Suchergebnisse

The Swedish model of industrial relations is distinguished by a high degree of self-regulation with roots around the turn of the century 1900. Under the threat of state regulation, the labour market parties in the 1930s, and again in the late 1990s, found they had a common interest in self-regulation. The 1938 Saltsjöbaden Agreement between the blue-collar confederation LO and the employer confederation SAF had its predecessors in the 1905 Engineering Agreement and the December Compromise LO-SAF. Two dimensions of Swedish industrial relations are highlighted: self-regulation (unilateral and bi-partite) versus state regulation and centralization versus decentralization. These can in turn be combined into a four-field table, which is extended to include bipartite regulation between state and unions (state-supported union-run unemployment funds) and tripartite regulation (the 1990-1993 Stabilization Agreements). Advantages and disadvantages of self-regulation are discussed on the basis of an article by Ann Numhauser-Henning, professor of Private Law at Lund University. The Swedish model of bipartite collective self-regulation (in Swedish also labelled partsreglering) is maintained by a high coverage of collective agreements, in turn promoted by the high density of employers' associations and the internationally high union density. Up to the end of the 1930s the rate of unionization among Swedish white-collar workers was very low in many industries. The dominant attitude among private-sector employers was to consider working and employment conditions for white-collar workers as a matter reserved for unilateral employer control. Therefore, in 1931 eight white-collar unions founded Daco (the Confederation of Employees) in order to get the legislation considered necessary to change this situation. Two options were on the agenda as regards the form of legislation. Procedural legislation on the right of association and negotiation best conformed with the Swedish model of self-regulation, but at the same time was exceptional as the blue-collar workers had acquired these rights long ago through their own efforts. In 1936 the Law on Rights of Association and Negotiation was enacted with support from the social democratic government. Although this legislation deviates from the Swedish model of self-regulation, there is a world of difference between negotiated employment conditions (collective bargaining) and substantive legislation on employment conditions, which was the alternative option. In Denmark the turn of events followed a different path as a substantive law for white-collar workers, the funktionærloven, was introduced in 1938. In the absence of negotiation rights, younger Swedish public-sector professional employees in the 1930s and 1940s carried out unilateral actions in the form of mass layoffs and blockades of hiring of new staff combined with refusal to accept wages below a fixed minimum level. The centralization of LO in 1941 may be described as unilateral self-regulation and as a supplement to the Saltsjöbaden Agreement. In 1935 a government commission had recommended the LO to centralize, and the labour market parties to define rules of conduct safeguarding industrial peace. Union centralization in Sweden was quite different from the corresponding processes in Denmark and Norway. Although collective agreements distinguish all Nordic countries, Sweden is in a class of its own with respect to self-regulated wage formation and conflict resolution. A departure from the traditional Swedish model of industrial relations occurred with the series of labour laws introduced in the 1970s. One of the first was the 1971 law on employment protection for elderly employees. The 1997 Industry Agreement between the unions in manufacturing and corresponding SAF associations has clear parallels to the 1938 basic agreement with respect to origin (threat of state regulation), contents (negotiation procedure, conflict resolution) and the spirit of cooperation. The new reinforced National Mediation Office (2000) received, in addition to its mediation role in labour disputes, the task of promoting 'an efficient wage formation process' that meant the appearance of a new mix of self-regulation and state regulation.

In recent public debates regarding higher education, considerable attention has been paid to the general accreditation of higher-education institutions. In this short article, the author briefly explores accreditation in higher education and the extent to which it represents market regulation or government regulation. He looks at the extent to which general accreditation of colleges and universities as practiced in the US has emerged from the needs of students, colleges, and universities or has been planned from the top down. If accreditation is an emergent phenomenon, like a marketplace, then as social scientists people should be extremely skeptical of attempts to "fix" what may not be broken. Adapted from the source document.

Establishes regulations and provisions for petroleum products and the imposition of a levy on persons carrying on production.

Non Smoking Area (NSA) is a policy that is made considering that cigarettes are a type of addictive substance which if used can cause harm to the health of the individual or to the surrounding community. Certainly at a glance smoking in a public place does not look like a crime, different from pickpocket, robbery, and other violent crimes, but exposure to cigarette smoke can affect the incidence of disease and even kill all people even. Ironically, passive smokers carry more risk than active smokers or perpetrators. On the other hand public places are considered as free expression areas including smoking. Therefore, the central government up to the regional government stipulates and implements the NSA Policy. The study carried out in Bekasi City by conducting the Normative Juridical Study, Jurisdiction of Sociology, Philosophical Juridical Study and Juridical Comparative Study (Comparative Research of Law), this study produced a concept of regional regulation that can be scientifically used in Bekasi City

Intro -- FEDERAL REGULATIONS COST ESTIMATION, RULEMAKING ACTIVITY, AND COST-BENEFIT ISSUES -- FEDERAL REGULATIONS COST ESTIMATION, RULEMAKING ACTIVITY, AND COST-BENEFIT ISSUES -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- Chapter 1 METHODS OF ESTIMATING THE TOTAL COST OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS -- SUMMARY -- ESTIMATING THE TOTAL COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATION -- "BOTTOM-UP" METHOD: AGGREGATING EXISTING COST ESTIMATES -- What Is the Bottom-Up Approach? -- Why Use the Bottom-Up Approach? -- Case Study: The Annual OMB Report on the Total Costs and Benefits of Federal Rules -- Background on the OMB Report to Congress -- Summary of 2014 OMB Report on Costs and Benefits -- Analysis of Bottom-Up Approach to Aggregating Costs and Benefits -- Costs Not Estimated for Every Rule -- Independent Regulatory Agencies Are Often Not Required to Estimate Costs and Benefits -- Costs and Benefit Estimates Only Required for Economically Significant Rules -- Monetizing Costs Can Be Challenging -- Potential Uncertainties in Individual Cost-Benefit Analyses -- Questions Over Accuracy of Individual Cost and Benefit Estimates -- Measuring Costs over Time -- "TOP-DOWN" METHOD: ESTIMATING COSTS USING MACROECONOMIC MODELING -- What Is the Top-Down Approach? -- Why Use the Top-Down Approach? -- Case Study: Crain and Crain Report -- Background on the Crain and Crain Report -- Summary of the 2014 Crain and Crain Report -- Analysis of Top-Down Approach to Estimating Costs and Benefits -- Importance of Accurate Measures of Regulation in Top-Down Approach -- Questions About Proper Model Specification -- Selecting Independent Variables -- Selecting a Dependent Variable -- Selecting the Correct Form -- Other Potential Methodological Issues -- Questions of Causality -- Sample Size -- Potential for Double-Counting Costs -- No Discussion of Benefits of Regulations.