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and prosecutors. Part I of this Article argues that the conventional theory of hearsaydiscovery balance does not reflect the reality of modem federal practice. An imbalance has arisen because, in the last quarter century, developments in the law of evidence and confrontation are at odds with developments-or one might say nondevelopments-in the law of criminal discovery. Since enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, both the law of evidence and modem Confrontation Clause doctrine have evolved toward broader admission of hearsay in criminal cases. Contrary to conventional theory, that evolution has at least matched-and probably has outpaced-the trend toward more liberal admission of hearsay in civil cases. But while federal courts criminal cases, the rules of criminal discovery show no sign of adapting to that reality. As a result, in comparison to other litigants, federal criminal defendants now face a litigation environment that features both minimum discovery and maximum admissible hearsay. Part II offers some proposals to address that imbalance by expanding a defendant's right to learn in advance what hearsay he must face, and his right to gather "ammunition" to contest that hearsay. Where appropriate, I have included proposals that would require the amendment of existing rules. But recognizing the practical difficulties facing any rule-making initiative, my principal focus is to suggest more effective means of applying Rule 16, the Jencks Act, and the Brady doctrine-the major discovery tools presently available to criminal defendants-to the task of contesting prosecution hearsay. This Article is not a critique of developments in the law of evidence, nor of the Court's application of the Confrontation Clause to hearsay. It is not an argument that more, or less, hearsay should be admitted in criminal cases. Instead, it takes as a starting point the undeniable reality that, for good or ill, today's federal criminal trials include a wider variety of admissible hearsay than ever before. My aim is to show how the process of criminal discovery can and should adapt to that reality to correct the hearsay-discovery balance when the government relies on hearsay.

This book, the expanded and completely revised text of the author's renowned 1993 dissertation, studies the logical aspects of legal reasoning, in order to provide philosophical foundations for legal applications of Artificial Intelligence. It respects that legal reasoning often takes place in a disputational setting, and observes that the law leaves ample room for disagreement, which means that lawyers reason under the possibility of exceptions and with contradictory legal sources, and cannot do without non-deductive reasoning forms, such as analogical reasoning. The study shows that, contrary to what is often said, these features do not escape a logical analysis if recent developments in logic and Artificial Intelligence on so-called non-monotonic reasoning and defeasible argumentation are used, and if logic is regarded as a tool in, rather than as, a model of legal argument. This book is relevant for scholars in legal philosophy, artificial intelligence, logic and argumentation theory, and can also serve as a textbook for graduate courses in AI & Law, non-monotonic reasoning and legal argumentation

Intro -- CONTENTS -- Preface -- Introduction -- I The german revolution and the transformationof german law in the sixteenth century -- 1. The Reformation of the Church and of the State,1517-1555 -- 2. Lutheran Legal Philosophy -- 3. The Transformation of German Legal Science -- 4. The Transformation of German Criminal Law -- 5. The Transformation of German Civil and Economic Law -- 6. The Transformation of German Social Law -- II The english revolution and the transformationof english law in the seventeenth century -- 7. The English Revolution, 1640-1689 -- 8. The Transformation of English Legal Philosophy -- 9. The Transformation of English Legal Science -- 10. The Transformation of English Criminal Law -- 11. The Transformation of English Civil and Economic Law -- 12. The Transformation of English Social Law -- Conclusion -- Notes -- Acknowledgments -- Index.

peer-reviewed ; The empirical genesis for this novel inter-disciplinary dissertation was the devastating global financial crisis. A separate and simultaneous Irish crisis was located in the banking sector. The financial market domain, based in its own unique set of norms, and replete with shifting risk concerns and a criminogenic nature, exceeded the authorisations and boundaries of the regulatory control domain with disastrous results. These crises revealed market actor conduct control issues including: questionable risk management practices; fraudulent behaviour; breaches of trust; business culture concerns; governance, control system and regulatory failure; business disclosure and transparency inadequacies; ethical concerns including conflicts of interest; and, ineffectual sanctioning. They presented as both opportunity and motivational driver for the public financial regulatory reform agenda, a socially significant issue. The chosen research lens was the financial regulatory police pairing of criminal and administrative sanctioning, where the prime research issue was coordinated interplay strategy reform, targeted to improve market actor compliance. Three shifting paradigms, those of the financial markets and their two financial regulatory coercive control components, the criminal law and regulation, are the backdrop to the research interrogation. Each paradigm reflects a discrete normative system, and post-crisis each has not settled and is still shifting. Historically, they simultaneously developed and cross-fed. Hobbes and his contemporary Locke theorised contractarianism; the rule of law; and, political autonomy which the state took up from the market and re-branded as laissez faire. For modern democracy, Habermas has recognised that autonomy is the normative key with restriction secondary. Polanyi has argued that restriction was a societal countermovement which established control autonomies, which themselves required constraint. Within public regulation, restriction is regulation, a synonym for ...

The aim of the book is to highlight the law and economics issues confronting civil law countries. The following questions are addressed in this volume: to what extent have the existing codes in civil law countries been designed to incorporate economic considerations? Can the modifications made to codified rules over time be explained by a will to react to new economic constraints? Which economic problems are at the root of the revision of codes? And, given that the code is not the only source of law in civil law countries, the volume also explores the relationship between law and economics

Purpose: to determine the place of restrictive means and to establish their relationship with other means of criminal law. The methodological basis of the study is the dialectical method, which provided an opportunity to consider the studied phenomena in the development and relationship, unity and contradictions; system-structural method was used in the study of restrictive means in the system of criminal law; the dogmatic method was used to clarify the meaning of terms contained in regulations and used in legal doctrine and others. Results: restrictive means occupy a certain place in the classifications of legal means. First, the restrictive means relate to the means of installation. In addition, they are essentially more coercive than encouraging, so they are coercive measures. Further, restrictive means are non-punitive means because they do not meet the purpose of punishment. Finally, in the system of multi-track means of criminal law, restrictive means are security measures. Regarding the ratio of restrictive means with criminal liability, it can be noted that they do not meet the criteria of criminal liability, but belong to other means of criminal law. Discussion of problems of determining the place of restrictive means in the system of means of criminal law. The above gives grounds for the following conclusions. First, it is noteworthy that the legislator does not comply with the requirements of a systematic approach in formulating the provisions of criminal law. In particular, the norms of the same institute of other measures of criminal law nature are scattered by him in sections XIV, XIV1, XV, and now also XIII1 of the General Part of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. Obviously, it would be more reasonable and convenient to bring them all together in one section. Secondly, when applying restrictive measures, courts must assume that they are not criminal liability, but belong to other measures of a criminal law nature. Therefore, they should be applied according to the rules established in the Criminal ...