustrative evidence of how biases related to heuristics contributed to misjudgements about voters' reactions in two policy decisions by UK governments. Then, we use this evidence to develop a research agenda that aims to further our understanding of when political decision-makers rely on heuristics and the effects thereof. Such an agenda will contribute to the literature on policy responsiveness.

ABSTRACTThis paper proposes a class of surrogate constraint heuristics for obtaining approximate, near optimal solutions to integer programming problems. These heuristics are based on a simple framework that illuminates the character of several earlier heuristic proposals and provides a variety of new alternatives. The paper also proposes additional heuristics that can be used either to supplement the surrogate constraint procedures or to provide independent solution strategies. Preliminary computational results are reported for applying one of these alternatives to a class of nonlinear generalized set covering problems involving approximately 100 constraints and 300–500 integer variables. The solutions obtained by the tested procedure had objective function values twice as good as values obtained by standard approaches (e.g., reducing the best objective function values of other methods from 85 to 40 on the average. Total solution time for the tested procedure ranged from ten to twenty seconds on the CDC 6600.

It is broadly assumed that political elites (e.g. party leaders) regularly rely on heuristics in their judgments or decision-making. In this article, I aim to bring together and discuss the scattered literature on this topic. To address the current conceptual unclarity, I discuss two traditions on heuristics: (1) the heuristics and biases (H&B) tradition pioneered by Kahneman and Tversky and (2) the fast and frugal heuristics (F&F) tradition pioneered by Gigerenzer et al. I propose to concentrate on two well-defined heuristics from the H&B tradition—availability and representativeness—to empirically assess when political elites rely on heuristics and thereby understand better their judgments and decisions. My review of existing studies supports the notion that political elites use the availability heuristic and possibly the representativeness one for making complex decisions under uncertainty. It also reveals that besides this, we still know relatively little about when political elites use which heuristic and with what effect(s). Therefore, I end by proposing an agenda for future research.

Lay perceptions of risk appear rooted more in heuristics than in reason. A major concern of the risk regulation literature is that such "error‐strewn" perceptions may be replicated in policy, as governments respond to the (mis)fears of the citizenry. This has led many to advocate a relatively technocratic approach to regulating risk, characterized by high reliance on formal risk and cost‐benefit analysis. However, through two studies of chemicals regulation, we show that the formal assessment of risk is pervaded by its own set of heuristics. These include rules to categorize potential threats, define what constitutes valid data, guide causal inference, and to select and apply formal models. Some of these heuristics lay claim to theoretical or empirical justifications, others are more back‐of‐the‐envelope calculations, while still more purport not to reflect some truth but simply to constrain discretion or perform a desk‐clearing function. These heuristics can be understood as a way of authenticating or formalizing risk assessment as a scientific practice, representing a series of rules for bounding problems, collecting data, and interpreting evidence (amethodology). Heuristics are indispensable elements of induction. And so they are not problematicper se, but they can become so when treated as laws rather than as contingent and provisional rules. Pitfalls include the potential for systematic error, masking uncertainties, strategic manipulation, and entrenchment. Our central claim is that by studying the rules of risk assessmentquarules, we develop a novelrepresentationof the methods, conventions, and biases of the prior art.

This paper looks into decision-making processes in the course of a crisis. In particular, it looks into how governments decide and use heuristics during crisis management, in order to transfer policies, as an attempt to reinforce or regain their legitimacy in unsettled times. It aims to understand how two institutional features, one intrinsic–problem uncertainty– and one extrinsic –ambiguity at the international level– affect decision-making. It develops a typology of policy transfer under these two dimensions.It examines the case of disappearances in Mexico, where Congress issued national legislation in a crisis generated after the disappearance of 43 students in 2014. The Law on Disappeared was a result of an explicit attempt to transfer international guidelines.Results show that, as long as the degree of uncertainty surrounding the problem is low, heuristics change according the degree of ambiguity at the international level: when they are clear, tallying occurs, while when they are ambiguous, one-reason heuristics would favor binding instrument.Furthermore, findings also point towards a nuanced understanding on the effect of a high degree of problem uncertainty on policy transfer. The research is relevant for understanding how, in crisis, decisions adapt based on context.

What is rationality and what is the evidence for it? -- The case for bounded rationality -- Behavioral models of heuristics-based choice -- Kahneman and Tversky's research program on heuristics and biases (HBP) -- The fast and frugal heuristics research program (FFP) -- Philosophical foundations -- Optimal taxation and regulation in behavioral economics -- Libertarian paternalism in theory -- Libertarian paternalism in practice.

What is rationality and what is the evidence for it? -- The case for bounded rationality -- Behavioral models of heuristics-based choice -- Kahneman and Tversky's research program on heuristics and biases (HBP) -- The fast and frugal heuristics research program (FFP) -- Philosophical foundations -- Optimal taxation and regulation in behavioral economics -- Libertarian paternalism in theory -- Libertarian paternalism in practice.

PurposeCustomer centricity has evolved into a success factor for many companies, requiring all corporate activities – including business processes – to be aligned with customer needs. With most existing approaches to business process (re-)design focusing on process efficiency, customers are often treated as second-class citizens. Despite emergent research on customer process management, there is a lack of guidance on how to design customer-centric business processes.Design/methodology/approachThe authors conducted a structured literature review and analyzed companies awarded for outstanding customer centricity to compile design heuristics for customer-centric business processes. The authors iteratively validated and refined these heuristics with experts from academia and industry. Finally, the heuristics was grouped according to their expected impact on interaction capabilities to enable their prioritization in specific settings.FindingsThe authors proposed 15 expert-approved and literature-backed design heuristics for customer-centric business processes together with real-world examples. The heuristics aim at increasing customer satisfaction with interaction-intensive core processes, which is an important driver of corporate success.Originality/valueThe design heuristics complement existing efficiency-centered (re-)design heuristics. They reflect cognitive shortcuts that support process analysts in the generation of innovative ideas during process (re-)design. The heuristics also add to customer process management and help put customer centricity into practice.