Suchergebnisse

The signaling trap -- How elections work in Vietnam -- "Unconditional party government" : legislative organization in the VNA -- Explaining the evolution of the VNA -- Mobilized or motivated? -- Explaining oversight behavior -- Intimidation or legitimation?

1,4. The commission recommendations: fundamental principles of democracy. - 1992. - 78 S

The single-party system of Nasser's Egypt belongs to a political genre widespread in Africa. It is a collaboration movement in which a nationally dominant leader enters into an "alliance" with regionally and locally influential persons; the party organization serves as a kind of "formal contract" between them. As a rule, the alliance is tacit in nature, based on each side's reading of political realities, and therefore tending both to be ad hoc and to involve a limited degree of direct interaction. The collaboration movement may be described as a transcendental organization with which individuals willing to deal with and support the regime may affiliate without necessarily making a total commitment to the movement.

When do electorally dominant parties lose power in democracies? Drawing on the experiences of India's states during the period of Indian National Congress dominance, we argue that single-party dominance is less likely to endure under two conditions: first, when one of the opposition parties possesses a longstanding and robust party organization and, second, when there is a single social cleavage dividing the political class into two main cleavage groups. Both conditions contribute to the demise of a dominant party system by encouraging a previously fragmented opposition to consolidate behind one large party capable of challenging the dominant party. We provide support for our argument with evidence from across India's states and with more in-depth case studies of Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, and Uttar Pradesh.

After noting some of the unique features of Franco's dictatorship this article analyses the institutional configuration of Franco's first government. It then addresses the relationship between General Franco and the official party, Falange Espaola y de las JONS from its creation in
April 1937, and the relationship between it and the government after the creation of the first cabinet in February 1938; the internal composition, the dynamics of the council of ministers and its political priorities during the war years; and the recruitment criteria, socio-biographical profile
and political careers of those who became ministers.