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This article forms part of a longer-term project dealing with the impact of public choice theories in political science. The focus here is on economic models of bureaucracy, which despite their increasing theoretical significance and influence on practical politics have heretofore been little analysed, except by their exponents. I have argued elsewhere that amongst existing public choice accounts there are two seminal works, Antony Downs's pluralist treatment inInside Bureaucracyand William Niskanen's new right thesis inBureaucracy and Representative Government. The central innovation of economic approaches is their stress on rational officials' attachment to budget maximization strategies. In Downs's case this is a finite maximand limited by bureaucrats' conservatism and other motivations. But in Niskanen's case budget maximization is an open-ended process, constrained only by external limits on agencies' abilities to push up their budgets. None the less, despite their disparate approaches and conclusions, both these books share four failings common to almost all other public choice work in the field:(1) They operate with vague and ill-defined definitions of bureaucrats' utility functions.(2) They assume that all bureaucracies are hierarchical line agencies.

THIS ARTICLE FORMS PART OF A LONGER-TERM PROJECT DEALING WITH THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC CHOICE THEORIES IN POLITICAL SCIENCE. THE FOCUS HERE IS ON ECONOMIC MODELS OF BUREAUCRACY, WHICH DESPITE THEIR INCREASING THEORETICAL SIGNIFICANCE AND INFLUENCE ON PRACTICAL POLITICS HAVE HERETOFORE BEEN LITTLE ANALYSED, EXCEPT BY THEIR EXPONENTS. DURLEARY ARGUES THAT AMONGST EXISTING PUBLIC CHOICE ACCOUNTS THERE ARE TWO SEMINAL WORKS, ANTONY DOWNS'S PLURALIST TREATMENT IN INSIDE BUREAUCRACY AND WILLIAM NISKANEN'S NEW RIGHT THESIS IN BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT. THE CENTRAL INNOVATION OF ECONOMIC APPROACHES IS THEIR STRESS ON RATIONAL OFFICIALS' ATTACHMENT TO BUDGET MAXIMIZATION STRATEGIES, IN DOWN'S CASE THIS IS A FINITE MAXIMAND LIMITED BY BUREAUCRATS CONSERVATISM AND OTHER MOTIVATIONS. BUT IN NISKANEN'S CASE BUDGET MAXIMIZATION IS AN OPEN-ENDED PROCESS, CONSTRAINED ONLY BY EXTERNAL LIMITS ON AGENCIES ABILITIES TO PUSH ON THEIR BUDGETS. NONE THE LESS, DESPITE THEIR DISPARATE APPROACHES AND CONCLUSIONS, BOTH THESE BOOKS SHARE FAILINGS COMMON TO ALMOST ALL OTHER PUBLIC CHOICE WORK IN THE FIELD: (1) THEY OPERATE WITH VAGUE AND ILL-DEFINED DEFINITIONS OF BUREAUCRATS' UTILITY FUNCTIONS. (2) THEY ASSUME THAT ALL BUREAUCRACIES ARE HIERARCHICAL LINE AGENCIES.

In many parts of the developing world, ethnic minorities play a central role in the economy. Examples include Chinese throughout Southeast Asia, Indians in East Africa and Lebanese in West Africa. These rich minorities are often subject to popular violence and extortion, and are treated ambiguously by local politicians. We analyze the impact of the presence of a rich ethnic minority on violence and on interactions between a rent-seeking local elite and a poor majority. We find that the local elite can always make use of the rich minority to maintain its hold on power. When the threat of violence is high, the government may change its economic policies strategically to sacrifice the minority to popular resentment. We investigate the conditions under which such instrumental scapegoating emerges, and the forms it takes. We then consider some social integration capturing, for instance, mixed marriages and shared education. Social integration reduces violence and yields qualitative changes in economic policies. Overall, our results help explain documented patterns of violence and segregation.

International audience Historically and in many parts of the developing world, ethnic minorities have played a central role in the economy. Examples include Chinese throughout South-east Asia, Indians in East Africa, and Jews in medieval Europe. These rich minorities are often subject to popular violence and extortion, and are treated ambiguously by local politicians. We analyse the impact of the presence of a rich ethnic minority on violence and on interactions between a rent-seeking local elite and a poor majority. We find that the local elite can always make use of the rich minority to maintain its hold on power. When the threat of violence is high, the government may change its economic policies strategically to sacrifice the minority to popular resentment. We investigate the conditions under which such instrumental scapegoating emerges, and the forms it takes. We then introduce some social integration, capturing, for instance, mixed marriages and shared education. Social integration reduces violence and yields qualitative changes in economic policies. Overall, our results help to explain documented patterns of violence and segregation.

The notion of evidence-based policy making (EBP) has gained renewed currency in the UK in the context of the current Labour Government's commitment to modernise government. Thus, a key driver of modernisation is seen as evidence based policy making and service delivery - 'what matters is what works'. The aim of this article is to critically examine the assumptions underpinning EBP asking, in particular, the extent to which the increased emphasis on the role of evidence in policy making is indicative of 'technocratic politics' underpinned by an instrumental rationality which erodes the normative basis of policy making and undermines the capacity for 'appropriate' practice. It is argued that the current emphasis on EBP needs to be understood in the context of recent trends in governance processes and the development by New Labour of performance management for public services. The nature of the evidence we can expect from evaluation and the role of evidence in policy-making practice are critically examined. It is argued that we need an expanded notion of 'practical reason' to guide 'appropriate practice' within the context of a broader framework of 'responsible government.'

What determines citizens' preferences over alternative decision-making procedures – the personal gain associated with a procedure, or the intrinsic value assigned to it? To answer this question, we present results of a laboratory experiment in which participants select a procedure to decide on the provision of a public good. In the first stage, they choose between majority voting and delegation to a welfare-maximizing algorithm. In the second stage, subjects either vote on the public good provision, or the decision is taken by the algorithm. We define three experimental conditions in which participants receive information about whether a majority in the group faces a positive or negative pay-off from the public good provision, about whether there is a positive group benefit from its provision, or neither kind of information. Findings confirm the importance of instrumental motives in procedural choices. At the same time, however, a significant share of participants chose a procedure that does not maximize their individual benefit. While majority voting seems to be preferred for intrinsic values of fairness and equality, support for delegation to the welfare-maximizing algorithm increases if the group benefit from a public good is known – even in participants who are net payers for its provision.

Se diseñó un instrumento para valorar los saberes éticos y cívicos en los estudiantes. El instrumento integró los saberes de compromiso, autorregulación, respeto, promoción de los derechos, comunicación asertiva, honorabilidad, sinceridad y valoración de la democracia. Posteriormente, se sometió a la revisión de expertos, juicio de expertos y aplicación a un grupo piloto. Los expertos realizaron mejoras en la redacción de los elementos del instrumento. A juicio de los expertos, todos los ítems fueron validados en pertinencia (IVC y V de Aiken> 0.80; ICI> 0.50), y en redacción, se identificaron mejoras. El grupo piloto expresó un buen grado de comprensión de los elementos del instrumento. El proceso facilitó la creación de un instrumento pertinente y con validez de contenido.

Within the realm of comparative politics, ethnicity has been conceptualized as both a fixed category in which individuals are born, as well as one of multiple identities that can be made politically salient by different actors. The latter perspective corresponds to instrumental and constructivist conceptualizations of ethnicity that seeks first and foremost to answer the question: 'Under which circumstances will ethnicity activate and affect citizens' political behavior?' Since the 1990s, Latin American social movements began to 'play the ethnic card', which culminated with the first indigenous candidate ever, to win a presidential election in the region in 2005. Applying research designs based on instrumental and constructivist conceptualizations of ethnicity could significantly advance the study of Latin American social movements. ; Dentro del área de estudios de Política Comparada, se ha conceptualizado a la etnicidad como una categoría fija en la cual nacen las personas, pero también como solo una de las múltiples identidades que pueden ser políticamente activadas por diversos actores. Esta última perspectiva corresponde al paradigma instrumental o constructivista, que busca responder la siguiente pregunta: ¿Bajo qué circunstancias se activará la identidad étnica de ciudadanos, de modo tal que afecte su comportamiento político? Desde los '90s que los movimientos sociales en Latinoamérica comenzaron a presentarse como movimientos de origen étnico, lo cual culminó con la elección del primer presidente indígena de la region, en 2005. Diseñar investigaciones, utilizando nociones instrumentales y constructivistas de etnicidad, puede permitir el avance del estudio de los movimientos sociales en la región.

In its 2012 decision in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Church & Sch. V. EEOC, the Supreme Court held that the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment require recognition of a "ministerial exception" to general antidiscrimination statutes (in that case, the ADA), because religious institutions must have autonomy in selecting their ministers. In the course of its analysis, however, the Court made a very interesting move. In response to the government's argument that the case could be resolved under the general First Amendment right of association, the Court responded that this position was "untenable," and indeed "remarkable," because the very existence of the Religion Clauses indicated that religious groups must be treated differently from secular groups. It also rejected the view that its groundbreaking decision in Employment Division v. Smith, which interpreted the Free Exercise Clause extremely narrowly, precluded reliance on the Religion Clauses here, curtly distinguishing Smith on the grounds that it did not involve "government interference with an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself." Hosanna-Tabor thus appears to stand for the propositions that religious groups are different from secular groups for constitutional purposes and entitled to extra constitutional protections, and further, that religious institutions such as churches possess broader Free Exercise rights than do individuals. In this article, I argue both these propositions are indefensible in light of the text, history, and purposes of the Religion Clauses. I further argue that granting religious institutions special constitutional rights raises some very difficult, ultimately irresolvable boundary problems regarding the scope of the ministerial exception.Ultimately, I conclude that a much better analytic course for the Court to have followed in Hosanna-Tabor would have been to rely on the freedoms of association and Assembly protected by the First Amendment, which the Court so casually rejected. The effect of relying on Assembly and association would be to grant all groups whose activities are relevant to democratic politics a right of autonomy, including a right to select its members and leaders. Religious groups would certainly qualify for such a right (thus affirming the result in Hosanna-Tabor), but so would many secular groups on the same terms. I discuss the ways in which this vision of associational rights fits well with the overall structure of the First Amendment, and with the instrumental role that religious groups (as opposed to individuals) play in our society. Relying on Assembly and association also avoids the boundary problems raised by the ministerial exception, and defuses the tension with free-speech doctrine created by the Court's preferential treatment of religious groups in Hosanna-Tabor. I conclude by exploring the ways in which the existence of the Religion Clauses may be relevant to religious groups' Assembly/associational rights, even if they are not the source of those rights.