Suchergebnisse

This report inventories the crisis management capacities of the European Commission, Council of Ministers of the European Union, and the European Council. It responds to a central concern in the Transcrisis project: that the 'institutional capacities in the three institutions need to be better measured in terms of how they contribute to preparation, response, and recovery' (Transcrisis proposal, p. 34). Capacities are defined in terms of politico-administrative features that facilitate the pursuit of seven tasks of effective crisis management, defined by the project as: detection, sense-making, decisionmaking, coordination, meaning-making, communication and accountability. Investigating capacities in seven issue areas, we reveal a host of emerging capacities in recent years (roughly 200 in total). Some of these capacities were expected, others are surprising. When compared with previous studies, the results show intriguing trends in how, where and in what forms capacities have evolved in recent years. While this report serves as a stand-alone deliverable with its own essential findings, it also provides the foundation for further exploration of effectiveness, legitimacy and leadership across Transcrisis subprojects.

Recent studies have found that the European Parliament (EP) had limited substantive influence on the European Union's response to the European debt crisis. It has been argued that Parliament compensated this loss by expanding its procedural power in crisis legislation; that is, its ability to hold the implementing institutions to account. In this study, we systematically assess the nature of parliamentary accountability and the conditions under which the EP has been successful at increasing its oversight powers. We do so by using new data on the accountability provisions included in concluded economic and financial legislation, scrutinized by the EP between 2009 and 2016. We find that Parliament has been more likely to gain oversight powers in crisis legislation, package deals, and salient legislative files. Our findings provide a more nuanced picture of Parliament's inter-institutional gains and losses in recent years and add to our understanding of the EP's account-holding role.

The present TransCrisis WP5.2 deliverable chapter reports the underway study of the response of the leaders of the European Union (EU) institutions to the inflow of irregular migrants to Europe since 2011. The alarming 700% increase in the number of people crossing into the EU without a permit in 2011 was perceived by many Europeans as a phenomenon which would trigger a crisis across the external EU borders and the borders between the EU member states (MSs). Consequently, the EU leaders were called upon to respond and develop a strategy of trans-boundary crisis management. This paper is divided into three parts – followed by a conclusion – which are structured as follows: The first part gives definitions for the phenomenon and the response, places the European migration crisis in the context of global migration flows and discusses the EU administration's approaches in its attempts to manage the crisis. The second part of this paper discusses the TransCrisis framework for the analysis of the European migration crisis by specifically looking at the scenario methodology that has been adopted in the current research and how it enables the analyst to assess the effectiveness and legitimacy of the management actions used by the acting authorities. In the third part of this paper the scenario methodology discussed in the previous section is then used to analyse the EU leaders' response to the crisis. Finally, in the Conclusions section, propositions with regards to the assessment of the management actions are given along with some recommendations to the management leaders (these being strictly provisional pending the completion of this WP study).

AbstractBefore the COVID‐19 pandemic, infectious disease experts had postulated that the next pandemic is only a matter of time, and Finland, among other nations, had prepared for it. Yet the COVID‐19 pandemic crossed the customary political, functional, and temporal boundaries of crisis management to a surprising degree. This study analyses pandemic preparedness among Finnish infectious disease experts at the central government level before and during the COVID‐19 pandemic (2017–2021). The study is based on interview material, participant observation in the Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare's infectious disease unit in 2017, and health security‐related document analysis. By analyzing expert perceptions of preparedness in two points of time, the study provides insights on the challenges that increasingly transboundary crises have posed for preparedness efforts. The experts perceived that pandemic preparedness would benefit from a more generic approach to planning and from more comprehensive risk assessments and policy advice. The analysis shows that Finnish crisis management had overlooked the extent of transboundedness of present‐day crises and is lacking consideration of how crises turn into chronic conditions that deplete capacities over time. The crisis man.agement regime needs to develop structures to better analyze systemic risks and to extend its timeframe to cover long‐term crises.

AbstractSetbacks—unanticipated, unwanted, and often sudden checks on moving forward—are common in crisis prevention. Managing setbacks, however, is rarely discussed. Even less discussed is the central role that setback management can play in preventing transboundary crises across interdependent critical infrastructures for electricity, water, transportation, and financial services. With a focus on the ongoing financial crisis and on strategies for resilience and anticipation, the article draws out implications for crisis prevention as the first, rather than last, line of defense in managing future crises.

Decision 1082/2013 on Serious Cross-border Health Threats (Health Threats Decision) was adopted in 2013 with the aim of preparing for and responding to serious health threats. In this legislation, the European Union adopts an "all-hazards" approach which strongly relies on the exchange of information as a driver of regulatory activities. This article first demonstrates that the electronic systems of information exchange constitute a key tool in EU Health Crisis and Disaster Management ("EHCDM"). Second, it identifies the distinctive features of these mechanisms in the EU context: the reinforcement of a statutory policy shift towards securitisation of public health, the peculiarity of the EU composite administrative procedures as well as the facilitation of the quality of the sense-making activities. Finally, the article uncovers the possible problems which may affect the adequate functioning of EHCDM and argues the routes for further research. The piece links legal analysis with the interdisciplinary conceptual lens to offer an important contribution to closer characterisation of the EHCDM as a field in its own right together with a better understanding of the EU public health law and administration in the context of transboundary crisis management and health security governance.

AbstractWhat makes a well‐functioning governmental crisis management system, and how can this be studied using an organization theory–based approach? A core argument is that such a system needs both governance capacity and governance legitimacy. Organizational arrangements as well as the legitimacy of government authorities will affect crisis management performance. A central argument is that both structural features and cultural context matter, as does the nature of the crisis. Is it a transboundary crisis? How unique is it, and how much uncertainty is associated with it? The arguments are substantiated with empirical examples and supported by a literature synthesis, focusing on public administration research. A main conclusion is that there is no optimal formula for harmonizing competing interests and tensions or for overcoming uncertainty and ambiguous government structures. Flexibility and adaptation are key assets, which are constrained by the political, administrative, and situational context. Furthermore, a future research agenda is indicated.

In a world facing a growing water crisis, conflicts regarding water sharing and environmental issues are expected to grow, especially in transboundary river basins, where 40% of the world's population lives. This book represents one of the first attempts to bring together methodologies and analytical tools from socio-economic, international policy, engineering, and water management specialists dealing with transboundary water resources. The book is divided into three parts. Part I introduces state--of-the-art concepts in institutional policy and conflict analysis. Part II presents engineering approaches and models for transboundary water management and conflict resolution. Part III analyzes cases in international river basins and enclosed seas

Pan-European legislation stimulates international cooperation to overarching challenges of large carnivore management across jurisdictions. We present an analysis for current transboundary brown bear (Ursus arctos) population management in Croatia and Slovenia. Slovenia's bear management attempts aimed to reduce human-bear conflicts, by limiting the size and distribution of the bear population, with a relatively frequent use of intervention shooting. In contrast, fewer conflicts occur in Croatia and bears have been traditionally managed as a valuable game species, with heavily male-biased trophy hunting. On average 9% of the estimated bear population was removed annually in Croatia and 18% in Slovenia for the years 2005e2010. In Croatia, a greater proportion of adult males were shot than in Slovenia (80% vs 47% of total hunted males, respectively). We model a scenario for the shared panmictic population and two scenarios assuming that Croatian and Slovenian bear populations were spatially closed. When isolated, each countries' policies lead to potentially undesired management directions. The Slovenian bear population showed a stable or slightly decreasing trend that maintained its sex and age structure, while the Croatian bear population showed an increase in size but with a possible lack of older male bear. The panmictic scenario showed that different management policies buffered each other out with the overall combined population trend being slightly increasing with a sustained age/sex structure. The recent geopolitical refugee crisis has led to the partial erection of border security fencing between the two countries. Our data illustrate how the impacts of constructed fencing put in place to address border security issues may also impact the fate of Europe's bear populations and other wildlife species that use shared ecosystems

"Key Actors in the Management of Crises: European Union" published on by Oxford University Press.

AbstractStreet‐level bureaucrats are often grassroots officials, and they are regarded as passive practitioners of policy with no authority to change policy or innovate, while policy entrepreneurs are usually high‐level officials. Based on observations of China's responses to two national crises, this study found that the times do make a hero. When acting as innovative frontline technocrats, major transboundary crisis practitioners, and management savvy operators within the top‐down bureaucracy, street‐level bureaucrats can become policy entrepreneurs. To innovate and drive policy change, street‐level policy entrepreneurs will adopt innovative strategies. They will make efficient use of their expertise and discretion, integrate various resources, strive for attention from superiors, consolidate their achievements, and expand their influence.

Since 1982, Southeast Asia has experienced almost annual 'haze' pollution, caused by smoke from grass, forest and peat fires mostly in Indonesia. The haze affects the health of some 75 million people and the economies of six ASEAN nations. It is the region's first transboundary environmental crisis that ASEAN is attempting to address collectively. ASEAN level interaction is often guided by the ASEAN Way, and a common debate is whether these norms constrain states from interacting effectively at the regional level. This paper will address this debate using interviews and material compiled during fieldwork in Singapore. While Singapore was one of the first countries to propose a common regional approach to the haze, this paper will illustrate how Singapore has in fact been constrained by the ASEAN Way while engaging with Indonesia and ASEAN. This is reflected in terms of its behavior at the ASEAN forum, statements made, and actions taken. As a result, Singapore has often resorted to other means of engagement, like bilateral and track-two engagement. As Singapore is one of the major 'victims' in this equation, this paper serves as important piece of the broader puzzle of why haze management in ASEAN has been less than effective.