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In 2015 Papua New Guinea marked its fortieth year of independence. But while the predictions of more pessimistic commentators in 1975 have been avoided, for many Papua New Guineans celebrations were muted; despite the country's rich resource developments, for many people there has been little change in social and economic circumstances.

Prime Minister Peter O'Neill came under continuing pressure to step down pending resolution of corruption charges but resisted demands from university students and civil society groups and convincingly defeated a parliamentary vote of no confidence. Papua New Guinea experienced a further decline in GDP growth and faced landowner threats to shut down liquefied natural gas production.

The current power struggle has taken on historical proportions, interrupting the four-year-old Somare government in Papua New Guinea one year short of its full five-year term. In August 2011, Speaker of Parliament Jeffrey Nape declared the Office of Prime Minister vacant, resulting in Parliament electing Peter O'Neill as the new prime minister. Late in the year, the Supreme Court ruled otherwise.

Ultimately, 2020 turned out to be an ordinary year for Papua New Guinea. Other than the COVID-19 crisis, much remained the same in the country. Any expectations that the new prime minister, James Marape, would change its direction fell apart quickly when it was clear that "business as usual" would continue. Despite their best efforts, Australia and its allies failed to stop the rising Chinese influence in the country.

This article contributes to debates about how capitalist corporations
'see', and how they concurrently relate to the places where they
are located. It argues that an analytical focus on 'seeing' illuminates how
internal organization and outward relation making are tied together in
complex ways. Even so, corporations of the extractive industries in particular
cannot be assumed to encompass a single coherent view. The empirical
case is a critical examination of how a gas project employed strict
health, safety, and security measures to generate order when encountering
alterity in an unfamiliar environment in Papua New Guinea. It reveals
how the project was organized around two conflicting ways of seeing its
host country—trying to separate itself from it while simultaneously having
to engage and provide benefits for it.

On many measures of ethno-linguistic diversity, Papua New Guinea is the most fragmented society in the world. I argue that the macro-level political effect of this diversity has been to reduce, rather than increase, the impact of ethnic conflict on the state. Outside the Bougainville conflict, and (to a lesser extent) the recent upsurge of violence in the Southern Highlands, ethnic conflicts in Papua New Guinea have not presented a threat to national government. In contrast to most other ethnically diverse societies, the most consequential impacts of ethnic conflict in Papua New Guinea are at the local level. This paper therefore examines the disparate impacts of local- and national-level forms of ethnic conflict in Papua New Guinea.

Based on extensive interviews (N not given) supplemented by a study of relevant documentation, the substantial government decentralization that has taken place in Papua New Guinea since independence is outlined. Attention is drawn to the five main sources from which provincial governments draw their funds. The following issues are discussed: (1) whether provincial government should be retained, (2) the position of the suspended & less developed provinces, (3) manpower & public service, (4) finance, (5) economic growth & social justice, (6) conflict & cooperation, & (7) local government. The main conclusions are that provincial government is here to stay, at least for the foreseeable future, but will be subject to tighter control by the national government, & that the provinces will continue to vary considerably in their resources & taxable capacities; provincial inequality will not be significantly reduced. 3 Tables, 1 Map. AA

On many measures of ethno-linguistic diversity, Papua New Guinea is the most fragmented society in the world. I argue that the macro-level political effect of this diversity has been to reduce, rather than increase, the impact of ethnic conflict on the state. Outside the Bougainville conflict, and (to a lesser extent) the recent upsurge of violence in the Southern Highlands, ethnic conflicts in Papua New Guinea have not presented a threat to national government. In contrast to most other ethnically diverse societies, the most consequential impacts of ethnic conflict in Papua New Guinea are at the local level. This paper therefore examines the disparate impacts of local- and national-level forms of ethnic conflict in Papua New Guinea.

Indigenous elites play a key role in mediation of economic & cultural relationships between developing countries & the internationally dominant industrial powers. Such elites often constitute a major obstacle to nation-building & become entrenched within new structures of social & economic inequality. The ideology of these new elites is often supported by introduced systems of Western education, & notions about knowledge & the role of men of knowledge in society. Focusing on the dominant ideology of the new elite stratum in Papua New Guinea, data concerning elite attitudes & beliefs were elicited. Both qualitative & quantitative methods were used, & the techniques employed included content analysis, projective tests, & the development & use of an elitism attitude scale with large samples. The logic of the Papua New Guinea elite ideology rested upon faith in the role of Western knowledge in economic development, but the efficacy of Western knowledge was perceived to apply largely to urban locations & introduced economic activities, rather than to rural & traditional life. The dominant conception of Western knowledge included an extension of its domain to include moral knowledge in a manner analogous to the broad scope of conceptions of traditional knowledge. The existence of a small minority with different views may be strategically significant for Papua New Guinea's future. Modified AA.

The introduction of village courts in Papua New Guinea in 1975
was an ambitious experiment in providing semi-formal legal access to the
country's overwhelmingly rural population. Nearly 50 years later, the
enthusiastic adoption of these courts has had a number of ramifications, some of
them unanticipated. Arguably, the village courts have developed and are working
exactly as they were supposed to do, adapted by local communities to modes and
styles consistent with their own dispute management sensibilities. But with
little in the way of state oversight or support, most village courts have
become, of necessity, nearly autonomous. Village courts have also become the
blueprint for other modes of dispute management. They overlap with other sources
of authority, so the line between what does and does not constitute a
'court' is now indistinct in many parts of the country. Rather than casting
this issue as a problem for legal development, the contributors to Grassroots
Law in Papua New Guineaask how, under conditions of state withdrawal, people
seek to retain an understanding of law that holds out some promise of either
keeping the attention of the state or reproducing the state's authority.