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"Increasing efficiency in generating national income and improving equity in its distribution among economic agents is at the forefront of priorities of most modern economies. This book presents a model which aims to maximize a symmetrical welfare function under certain constraints which consider both efficiency and equity, i.e. taxes and subsidies, implemented by a public authority. The model is numerically implemented and considers a set of economic agents with starting incomes that satisfy Pareto income law under various values of the alpha parameter. Also, the model implementations respect the social production function. Various experiments are presented which show how income inequality (measured by means of the Lorenz curve and, what I call, the Lorenz-Gini inequality index) and measures of poverty are sensibly reduced by redistributing national income without lowering efficiency in production. A case study, or application, of Italian personal income in 2008 is also presented."--Publisher's website

The death of welfare economics has been declared several times. One of the reasons cited for these plural obituaries is that Kenneth Arrow's impossibility theorem, as set out in his pathbreaking Social Choice and Individual Values in 1951, has shown that the social welfare function—one of the main concepts of the new welfare economics as defined by Abram Bergson (Burk) in 1938 and clarified by Paul Samuelson in the Foundations of Economic Analysis—does not exist under reasonable conditions. Indeed, from the very start, Arrow kept asserting that his famous impossibility result has direct and devastating consequences for the Berg-son-Samuelson social welfare function, though he seemed to soften his position in the early eighties. On his side, especially from the seventies on, Samuelson remained active on this issue and continued to defend the concept he had devised with Bergson, tooth and nail, against Arrow's attacks. The aim of this article is precisely to examine this rather strange controversy, which is almost unknown in the scientific community, even though it lasted more than fifty years and involved a conflict between two economic giants, Arrow and Samuelson, and, behind them, two distinct communities—welfare economics, which was on the wane, against the emerging social choice theory—representing two conflicting ways of dealing with mathematical tools in welfare economics and two different conceptions of social welfare.

Murray Rothbard offered a twofold defense of the unhampered market economy. He argued that it upholds natural rights and promotes the life and flourishing of persons more fully than any other social system. His welfare economics was not a defense of the unhampered market economy, but a critique of mainstream economists' use of welfare economics to promote state intervention. He argued that mainstream economists accept the subjectivity of value by adhering to the Pareto rule in welfare economics. In doing so, however, they must embrace all the implications of the subjectivity of value and not just the impossibility of interpersonal utility comparisons. They must accept also the principle of demonstrated preference. Recasting welfare economics along the lines of demonstrated preference reorients it away from artificial models of the economy based on fictitious economic agents toward the real economy of actual human persons. Rothbard's demonstration that laissez-faire renders the greatest social welfare in the real economy is shown to be valid.

This paper argues that welfare economics should be restored to a prominent place on the agenda of economists, and should occupy a central role in the teaching of economics. Economists should provide justification for the ethical criteria underlying welfare statements, and these criteria require constant re-evaluation in the light of developments in economic analysis and in moral philosophy. Economists need to be more explicit about the relation between welfare criteria and the objectives of governments, policy-makers and individual citizens. Moreover, such a restoration of welfare economics should be accompanied by consideration of the adoption of an ethical code for the economics profession.

AbstractSocial decisions in risky contexts raise a number of difficult questions, such as: (1) Should social decisions be more or less risk averse than the average person? (2) Should we try to avoid large catastrophes more than frequent but limited harms with similar expected impact? (3) Should social decisions be ambiguity averse or stick to the expected utility canon? This paper reviews the welfare economics of risk and uncertainty and examines possible answers to these questions, based on the pros and cons of utilitarianism, ex ante egalitarianism and ex post egalitarianism.

First published in 1950, A Critique of Welfare Economics was enormously influential. It was concerned with the exposition, criticism, and appreciation of the theory of economic welfare as it had been developed to that date. Now reissued to coincide with the publication of Professor Little's new volume, Ethics, Economics, and Politics. The Critique benefits from a new preface in which the author assesses the contribution that it made in the light ofsubsequent literature in the area. - ;A Critique of Welfare Economics was first published in 1950. It was concerned with the exposition, criticism

Increasing efficiency in generating national income and improving equity in its distribution among economic agents is at the forefront of priorities of most modern economies. This book presents a model which aims to maximize a symmetrical welfare function under certain constraints which consider both efficiency and equity, i.e. taxes and subsidies, implemented by a public authority. The model is numerically implemented and considers a set of economic agents with starting incomes that satisfy Pareto income law under various values of the alpha parameter. Also, the model implementations respect the social production function. Various experiments are presented which show how income inequality (measured by means of the Lorenz curve and, what I call, the Lorenz-Gini inequality index) and measures of poverty are sensibly reduced by redistributing national income without lowering efficiency in production. A case study, or application, of Italian personal income in 2008 is also presented