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This paper examines the optimal adaptation policy of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) to cope with climate change. We build a dynamic optimization problem to incorporate the following ingredients: (i) local production uses labor and natural capital, which is degraded as a result of climate change; (ii) governments have two main policy options: control migration and/or conventional adaptation measures ; (iii) migration decisions drive changes in the population size; (iv) expatriates send remittances back home. We show that the optimal policy depends on the interplay between the two policy instruments that can be either complements or substitutes depending on the individual characteristics and initial conditions. Using a numerical analysis based on the calibration of the model for different SIDS, we identify that only large islands use the two tools from the beginning, while for the smaller countries, there is a substitution between migration and conventional adaption at the initial period

This paper examines the optimal adaptation policy of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) to cope with climate change. We build a dynamic optimization problem to incorporate the following ingredients: (i) local production uses labor and natural capital, which is degraded as a result of climate change; (ii) governments have two main policy options: control migration and/or conventional adaptation measures ; (iii) migration decisions drive changes in the population size; (iv) expatriates send remittances back home. We show that the optimal policy depends on the interplay between the two policy instruments that can be either complements or substitutes depending on the individual characteristics and initial conditions. Using a numerical analysis based on the calibration of the model for different SIDS, we identify that only large islands use the two tools from the beginning, while for the smaller countries, there is a substitution between migration and conventional adaption at the initial period

This paper examines the optimal adaptation policy of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) to cope with climate change. We build a dynamic optimization problem to incorporate the following ingredients: (i) local production uses labor and natural capital, which is degraded as a result of climate change; (ii) governments have two main policy options: control migration and/or conventional adaptation measures ; (iii) migration decisions drive changes in the population size; (iv) expatriates send remittances back home. We show that the optimal policy depends on the interplay between the two policy instruments that can be either complements or substitutes depending on the individual characteristics and initial conditions. Using a numerical analysis based on the calibration of the model for different SIDS, we identify that only large islands use the two tools from the beginning, while for the smaller countries, there is a substitution between migration and conventional adaption at the initial period

ABSTRACTGhana's pursuit of socio-economic growth has necessitated joining the information communication technology (ICT) revolution, thus increasing the consumption and obsolescence rate of electrical and electronic equipment (EEE) and the creation of what is popularly called e-waste. The absence of legislation governing its importation and disposal, combined with the dynamics of Accra's urban economy, including neo-liberal policies and lack of formal job opportunities, has triggered people's ingenuity to engage in novel occupations such as e-waste recycling. Though a lucrative strategy, it comes with a price for those involved: environmental health risks, a fact well articulated by a burgeoning literature. Nevertheless, little empirical evidence exists relating to this perceived relationship. Using questionnaires, FGDs and in-depth interviews, this study fills the lacuna. The findings reveal that the mean daily income of an e-waste worker is GH¢30, far above the daily minimum wage of GH¢4·48. Despite the positives, the findings also show that the environment and health can be compromised.

Biomasse spielt eine Schlüsselrolle bei der Erfüllung der EU 20-20-20 Energieziele. Aufgrund des steigenden Bedarfs bei gleichzeitig limitierten einheimischen Ressourcen ist die EU auf weltweite Biomasseimporte angewiesen. In diesem Rahmen untersucht die vorliegende Arbeit die Einflussnahme unterschiedlicher Förderungen, Preisrisiken und die thermische Vorbehandlung durch Torrefizierung auf Pelletsversorgungsketten. Die Analysen basieren auf drei realen Fallstudien für Pelletshandel von Australien, Kanada und Russland nach Europa. In der ersten Untersuchung wird die Kofeuerung importierter Pellets auf ihre Effizienz hinsichtlich CO2 Einsparungen und verbundener Förderungen evaluiert. Szenarien zeigen, dass Biomasse- Kofeuerung einen effizienten Beitrag zur Erfüllung der EU Energieziele leisten kann. Dennoch könnten die Fördersysteme noch wirksamer auf die Versorgungsoptionen mit geringstem Umwelteffekt abzielen. Die zweite Analyse untersucht den Einfluss von Preisrisiken auf die Wirtschaftlichkeit der Versorgungsketten. Es wird gezeigt, dass Preisrisiken extrem starke wirtschaftliche Schwankungen über einen kurzen Zeitraum verursachen können. Die Absicherung der Versorgungskette geschieht oft über bilaterale Verträge, persönliche Erfahrungen und schnelle Anpassungen an das Fördersystem. Dabei könnte ein systematisches Monitoring dazu beitragen, den Markt verlässlicher zu gestalten und Investitionsentscheidungen zu erleichtern. In der letzten Untersuchung werden die Vorteile von Versorgungsketten auf Basis torrefizierter Pellets bewertet. Im Ergebnis zeigt sich, dass torrefizierte Pellets einen gewissen wirtschaftlichen und ökologischen Vorteil ermöglichen können, es aber noch Forschungsbedarf hinsichtlich der Technologieumsetzung und Marktimplementierung gibt. ; Biomass plays a key role to achieve the EU's 20-20-20 energy and climate targets. Because of rising European demand and limited domestic resources, the EU relies on worldwide imports. Given this framework, the present thesis explores the influences on wood pellet supply chains considering different environmental policies, price risks and the effect of torrefaction pretreatment. The examinations refer to three real case studies for pellet trade from Australia, Canada, and Russia to Europe. In the first investigation, the efficiency of co-firing imported wood pellets in terms of CO2 savings and related subsidy schemes is analysed. Scenarios show that co-firing biomass is efficient to contribute to the EU energy targets. Though, policy makers could use these instruments more effective when directing sourcing decision towards options with even less environmental impacts. The second analysis explores the influence of statistically derived price risks on total supply chain economics. It is shown that price risks can effect strong fluctuations in the short term, which seriously affect the profitability of individual trade routes. Securing the supply chain is mainly based on individual producer-buyer agreements, personal branch experiences and fast reactions on the subsidy system. Systematic evaluation of supply chains could contribute to a more reliable market and thus foster investment decisions. In the last investigation, the economic and environmental performance of potential torrefaction-based supply chains is assessed. As a result, torrefaction-based supply chains turn out to be a certain alternative to conventional ones. Though, still huge research efforts and industrial demonstration are required to make torrefied biomass a real alternative on the market.

The adoption Colombian Cartagena Montreal Biosafety Protocol, supplementary to the Convention on Biodiversity Rio 1992, staged a framework of environmental governance, health and farming, tending a glocal order to incorporate civil society in agendamiemto, and evaluation of these policies) public.Also in the 2002-2008 study period is displayed by the Colombian government to use a global agricultural public policy that follows a development model dependent Periphery and Center for Environmental Economics, where the country's renunciation of protection precautionary measure uncertain risks that are recognized by international environmental law from the Biosafety Protocol. ; La adopción colombiana del Protocolo de Bioseguridad Cartagena-Montreal complementario del Convenio sobre Biodiversidad Rio 1992, escenifica un marco de referencia de gobernanza ambiental sanitaria y agrícola, de un orden glocal tendiente a incorporar a la sociedad civil, en el agendamiemto, y evaluación de las mencionadas políticas públicas.Por otra parte en el período de estudio 2002-2008 se despliega por parte del gobierno colombiano el uso de una política pública agrícola global que obedece a un modelo de desarrollo dependiente Centro Periferia y de Economía Ambiental, en donde el país renuncia a una protección de riesgos inciertos que precautoriamente, se reconocen por el derecho ambiental internacional desde el Protocolo de Bioseguridad.

The adoption Colombian Cartagena Montreal Biosafety Protocol, supplementary to the Convention on Biodiversity Rio 1992, staged a framework of environmental governance, health and farming, tending a glocal order to incorporate civil society in agendamiemto, and evaluation of these policies) public.Also in the 2002-2008 study period is displayed by the Colombian government to use a global agricultural public policy that follows a development model dependent Periphery and Center for Environmental Economics, where the country's renunciation of protection precautionary measure uncertain risks that are recognized by international environmental law from the Biosafety Protocol. ; La adopción colombiana del Protocolo de Bioseguridad Cartagena-Montreal complementario del Convenio sobre Biodiversidad Rio 1992, escenifica un marco de referencia de gobernanza ambiental sanitaria y agrícola, de un orden glocal tendiente a incorporar a la sociedad civil, en el agendamiemto, y evaluación de las mencionadas políticas públicas.Por otra parte en el período de estudio 2002-2008 se despliega por parte del gobierno colombiano el uso de una política pública agrícola global que obedece a un modelo de desarrollo dependiente Centro Periferia y de Economía Ambiental, en donde el país renuncia a una protección de riesgos inciertos que precautoriamente, se reconocen por el derecho ambiental internacional desde el Protocolo de Bioseguridad.

Umweltverträglichkeit und Abfallwirtschaft - zwei Reizwörter, die bei Planung und Durchführung von Zulassungsverfahren für Abfallverbrennungsanlagen, Deponien und anderen Abfallwirtschaftseinrichtungen immer wieder zu kontroversen Diskussionen führen. Angesichts der Novellierung der EG-UVP-Richtlinie und des Fristengefüges der TA Siedlungsabfall dürfte sich diese Diskussion in Zukunft verstärkt fortsetzen. Der Leser wird systematisch in die rechtlichen Grundlagen und die UVP bei der Planung von Abfallwirtschaftsanlagen eingeführt. Dabei wird ein weiter Bogen gespannt, der von Entwicklungen auf europäischer Ebene, dem Stand der bundesdeutschen Gesetze und Regelwerke, der Genehmigungspraxis bis hin zur Erstellung von Fachgutachten für ein Zulassungsverfahren reicht

El cultivo de palma de aceite en Colombia ha tenido una expansión importante, producto de políticas gubernamentales que lo consideran un factor de desarrollo para la economía agraria y del país. Con un recorrido de más de cincuenta años, cuenta actualmente con una producción en cuatro zonas reconocidas, en donde la mayor parte de los productores están asociados a Fedepalma. Un aspecto que genera debate en el país es la sostenibilidad del sector en sus componentes económico, social y ambiental. El objetivo de esta revisión es determinar si en el país se ha desarrollado una palmicultura sostenible. Se concluye que este sector agrario es sostenible en lo económico para el gran productor, pero no es sostenible en lo social y ambiental, aunque hay avances puesto que se aspira a contar con certi"caciones internacionales. Por lo general, el sector es considerado sostenible por parte de las entidades gubernamentales y del propio sector, salvo excepciones. ; The oil palm cultivation in Colombia has had an important expansion; it has been the product of government policies that consider it a development factor for the agricultural economics and the economy of the country. After fifty years, it has a production in four known areas where most of the producers are associated to Fedepalma. An aspect that generates debate in the country is the sustainability of the sector in its environmental, economic and social components. The main purpose of this revision is to determine if in the country a sustainable palm oil cultivation culture has been developed. It is concluded that this agricultural sector is economically sustainable for the large producer, but it is not sustainable in the environmental and social aspects although there are advances due to the fact that it will become internation ally certified. In general terms, the government entities and the sector itself consider it sustainable, considering some exceptions.

International audience ; Integrated assessment models are commonly used to generate optimal carbon prices based on an objective function that maximizes social welfare. Such models typically project an initially low carbon price that increases with time. This framework does not reflect the incentives of decision makers who are responsible for generating tax revenue. If a rising carbon price is to result in near-zero emissions, it must ultimately result in near-zero carbon tax revenue. That means that at some point, policy makers will be asked to increase the tax rate on carbon emissions to such an extent that carbon tax revenue will fall. Therefore, there is a risk that the use of a carbon tax to generate revenue could eventually create a perverse incentive to continue carbon emissions in order to provide a continued stream of carbon tax revenue. Using the Dynamic Integrated Climate Economy (DICE) model, we provide evidence that this risk is not a concern for the immediate future but that a revenue-generating carbon tax could create this perverse incentive as time goes on. This incentive becomes perverse at about year 2085 under the default configuration of DICE, but the timing depends on a range of factors including the cost of climate damages and the cost of decarbonizing the global energy system. While our study is based on a schematic model, it highlights the importance of considering a broader spectrum of incentives in studies using more comprehensive integrated assessment models. Our study demonstrates that the use of a carbon tax for revenue generation could potentially motivate implementation of such a tax today, but this source of revenue generation risks motivating continued carbon emissions far into the future.

International audience ; Integrated assessment models are commonly used to generate optimal carbon prices based on an objective function that maximizes social welfare. Such models typically project an initially low carbon price that increases with time. This framework does not reflect the incentives of decision makers who are responsible for generating tax revenue. If a rising carbon price is to result in near-zero emissions, it must ultimately result in near-zero carbon tax revenue. That means that at some point, policy makers will be asked to increase the tax rate on carbon emissions to such an extent that carbon tax revenue will fall. Therefore, there is a risk that the use of a carbon tax to generate revenue could eventually create a perverse incentive to continue carbon emissions in order to provide a continued stream of carbon tax revenue. Using the Dynamic Integrated Climate Economy (DICE) model, we provide evidence that this risk is not a concern for the immediate future but that a revenue-generating carbon tax could create this perverse incentive as time goes on. This incentive becomes perverse at about year 2085 under the default configuration of DICE, but the timing depends on a range of factors including the cost of climate damages and the cost of decarbonizing the global energy system. While our study is based on a schematic model, it highlights the importance of considering a broader spectrum of incentives in studies using more comprehensive integrated assessment models. Our study demonstrates that the use of a carbon tax for revenue generation could potentially motivate implementation of such a tax today, but this source of revenue generation risks motivating continued carbon emissions far into the future.

International audience ; Integrated assessment models are commonly used to generate optimal carbon prices based on an objective function that maximizes social welfare. Such models typically project an initially low carbon price that increases with time. This framework does not reflect the incentives of decision makers who are responsible for generating tax revenue. If a rising carbon price is to result in near-zero emissions, it must ultimately result in near-zero carbon tax revenue. That means that at some point, policy makers will be asked to increase the tax rate on carbon emissions to such an extent that carbon tax revenue will fall. Therefore, there is a risk that the use of a carbon tax to generate revenue could eventually create a perverse incentive to continue carbon emissions in order to provide a continued stream of carbon tax revenue. Using the Dynamic Integrated Climate Economy (DICE) model, we provide evidence that this risk is not a concern for the immediate future but that a revenue-generating carbon tax could create this perverse incentive as time goes on. This incentive becomes perverse at about year 2085 under the default configuration of DICE, but the timing depends on a range of factors including the cost of climate damages and the cost of decarbonizing the global energy system. While our study is based on a schematic model, it highlights the importance of considering a broader spectrum of incentives in studies using more comprehensive integrated assessment models. Our study demonstrates that the use of a carbon tax for revenue generation could potentially motivate implementation of such a tax today, but this source of revenue generation risks motivating continued carbon emissions far into the future.

International audience ; Integrated assessment models are commonly used to generate optimal carbon prices based on an objective function that maximizes social welfare. Such models typically project an initially low carbon price that increases with time. This framework does not reflect the incentives of decision makers who are responsible for generating tax revenue. If a rising carbon price is to result in near-zero emissions, it must ultimately result in near-zero carbon tax revenue. That means that at some point, policy makers will be asked to increase the tax rate on carbon emissions to such an extent that carbon tax revenue will fall. Therefore, there is a risk that the use of a carbon tax to generate revenue could eventually create a perverse incentive to continue carbon emissions in order to provide a continued stream of carbon tax revenue. Using the Dynamic Integrated Climate Economy (DICE) model, we provide evidence that this risk is not a concern for the immediate future but that a revenue-generating carbon tax could create this perverse incentive as time goes on. This incentive becomes perverse at about year 2085 under the default configuration of DICE, but the timing depends on a range of factors including the cost of climate damages and the cost of decarbonizing the global energy system. While our study is based on a schematic model, it highlights the importance of considering a broader spectrum of incentives in studies using more comprehensive integrated assessment models. Our study demonstrates that the use of a carbon tax for revenue generation could potentially motivate implementation of such a tax today, but this source of revenue generation risks motivating continued carbon emissions far into the future.

International audience ; Integrated assessment models are commonly used to generate optimal carbon prices based on an objective function that maximizes social welfare. Such models typically project an initially low carbon price that increases with time. This framework does not reflect the incentives of decision makers who are responsible for generating tax revenue. If a rising carbon price is to result in near-zero emissions, it must ultimately result in near-zero carbon tax revenue. That means that at some point, policy makers will be asked to increase the tax rate on carbon emissions to such an extent that carbon tax revenue will fall. Therefore, there is a risk that the use of a carbon tax to generate revenue could eventually create a perverse incentive to continue carbon emissions in order to provide a continued stream of carbon tax revenue. Using the Dynamic Integrated Climate Economy (DICE) model, we provide evidence that this risk is not a concern for the immediate future but that a revenue-generating carbon tax could create this perverse incentive as time goes on. This incentive becomes perverse at about year 2085 under the default configuration of DICE, but the timing depends on a range of factors including the cost of climate damages and the cost of decarbonizing the global energy system. While our study is based on a schematic model, it highlights the importance of considering a broader spectrum of incentives in studies using more comprehensive integrated assessment models. Our study demonstrates that the use of a carbon tax for revenue generation could potentially motivate implementation of such a tax today, but this source of revenue generation risks motivating continued carbon emissions far into the future.