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The aim of this article is to underline a more broad and complex approach towards the regulation of lobbying. Our objective here is to provide a systematic enumeration of possible regulatory alternatives. This research involves the examination of the most notable and significant cases of lobbying regulation in the western world and is based largely on the textual analysis of relevant regulatory documents. We do not, however, intend to present the detailed mapping of lobbying regulation in all possible arenas, or evaluate these means, or even recommend particular regulatory options or instruments. We therefore suggest an analytical framework highlighting three important points that should be clarified in each regulatory system: 1) the actors involved in lobbying, 2) the form of regulation, and 3) the regulatory means and instruments. The proposed topography of lobbying regulation can serve as a general basis for the further analysis of regulatory schemes and their comparison, but also as a guide for those considering regulatory options.

This article examines lobbying firms as intermediaries between organized interests and legislators in the United States. It states a partisan theory of legislative subsidy in which lobbying firms are institutions with relatively stable partisan identities. Firms generate greater revenues when their clients believe that firms' partisan ties are valued highly by members of Congress. It hypothesizes that firms that have partisan ties to the majority party receive greater revenues than do firms that do not have such ties, as well as that partisan ties with the House majority party lead to greater financial returns than do partisan ties to the Senate majority party. These hypotheses are tested using data available under the Lobbying Disclosure Act from 2008 to 2016. Panel regression analysis indicates that firms receive financial benefits when they have partisan ties with the majority party in the House but not necessarily with the Senate majority party, while controlling for firm-level covariates (number of clients, diversity, and organizational characteristics). A difference-in-differences analysis establishes that Democratically aligned lobbying firms experienced financial losses when the Republican Party reclaimed the House in 2011, but there were no significant differences between Republican and Democratic firms when the Republicans reclaimed the Senate in 2015.

This article examines lobbying firms as intermediaries between organized interests and legislators in the United States. It states a partisan theory of legislative subsidy in which lobbying firms are institutions with relatively stable partisan identities. Firms generate greater revenues when their clients believe that firms' partisan ties are valued highly by members of Congress. It hypothesizes that firms that have partisan ties to the majority party receive greater revenues than do firms that do not have such ties, as well as that partisan ties with the House majority party lead to greater financial returns than do partisan ties to the Senate majority party. These hypotheses are tested using data available under the Lobbying Disclosure Act from 2008 to 2016. Panel regression analysis indicates that firms receive financial benefits when they have partisan ties with the majority party in the House but not necessarily with the Senate majority party, while controlling for firm-level covariates (number of clients, diversity, and organizational characteristics). A difference-in-differences analysis establishes that Democratically aligned lobbying firms experienced financial losses when the Republican Party reclaimed the House in 2011, but there were no significant differences between Republican and Democratic firms when the Republicans reclaimed the Senate in 2015.

Nonprofit and voluntary associations around the world are the primary vehicle for representing the voices of citizens in the policy-making process. As scholars who are committed to advancing the role of civil society and the citizen, it is incumbent upon us to provide theoretical and practical frameworks that can assist nonprofits with this important work. In developed nations, the similarity between societal values and structures in democratic countries makes it possible to assess and advance best practices for policy advocacy regardless of the origin of those advocacy models. This research introduces a recently developed conceptual framework originally deployed to diagnose nonprofit organizations in the U.S. engaged in legislative advocacy. Applied to 12 Israeli nonprofit organizations involved in legislative advocacy and seeking to advance change through the legislative process, this paper assesses and expands the proposed model confirming that most facets of the U.S. framework were commonly used by Israeli nonprofits. There is also evidence that culturally embedded norms are the main source for deviations from the model applied in the U.S.

Examines efforts by local government organizations to influence state governments, focusing on differences between governmental and nongovernmental lobbyists, lobbying tactics, and effects of changes in state politics, such as campaign finance and increased scrutiny of interest groups; US.

The current experience of lobbying interests in Europe requires a detailed study of legislation to provide open public access to the Transparency Register and to promote the use of lobbying transparency mechanisms in European countries and EU institutions. These mechanisms ensure the implementation of relevant regulations and political decisions by political actors with the assistance of interest groups for the effective implementation of public policy. The purpose of the study is to establish the patterns of implementation of interest lobbying policy in Europe and assessing the reliability of lobbying activities in European countries and EU institutions to check the effectiveness of lobbying interests' modern experience in Europe and mechanisms in ensuring transparency and its integrity in the EU. Research methods: comparative analysis; regression analysis; systematization, generalization. Results. Availability has established the relationship between disclosure by lobbyists and oversight of compliance with the rules of the register and transparency in lobbying. Lobby transparency has been identified as too weak across Europe, as the implementation of the Transparency Register, which aims to regulate lobbying, has not protected against its excessive influence. The largest expenditure on EU lobbying for the period 2017-2018 falls on countries such as Belgium, Germany, and Italy. The current expenditure of EU member states is 91%, more than €2 billion. It was found that lobbying in Europe helps to solve current problems by further improving the legislation that will ensure the implementation of effective EU policy, where the main topics on the agenda are the implementation of the Law on Digital Services and overcoming the COVID-19 pandemic. It has been established that lobbying in Europe should address barriers to access to public sector information and public data faced by citizens, and require the implementation of measures to regulate the further activities of officials between the public sector and lobbying.

Lobbying has long been a source of anxiety. As early as the mid-nineteenth century courts expressed concern about the "designing and corrupt men" who sought to wield "secret influence." Lobbying is a multi-billion dollar business today, but the association of "lobbying" with improper influence is so strong that the American League of Lobbyists – the lobbyists' trade association – recently renamed itself to drop the word "lobbyist." Yet, courts have also long recognized that people have a legitimate interest in being able to influence government action, and that they may need to be able to hire agents to help them, and since the 1950s the Supreme Court has recognized that lobbying consists of rights protected by the First Amendment. The law of lobbying has been structured by these two competing visions of lobbying, as it strives to hold together the differing and conflicting goals of protecting constitutional rights of speech and petition; controlling unfair and improper means of influencing government action; and promoting transparency of lobbying's role in the political process. This article examines the legal framework for the regulation of lobbying. It explores the values shaping lobbying regulation, the regulatory techniques, and the evolving judicial treatment of lobbying. It then addresses the principal issues on today's regulatory agenda, particularly the interplay of lobbying with campaign finance and the application of lobbying laws to grassroots activities intended to influence government action.