Suchergebnisse

What is the motivational effect of imposing a minimum effort requirement? Agents may no longer exert voluntary effort but merely meet the requirement. Here, we examine how such hidden costs of control change when control is considered legitimate. We study a principal-agent model where control signals the expectations of the principal and the agent meets these expectations because he is guilt-averse. We conjecture that control is more likely to be considered legitimate (i) if it is not exclusively aimed at a specific agent or (ii) if it protects the endowment of the principal. Given the conjecture, the model predicts that hidden costs are lower when one of the two conditions is met. We experimentally test these predictions and find them confirmed. -- Moral hazard ; intrinsic motivation ; guilt aversion

Abstract
International institutions are facing increasing criticism of the legitimacy of their authority. But what does it mean for an international institution to be legitimate? Arthur Applbaum's latest book provides a convincing new concept of legitimacy, namely, the power-liability view, and a new normative conception, the free group agent account. However, it is not clear how they can be applied to the international level. First, this paper examines how different concepts of legitimacy can be applied to international institutions. Second, it assesses three different conceptions of legitimacy, namely, the service conception, Applbaum's free group agent account and the autonomy-based conception for the international level. It outlines how on the last conception, international institutions' legitimacy depends on three different aspects required to protect autonomy: the political power of the institution; its purpose; and its relation to other institutions. Finally, the paper argues that the creation of an international institution should be seen as part of relational legitimacy and that state consent plays an important role to protect the political autonomy of peoples.

Although elections have become the norm not only in democratic regimes but also in autocratic ones, the legitimacy of the electoral process in different countries is often contested. Facing strong international pressures to prove democratic credentials, eventual winners have a strong incentive to ensure high levels of voter turnout. Conversely, leaders of parties likely to lose the election have an incentive to reduce turnout—for example, through boycotts—to delegitimize the election. In such situations, turnout is a major dimension of competition. To overcome the potential delegitimizing effects of low turnout, incumbents will often turn toward clientelistic mobilization, as high turnout can be a powerful rejoinder to those who denounce elections as a sham and can put observers' concerns about the legitimacy of the electoral process to rest. We develop a theory to explain how such campaigns will target particularistic benefits. We argue that what we term "legitimacy buying" will be primarily aimed at "staunching the bleeding" of supporters who are usually consistent voters but have doubts about the legitimacy of the election. This theoretical prediction departs from theories used to explain vote buying in contexts in which the legitimacy of the elections is largely uncontested by significant groups in society. The theory is supported by data from a list experiment on vote buying conducted after the Honduran 2009 elections, which occurred in the wake of President Zelaya's ousting and in the midst of a boycott promoted by his supporters.

AbstractThis article examines the interaction of different modes and levels of legitimacy within network governance institutions over time. Drawing on new theoretical directions in European governance studies and empirical findings from Canada, we contend that whereas input legitimacy can be exchanged, or traded-off, with output legitimacy to reinforce the overall legitimacy of a network governance institution, "throughput legitimacy" functions as a necessary condition that sustains legitimacy over time. Through a comparison of homelessness governance networks in Toronto and Calgary, we find that throughput legitimacy carries an amplification effect that results in either virtuous or vicious cycles. That is, we argue and demonstrate that low throughput legitimacy in network governance institutions can effectively bring down the whole house of cards.