Suchergebnisse

This article searches for lessons from Montana's experience for the future of American judicial elections. Part II considers the origin of judicial elections and history of reforms in Montana, which is marked both by substantial worries about outside political intervention in state courts and by several innovative responses to it. Part III reviews the practice established by Montana's reformed model of judicial selection over the past four decades. Part IV examines the Montana Supreme Court's engagement with Citizens United, followed by a close analysis of an election held in its aftermath: the hardfought 2014 campaign between incumbent Justice Mike Wheat and challenger Lawrence VanDyke. Part V suggests some preliminary conclusions about the meaning of Citizens United and other recent legal developments for judicial elections in the states, and how states might respond.

AbstractJudicial elections have two opposing effects on legitimacy perceptions for state supreme courts. Elections not only provide a boost to legitimacy through the chance to hold officials accountable but also involve campaign activity that decreases legitimacy perceptions. This article examines these two opposing effects using a nationally representative survey that includes items assessing diffuse support for state supreme courts. It uses multiple indicators to differentiate between states with highly active election systems involving large amounts of campaign activity and states with less active elections systems that involve little campaign activity. The results from the survey show that the legitimacy of elected courts is higher than appointed courts but only in states with little election activity. In states with high amounts of election activity, the legitimacy of elected courts is lower than appointed courts.

This Comment argues that elections can give us good judges who are both accountable to the voters and able to decide cases impartially. To accomplish this, we must, in the words of one local media commentator, "take off the muzzle and allow judges to discuss issues." But before one can propose change, one should understand the present system and the purposes it was designed to serve. Part II of this Comment examines Canon 7 of the Washington Code of Judicial Conduct and the balance it strikes between accountability and impartiality. Part III explores how the Canon has been interpreted in Washington case law and ethics opinions and how those interpretations have kept information about judges out of the electoral process. Part IV argues that Canon 7 should be changed because it undermines the accountability that the framers of the Washington Constitution intended to achieve through elections. Elections were so important to the framers of both the state and federal constitutions that they sought to specially protect political speech. Part V argues that the Canon contravenes the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and its corresponding state provision. Part VI examines the judicial electorate, the sources of voter information, and the expectations of voters. This Part concludes that Canon 7 should be changed because it is premised on faulty assumptions about voters. Washington is not alone in trying to balance accountability and impartiality. Part VII of this Comment demonstrates that other states have chosen canons with fewer restrictions on campaign speech and have not seen negative results. Finally, Part VIII suggests a proposal for change.

"The idea that wealthy people use their money to influence things, including politics, law, and media will surprise very few people. However, as Michael S. Kang and Joanna Shepherd argue in this readable and rich study of the state judiciary, the effect of money on judicial outcomes should disturb and anger everyone. In the current system that elects state judges, the rich and powerful can spend money to elect and re-elect judges who decide cases the way they want. Free to Judge is about how and why money increasingly affects the dispensation of justice in our legal system, and what can be done to stop it. One of the barriers to action in the past has been an inability to prove that campaign donations influence state judicial decision-making. In this book, Kang and Shepherd answer that challenge for the first time, with a rigorous empirical study of campaign finance and judicial decision-making data. Pairing this with interviews of past and present judges, they create a compelling and persuasive account of people like Marsha Ternus, the first Iowa state supreme court justice to be voted out of office after an intense her and her decision in a same-sex marriage case. The threat of such an outcome, and the desire to win reelection, results in judges demonstrably leaning towards the interests and preferences of their campaign donors across all cases. Free to Judge is thus able to identify the pieces of our current system that invite bias, such as judicial reelection, and what reforms should focus on. This thoughtful and compellingly written book will be required reading for anybody who cares about creating a more just legal system"--

Constitutional law in the United States is, for most practical
purposes, the product of 'judicial review', the power of
judges to disallow policy choices made by other officials or
institutions of government, ostensibly because those choices are
prohibited by the Constitution. This extraordinary and unprecedented
power, America's dubious contribution to the science of
government, has made American judges the most powerful in the world,
not only legislators but super-legislators, legislators with virtually
the last word. Because lawmaking power divorced from popular will is
tyranny, most states have attempted to reconcile the lawmaking power of
judges with representative self-government by subjecting all or some
judges to some form of popular election. In all but four such states,
judges, encouraged and supported by their fellow lawyers in the
organized bar—would-be judges and beneficiaries of judicial
power—have responded by adopting codes of judicial ethics that
limit what candidates for election to judicial office are permitted to
say. The effect is to undermine elections as a control on judicial
power by limiting criticism of judicial activism, the misuse of
judicial power.