Suchergebnisse

This article assesses recent reforms of the appointment procedure for members of the Court of Justice and the General Court. We evaluate the effects of the establishment of the Article 255 TFEU Panel. Next to a discussion on the transparency of the Panel's opinions, the criteria set and the role it plays in reappointments, we present case studies of the selection procedure in fourteen Member States, representing new and old, and small and large Member States. Our analysis shows that far from being a paper tiger, the Article 255 TFEU Panel has proven to have a significant impact: it has had a chilling effect on a number of national nominations but also indirectly influenced the selection processes in some Member States, thus limiting arbitrariness. However, opening up judicial appointments to scrutiny at both the EU and the national level has resulted in a subtle move into the direction of judicial self-government.

Scholars have increasingly theorized, and debated, the decision by states to create and delegate authority to international courts, as well as the subsequent autonomy and behavior of those courts, with principal-agent and trusteeship models disagreeing on the nature and extent of states' influence on international judges. This article formulates and tests a set of principal-agent hypotheses about the ways in which, and the conditions under which, member states are able use their powers of judicial nomination and appointment to influence the endogenous preferences of international judges. The empirical analysis surveys the record of all judicial appointments to the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO) over a 15-year period. We present a view of an Appellate Body appointment process that, far from representing a pure search for expertise, is deeply politicized and offers member-state principals opportunities to influence Appellate Body members ex ante and possibly ex post. We further demonstrate that the Appellate Body nomination process has become progressively more politicized over time as member states, responding to earlier and controversial Appellate Body decisions, became far more concerned about judicial activism and more interested in the substantive opinions of Appellate Body candidates, systematically championing candidates whose views on key issues most closely approached their own, and opposing candidates perceived to be activist or biased against their substantive preferences. Although our empirical study is specific to the WTO, our theory and findings have implications for the judicial politics of a large variety of global and regional international courts and tribunals. [Reprinted by permission; copyright Sage Publications Ltd. & ECPR-European Consortium for Political Research.]

Purpose: Since the inception of the notions of separation of powers and judicial independence, different judicial systems across the globe have devised various models of judicial appointments to meet the standards of the concepts of separation of powers and judicial independence. Methodology: In general, three moles of judicial appointments namely the politicised, the judicialised and the institutionalised models have been used in different jurisdictions. Findings: In Pakistan, since its independence, all these three models have been practiced, however none of these could help to achieve the required standards of judicial independence. The causes of failure perhaps rooted in the attitudes and intentions of the constitutional players rather than internal flaws of these three models. Implications: This article analyses the pros and cons of these models of judicial appointments and the causes of failure of these models in provision of independent and trustworthy judiciary in Pakistan and then proposes a better model with further improvements for judicial appointments in Pakistan.

Scholars have increasingly theorized, and debated, the decision by states to create and delegate authority to international courts, as well as the subsequent autonomy and behavior of those courts, with principal–agent and trusteeship models disagreeing on the nature and extent of states' influence on international judges. This article formulates and tests a set of principal–agent hypotheses about the ways in which, and the conditions under which, member states are able use their powers of judicial nomination and appointment to influence the endogenous preferences of international judges. The empirical analysis surveys the record of all judicial appointments to the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO) over a 15-year period. We present a view of an Appellate Body appointment process that, far from representing a pure search for expertise, is deeply politicized and offers member-state principals opportunities to influence Appellate Body members ex ante and possibly ex post. We further demonstrate that the Appellate Body nomination process has become progressively more politicized over time as member states, responding to earlier and controversial Appellate Body decisions, became far more concerned about judicial activism and more interested in the substantive opinions of Appellate Body candidates, systematically championing candidates whose views on key issues most closely approached their own, and opposing candidates perceived to be activist or biased against their substantive preferences. Although our empirical study is specific to the WTO, our theory and findings have implications for the judicial politics of a large variety of global and regional international courts and tribunals.