Suchergebnisse

Television is a very influential media and important tool in capital accumulation. This study aims to reveal the use of Islamic and Betawi ethnic symbols, workers, and also the audiences of Tukang Bubur Naik Haji (TBNH) soap opera at RCTI. This research used a political economy of communication perspective. The data were collected by using interview, observation, documentation, and literature study. The result shows that the religious symbols of Islam and Betawi culture have been exploited as comodity to be traded. Those symbols have been commercialized dan manipulated through the use of sensational, provocative, and hyperbole words or sentences to entertain audiences and to attract the advertisers. The hyper-comercialization and politicization of symbols caused the soap opera workers and Moslem audiences have been exploited. ; Televisi adalah media yang sangat berpengaruh dan juga alat yang penting dalam mengakumulasi modal. Tulisan ini bertujuan untuk mengungkap pemanfaatan simbol agama Islam dan budaya Betawi, pekerja sinetron dan khalayak sinetron Tukang Bubur Naik Haji (TBNH) di RCTI. Penelitian ini menggunakan pendekatan ekonomi politik komunikasi. Untuk mengumpulkan data peneliti melakukan wawancara mendalam, observasi, dokumentasi dan studi literatur. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa simbol agama dan budaya Betawi dieksploitasi sebagai komoditas untuk diperjualbelikan. Simbol tersebut dikomersialisasi dan diselewengkan melalui penggunaan kata-kata dan kalimat serta tayangan yang sensasional, provokatif dan hiperbola untuk menghibur dan menarik khalayak. Hiper-komersialisasi dan politisasi simbol ini menyebabkan pekerja sinetron dan khalayak muslim ikut dikomodifikasi dan dieksploitasi.

Although communications research in Spain produces a voluminous output and shows a great dynamism through a vast number of conferences and symposia, publications, books and articles, and doctoral dissertations, does this vast quantity show the same richness in terms of quality and diversity? In order to answer this question, and starting from the hypothesis that certain critical perspectives, mainly the political economy one, are deeply in the minority in the communications research field, the authors of this paper have carried out a study on the scholarly communications research presented or published in Spain during 2006. This paper presents the major results of it.

Explaining how political institutions shape human behavior is one of the big challenges of social sciences. This thesis uses game theory, behavioral economics and the tools of experimental economics to study two topics in particular: information aggregation and legitimacy of institutions. While political decisions are most accurate when based on aggregated information, individuals with heterogeneous preferences over political issues often have no incentives to share their private information sincerely. The first two chapters investigate whether individuals - instead of strategic lying - resort to telling the truth as a simple heuristic in complex collective decisions and whether the desire to show one's own expertise induces sincere communication. The last chapter studies how a political institution's legitimacy influences the extent and efficacy of third-party punishment. The evidence presented in this thesis shows that individuals differ largely in their ability to lie strategically, they are more likely to tell the truth when they can signal their expertise in a prestigious knowledge area, and sanctions of a democratically legitimized institution are milder and more effective. Relaxing the standard assumptions of full rationality and self-interested preferences, and integrating cognitive constraints and behavioral motives such as image concerns and legitimacy in economic models is thus key to understanding political behavior.

Explaining how political institutions shape human behavior is one of the big challenges of social sciences. This thesis uses game theory, behavioral economics and the tools of experimental economics to study two topics in particular: information aggregation and legitimacy of institutions. While political decisions are most accurate when based on aggregated information, individuals with heterogeneous preferences over political issues often have no incentives to share their private information sincerely. The first two chapters investigate whether individuals - instead of strategic lying - resort to telling the truth as a simple heuristic in complex collective decisions and whether the desire to show one's own expertise induces sincere communication. The last chapter studies how a political institution's legitimacy influences the extent and efficacy of third-party punishment. The evidence presented in this thesis shows that individuals differ largely in their ability to lie strategically, they are more likely to tell the truth when they can signal their expertise in a prestigious knowledge area, and sanctions of a democratically legitimized institution are milder and more effective. Relaxing the standard assumptions of full rationality and self-interested preferences, and integrating cognitive constraints and behavioral motives such as image concerns and legitimacy in economic models is thus key to understanding political behavior.

Explaining how political institutions shape human behavior is one of the big challenges of social sciences. This thesis uses game theory, behavioral economics and the tools of experimental economics to study two topics in particular: information aggregation and legitimacy of institutions. While political decisions are most accurate when based on aggregated information, individuals with heterogeneous preferences over political issues often have no incentives to share their private information sincerely. The first two chapters investigate whether individuals - instead of strategic lying - resort to telling the truth as a simple heuristic in complex collective decisions and whether the desire to show one's own expertise induces sincere communication. The last chapter studies how a political institution's legitimacy influences the extent and efficacy of third-party punishment. The evidence presented in this thesis shows that individuals differ largely in their ability to lie strategically, they are more likely to tell the truth when they can signal their expertise in a prestigious knowledge area, and sanctions of a democratically legitimized institution are milder and more effective. Relaxing the standard assumptions of full rationality and self-interested preferences, and integrating cognitive constraints and behavioral motives such as image concerns and legitimacy in economic models is thus key to understanding political behavior.

This article presents foundations of the analysis of media concentration from the perspective of the approach the critique of the political economy of the media and communication. It outlines the dangers and problems of media concentration, discusses the question of how to measure media concentration, identifies different types of media concentration, and gives a systematic overview of empirical studies of media concentration. As a result of the country comparison on a theoretical (macro) level with an analytically required high level of abstraction, first and foremost identities, commonalities and similarities with regard to the development of media concentration including its causes and consequences can be recognised. The author argues that media concentration also needs to be theorised. The paper distinguishes and discusses two such theoretical approaches: apologetic-normative competition theories of media concentration and critical-empirical theories of media concentration. Critical-empirical theories of media concentration situate media concentration in the context of the development of capitalism, which requires to use the critique of the political economy as theoretical foundation.

Innovation in information and communication technology (ICT) fuels the growth of the global economy. How ICT markets evolve depends on politics and policy, and since the 1950s periodic overhauls of ICT policy have transformed competition and innovation. For example, in the 1980s and the 1990s a revolution in communication policy (the introduction of sweeping competition) also transformed the information market. Today, the diffusion of Internet, wireless, and broadband technology, growing modularity in the design of technologies, distributed computing infrastructures, and rapidly changing business models signal another shift. This pathbreaking examination of ICT from a political economy perspective argues that continued rapid innovation and economic growth require new approaches in global governance that will reconcile diverse interests and enable competition to flourish. The authors (two of whom were architects of international ICT policy reforms in the 1990s) discuss this crucial turning point in both theoretical and practical terms.

Cover -- Globalization,Liberalization and Policy Change -- Contents -- List of Tables -- Foreword: Challenging Liberalization and Globalization -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- Abbreviations and Acronyms -- 1 Policy Change in Indian Communications -- 2 The Conventional Account of Liberalization -- 3 Historical and Critical Perspectives -- 4 India's Political Economy in a Global Context -- 5 Trade in Services Negotiations -- 6 Telecommunications Policies -- 7 Software and Computer Service Exports -- 8 Audiovisual Services and Broadcasting -- 9 Opening Policy Choices -- Notes -- Index.

The mobile market is frequently described as an ecosystem where powerful companies generate value from continuously harvesting and distributing data. In this article, we advance the ecological metaphor through both theoretical conceptualizations and empirical explorations of the contemporary app ecosystem. We thereby contribute to the emergent field of app studies by critically scrutinizing the political economy of mobile communication. The article identifies the prime infrastructural resources that ground app-based communication (devices, operating systems, app stores, apps, third-party services, and data accesses) and their ownership structures to discuss how power is obtained, exercised, and amplified in the app ecosystem. To illustrate the value of the theoretical approach, we provide a critical asset analysis of Google LLC (Alphabet, Inc.) and discuss its position as an invasive species in the app ecosystem.