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We study the information consequences of conservatism in accounting. Prior research shows that information asymmetries in capital markets lead to firm-level increases in conservatism. In this paper, we further argue that increases in conservatism improve the firm information environment and lead to subsequent decreases in information asymmetries between firm insiders and outsiders. We predict and test if this decrease in information asymmetries manifests itself through: (a) a decrease in the bid-ask spread and in stock-returns volatility, and (b) an improved information environment for financial analysts, leading to more precise and less dispersed forecasts, and to more analysts following the firm. Using a large US sample for the period 1977-2007 and several proxies for conservatism we find robust evidence consistent with our expectations. Our results are in line with conservatism being useful not only for debt-holders, but also for equity-holders. ; We acknowledge financial assistance from the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science (ECO2010–19314, ECO2008–06238/ECON and SEJ2007-67582/ECON), the ICJCE/AT1 UAM-Auditores Madrid Chair, IESE Research Division, the Government of Comunidad de Madrid (Grant CCG10-UC3M/HUM-4760) and the AECA Chair in Accounting and Auditing.

Information asymmetries persist because in certain situations the value of information cannot be appropriated by the one who has it. A game-theoretic model of information asymmetries is presented, showing that under certain conditions there exists a prisoner's dilemma. The model is used to clarify the failure of markets to transmit certain types of information, to explain policy failure in regulation without recourse to government failure, and to identify new types of transaction failure in hierarchy and politics.

This dissertation explores the relationship between informational asymmetries and costly conflict in the international system. While it is well-known that information asymmetries may cause conflict, little research explores the origins of such asymmetries. This dissertation explores the role of intelligence, diplomacy, and military strategy in revealing information. I show that, under broad conditions, states will often fail to disclose information about themselves and fail to gather information about their opponents. In consequence, the ability to gather information does not undermine the link between uncertainty and war.

The correspondence between individual preferences and electoral outcomes is often affected by the existence of information asymmetries among electoral participants and the presence of individuals or groups who exercise some form of agenda control. While the effects of agenda control in political decision making are widely recognized, the effects of information asymmetries are not as well understood. Since information asymmetries are fundamental characteristics of most elections, a deep understanding of the correspondence between individual preferences and electoral outcomes requires a serious consideration of the "effects" of information. I develop a generalizable agenda control model that takes as given the observation that most voters are not naturally inclined to invest in political information. The model allows me to provide a dynamic description of how voters and political elites can adapt to the information problems that characterize political decision making. It also allows me to demonstrate the effect of these adaptations on electoral outcomes.

Eva Becker assesses the US financial crisis as a crisis of regulatory data, information and knowledge. Based on the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission's interviews as well her own interviews, and drawing on Capture Theory and recent reformulations thereof, she develops "knowledge capture" as a theoretic framework to assess financial regulation under conditions of 21st century complexity. Contents Narratives of the Global Financial Crisis Multi-Level Complexity: The 21st Century Financial System US Policy Responses to the Crisis Knowledge Asymmetries and the Idea of Knowledge-Based Regulation Knowledge Capture in Financial Regulation: A Theoretic Framework Target Groups Lecturers and students of Political Science, Sociology and Economics Experts for Financial Market Regulation The Author Eva Becker holds a degree in communication management, philosophy and comparative literature (BA at University of Leipzig, Germany) and public management and governance (MA at Zeppelin University, Germany). From 2012 to 2014, she worked as a research associate on Helmut Willke's research project "policy responses to systemic risk", funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG)