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We offer a microfoundation of social entrepreneurship through the work of Vincent and Elinor Ostrom on polycentricity (Ostromian polycentricity) and that of Friedrich Hayek on the economics of knowledge (Hayekian knowledge) that reveals both the main strength and main weakness of social entrepreneurship. Problematizing social entrepreneurship in terms of the political economy of knowledge and based on Ostromian polycentricity and Hayekian knowledge, we first find the main strength of social entrepreneurship is that local, decentralized social entrepreneurs usually are the most appropriate and best-positioned—indeed, the most efficient—actors to solve their communities' social problems. Also based on the work of the Ostroms and Hayek, we identify the main weakness of social entrepreneurship: the lack of institutional safeguards to social entrepreneurship. The localized decision-making process, however, might mitigate to some degree the potential for large-scale abuse.

The recent Court of Appeal decision in the 'Heathrow' case, Plan B Earth v Secretary of State for Transport is an illustration of the challenges of reviewing polycentric and expert decision‐making. The issues raised in the case concerning the Planning Act 2008 are an illustration of a court's expository role in such contexts. The Court tackled directly a series of interpretive questions concerning the Planning Act 2008's obligations regarding the consideration of climate change. The Habitats and Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) Directive issues raised in the appeal, in contrast, were presented with the question of the intensity of review foregrounded in legal argument. The Court therefore sought to articulate the 'standard of review' and to apply it to the government's decisions. This way of framing the issue unfortunately sidelined the courts' expository role in relation to intepreting the Habitats and SEA Directives, leaving key provisions under‐analysed.

Abstract The transnational climate change governance (TCCG) landscape, led by sub- and non-state actors including businesses, municipalities, and NGOs, holds legitimate potential for tackling persisting climate injustices, in part by virtue of its polycentric character. However, while in theory polycentric governance systems could serve to correct structural power imbalances, the geography of TCCG remains remarkably uneven. This article explores this puzzle in the context of polycentric governance theory and the allegedly paradoxical relationship between polycentricity and equity. Two interrelated empirical and analytical research questions are addressed: (1) How is TCCG organized geographically along the global North–South divide? And, based on the geography of TCCG, (2) Does its polycentric character contribute toward more equitable governance across the global North and South? Following a large- N analysis of a novel dataset containing 174 governance arrangements and 1196 stakeholders with decision-making powers, I argue that the geography of TCCG is remarkably resistant to change, gravitating unmistakably toward the global North and its existing diplomatic hotspots. I argue that the TCCG system currently in place resembles a system of concentrated polycentricity—a product of an overarching system of rules shared with the international regime that could, in turn, potentially explain the persisting North–South inequities in a still seemingly increasingly polycentric climate.

AbstractThe transnational climate change governance (TCCG) landscape, led by sub- and non-state actors including businesses, municipalities, and NGOs, holds legitimate potential for tackling persisting climate injustices, in part by virtue of its polycentric character. However, while in theory polycentric governance systems could serve to correct structural power imbalances, the geography of TCCG remains remarkably uneven. This article explores this puzzle in the context of polycentric governance theory and the allegedly paradoxical relationship between polycentricity and equity. Two interrelated empirical and analytical research questions are addressed: (1) How is TCCG organized geographically along the global North–South divide? And, based on the geography of TCCG, (2) Does its polycentric character contribute toward more equitable governance across the global North and South? Following a large-Nanalysis of a novel dataset containing 174 governance arrangements and 1196 stakeholders with decision-making powers, I argue that the geography of TCCG is remarkably resistant to change, gravitating unmistakably toward the global North and its existing diplomatic hotspots. I argue that the TCCG system currently in place resembles a system of concentrated polycentricity—a product of an overarching system of rules shared with the international regime that could, in turn, potentially explain the persisting North–South inequities in a still seemingly increasingly polycentric climate.

It is often thought that local governments in the Global South have less influence over climate city networks than those from the Global North. We question this by examining how different climate city networks relate and function as interconnected, yet independent, decision-making centers. We explore the extent to which this polycentric system overcomes the assumed exclusivity and inequality of these networks. We analyze twenty-two climate city networks using qualitative comparative analysis to classify the networks with a majority of members from either the Global North or the Global South based on conditions related to their context, diversity of members, and degree of homogeneity. We find that climate city networks overcome North–South dependencies through targeted support reflecting the local needs and conditions of city members. This diversity of tailored alternatives for cities provides equality and inclusivity at the polycentric system level, despite showing inequality and exclusivity at the network level.

ABSTRACTPolycentricity at the metropolitan scale is perhaps the model of spatial organisation that needs to be investigated more thoroughly as regards its effects on travel. The aim of this paper is to test the role of polycentricity—as well as other spatial characteristics, such as compactness, functional diversification and size—in the costs of commuting, taking into account an external cost component (per‐capita CO2 emissions) and a private cost component (time spent on travelling). The degree of urban polycentricity has been measured by adopting a dynamic approach based on commuting flows and on social network analysis tools. The analysis is carried out using a database of 82 Italian metropolitan areas (MAs). Results show that MAs with a higher degree of polycentricity are more virtuous both in terms of private and external costs of mobility, while the degree of compactness is associated with lower environmental costs but with higher private costs. Size is associated with both higher external and private costs, while the role of functional diversification turns out to be statistically insignificant. Socio‐demographics also play a role.

AbstractPolycentricity is promoted as an ideal urban form to achieve sustainable and balanced development, and it has been widely adopted by planners in China, especially in large cities. However, the rhetoric about polycentricity has rarely been interrogated in planning research in terms of scales, contextuality, power and rationality. To fill this gap, we carried out a Foucauldian discourse analysis in our research to interpret the nature of polycentric practice in City Master Plans, using Tianjin as a case study. Through an analysis of how the discourse of polycentricity is being deployed in planning documents, we develop two principal arguments in this article. First, the conceptual substance of polycentricity evolved alongside the urban transition process in China, and its discursive practice involved multiple scales and spatial elements. Secondly, rather than being mere technocratic practice, the production and legitimation of distinct discourses of polycentricity is an articulation of multi‐scalar power involving various stakeholders, which is disguised and justified by the planning profession.