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Joint ventures aid firms in accessing new markets, knowledge, capabilities, and other resources. Yet they can be challenging to manage, largely because they are owned by two or more parent companies. These companies may have competing or incongruent goals, differences in management style, and in the case of international business, additional complexities associated with differing government policies and business practices. We examine research on joint venture (JV) performance in order to identify prominent academic discussions established over the last 25 years. From this research, we draw implications from past research and areas for future research on successfully managing JVs, taking into account the decisions JV partners must make throughout the partnering process, from initial motivations through partner selection and negotiation of terms to implementation and ongoing management. Key implications include the necessity of honesty, trust, and commitment for the success of the JV, settling disputes by focusing on what is best for the JV rather than individual partner objectives, and division of managerial responsibilities according to the functional expertise of each partner.

Includes index. ; Second ed. first pub. in 1918. ; Mode of access: Internet.

In a recent union election, an affiliate of the Communication Workers of America (CWA) unanimously won the right to represent certain technology employees of Cognizant Technology Solutions Corp. The names of the parties may not immediately resonate, but the CWA affiliate is Alphabet Workers Union. In turn, Cognizant Technology Solutions is a staffing agency for Alphabet Inc., which is the parent company for Google, and which was ruled by a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) Regional Director to be a joint employer with Cognizant. The union win is a step forward to a new joint employer standard that holds putative joint employers liable for bargaining obligations and unfair labor practices.

In most aspects of establishment and operation, joint venture corporations do not differ from any other corporate enterprise. A joint venture operating in a foreign country encounters daily problems of negotiable instruments law, property law and insurance law, to name but a few, in the same way that every corporation in that country does. Thus, it may seem presumptuous to write about joint ventures in a particular country unless one is willing and able to produce a comprehensive survey of that country's legal system. There are several areas of the foreign law, however, which are primary, in terms both of importance and of chronology, since the ground rules in these areas will govern the methods of establishment and operation and, indeed, are fundamental to the basic management decision of whether or not a joint venture operation would be practicable and profitable. Clearly, primary consideration must be given to matters of foreign exchange and foreign capital, company law, taxation, and in most cases matters of industrial property rights, as well as any special laws or aspects of laws relating to foreigners. The structuring of a joint company in the maze of interrelating rules in these legal areas might become quite a special problem. Not infrequently aspects of property law, anti-monopoly law and social and labor legislation also require special attention prior to establishment.

A small revolution has begun in child custody law, and as yet its dimensions and ultimate direction are uncertain. Joint custody, the sharing of legal authority by divorced or separated parents over their children, is gaining acceptance as the best arrangement for most children when their parents divorce. The legal system is embracing this arrangement with remarkable enthusiasm, although until recently it was viewed as being of questionable legality and antithetical to the best interest of the child. Today, thirty states have joint custody laws, most of which have been enacted since 1980. A growing number of the more recent statutes present joint custody not only as an acceptable option that cooperative parents may choose, but as the preferred arrangement, which should be encouraged or even required by the law. Although even joint custody advocates once rejected the viability of court-ordered joint custody against the will of either parent, 8 this option is available under most of the new laws. The implications of this trend are disturbing. The principal goal of custody law is to further the best interest of the child. Joint custody legislation purports to realize this goal by encouraging both parents to remain actively involved in their child's life. Two important assumptions are implicit in the recent trend: first, that parents will be able to cooperate in raising their child, regardless of whether or not they freely decided upon joint custody, and second, that the harm to the child caused by any interparental conflict will be outweighed by the benefit of continuing a parent-child relationship with both parents. Both of these assumptions are problematic. The first has no empirical support and is questionable as a general proposition. Substantial doubts about the second are raised by the growing body of social science research on divorce and interparental conflict. The potential for unfortunate results in a scheme in which courts are authorized or directed to compel joint custody also includes its less obvious but significant coercive effect upon the bargaining behavior of divorcing parents. By motivating reluctant parents to agree to joint custody, the law may produce results that are contrary to the primary objective that it is attempting to promote – the well-being of children. This Article examines joint custody and explores its implications for legal policy. Part I traces the social, cultural, and legal variables that have created an environment receptive to joint custody. Part II examines the movement toward a legal presumption favoring joint custody, and explores the impact of a legal preference for joint custody on negotiations by parties and on decisionmaking by courts. Part III explores the fairness of a joint custody presumption as a decision principle and the extent to which it promotes the best interest of children. Our analysis is based on the application of relevant empirical and theoretical social science research. We conclude in part IV that although some form of joint custody may benefit many families, the emerging legal rule is neither fair nor likely to benefit children. We propose an alternative rule that would limit the authority of courts to order joint custody to cases in which the parties voluntarily agree.