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Bangladesh and Pakistan had very different experiences with aid after 1971. Politics in Pakistan was less inclusive in terms of opportunities for intermediate (middle- and lower-middle-) class political entrepreneurs, and the dominance of military aid to Pakistan exacerbated the problem by allowing the top leadership to continue to rule without sharing much power with these classes. This not only had negative effects on the evolution of Pakistan's politics but also slowed down the growth of a broad-based manufacturing sector. In contrast, in Bangladesh the less centralized organization of political power and less concentrated forms of aid allowed intermediate-class political entrepreneurs to improve their access to resources and created opportunities for many of them to enter productive manufacturing activities such as the garments industry. Differences in patterns of aid can help to explain significant differences in economic and political outcomes in the two countries. These experiences challenge conventional ideas about the relationship among aid, good governance, and security. Designing aid policies so that aid can assist developing countries in improving their economic and political viability requires a better understanding of the complex relationships between aid and the political economies of recipient countries.

The Chávez government introduced a 'Bolivarian' national curriculum to promote radically different understandings of Venezuelan history and identity. We place the fate of this reform initiative within the broader study of state formation and nationalism. Scholars have long identified mass schooling as the key institution for socialising citizens and cultivating national loyalties, and many states have attempted to alter the nationalist content of schooling with these ends in mind. Venezuela constitutes an ideal case for identifying the specific conditions under which transformations of official national ideologies do and do not gain broader resonance. Using evidence derived from textbook analysis and semi-structured interviews with educational officials and teachers in Caracas, we highlight a new argument, showing that intrastate tensions between the central government and teachers, heightened by a well-established cultural machinery and by teachers' increasing exclusion from the Chavista political coalition, explain the limited success in government efforts to implement Bolivarian nationalism through the school curriculum. ; Research for this article was funded in part by Temple University.

This paper analyzes the impact of ideology on the size of US state governments. Following Pickering and Rockey (2011) this impact is hypothesized to increase with mean state income. This idea is tested using state-level ideology data derived from the voting behavior of state congressional representatives. Empirically the interaction of ideology and mean income is a key determinant of state government size. At 1960s levels of income the impact of ideology is negligible. At 1997 levels of income a one standard-deviation move towards the left of the ideology spectrum increases state government size by about half a standard deviation. Estimated income elasticities differentiated by state and time are found to be increasing with ideology and diminishing with income, as predicted by the theory.

En el presente artículo, vamos a abordar el tema de las ideas en el ámbito de la his-toria de la educación, para centrarnos seguidamente en el de las ideas sobre el Estado, en un momento histórico en el que este concepto se está formando y empezando a reclamar un protagonismo importante en un tema en que hasta entonces no lo tenía. En esta línea vamos a analizar el concepto de Estado, y el nacimiento del Estado Liberal. Hemos acotado el tiempo, comenzando en 1857, año de publicación de la primera ley general de educación y por el otro extremo terminaremos en 1931, fecha en la que comienza la segunda república. Además, vamos a centrar nuestro estudio en las ideas y pensamientos, sobre todo de los políticos, sobre el Estado y su papel en la Educación. En este sentido, se trata de dar algunas pinceladas sobre las ideas que expresan refiriéndose a distintos ámbitos: Estado Docente/Derecho a la Educación, Estado Administración, Función de Control/Libertad de Enseñanza, y Relaciones Estado e Iglesia, que veremos que cambian significativamente dependiendo de la ide-ología del que las exprese. ; This article looks at the topic of ideas in the area of history education to then focus on ideas about the State at a time in history when this concept was taking shape and beginning to claim major prominence in an area where, until then, it had little. In this sense, we will examine the concept of the State and the birth of the Liberal State. We have limited the timeframe from 1857 (when the first general education act was drafted) to 1931 (the start of the Second Republic in Spain). Furthermore, our study focusses on the ideas and approaches of politicians in terms of the State and its role in Education. In this vein, we attempt to provide an outline of differing opinions in reference to certain areas: the State as Educator/the Right to Education; the State as Administrator; Control/Freedom of Teaching, and the relations between Church and State. As we show, these changes significantly depend on their underlying ideology ; En aquest article abordarem la qüestió de les idees en el camp de la història de l'educació, per centrar les idees sobre l'Estat, aleshores en un moment històric en què aquest concepte es va formant i comença a reclamar una importació de paper davant d'una matèria en què fins ara no tenia això. És en aquest sentit que analitzarem el concepte de l'Estat, el naixement de l'Estat liberal, ja que ens han limitat el temps, a partir de 1857, any de publicació de la primera Llei general d'educació, i d'altra banda finalitzarem el 1931, data en què comença la Segona República. A més, centrarem el nostre estudi en les idees i els pensaments de tots els polítics de l'Estat i el seu paper en l'educació. En aquest sentit, es donaran algunes pistes sobre les idees expressades per referir-se a diferents àrees: Estat docent / dret a l'educació, Estat administració, funció de control / llibertat d'ensenyament, i relacions de l'Estat i l'Església, que veurem que van canviar significativament en funció de la ideologia dels que expressen.

It would be incorrect to see in the replacement of the colonial state by the post‐colonial state merely a distinction without a difference. The colonial state provided imperialism with a quite direct and unmediated instrument for control in the interests of 'accumulation on a world, scale' within the colonial social formation. The post‐colonial state, while prone toplay a similar role tothat played by its predecessor, is something more of an unpredictable quantity in this regard. Unpredictable, because of the greater scope for expression given to indigenous elements who now find in the 'independent' state a much more apt target for their activities and a potential instrument for the advancement of their own interests and concerns.
In theory, such unpredictability might hold the threat of challenges to the structures of continuing imperial domination arising either from the left (socialism) or from the right (a burgeoning and competitive locally‐based capitalism), with indigenous classes attempting to use the state in order to realize independent national projects of their own. However, under African conditions, these have been much less prominent than a third, more ironic, kind of 'threat' to imperial interests: the crystallization in many African settings of a state too weak and too internally compromised to stabilize society and economy and thereby effectively guarantee the on‐going generation of surplus and accumulation of capital. Such weakness, when it evidences itself, certainly reflects economic contradictions as well as specific attributes of the class forces at play in contemporary Africa. Nonetheless, it is a brand of weakness which finds its primary expression in the political sphere and, as we shall see, only a proper understanding of that sphere can shed real light on the problems involved. Unfortunately, it must also be noted that neither bourgeois political science (as exemplified in the work of countless 'Africanists') nor the work of those few Marxists who have undertaken analyses of African politics, have yet taken us very far towards such an understanding.
Uganda provides an example of these several points and will be explored in this article in order to illustrate them. Here is the 'unsteady state' par excellence—a dependent social formation which has not given rise to a revolution, but which has nevertheless failed to produce a state adequate to the task of guaranteeing the stable environment necessary for on‐going imperialist exploitation.At its most extreme, this has meant 'Aminism', a state 'unhinged', representing a situation so unpredictable that it has led, at least in the short‐run, to a particularly dramatic disruption of the production process‐a situation very far, it would seem, from servicing imperialism's most basic interests. At the same time, it must be emphasized that this bizarre denouement of Uganda's development is consistent with problems and possibilities present within Uganda from a much earlier period, problems which haunted General Amin's predecessor, Milton Obote, and problems which will not necessarily disappear with the passing of Amin himself.
Nor has the nature of such problems been well understood. Not, certainly, by those racists of all colours who either parody or praise Amin with little genuine concern for the havoc he has wreaked—most notably among his own African brothers and sisters. Not by President Nyerere and his advisors, whose ill‐fated support for Obote's post‐coup adventures served only to set back the emergence of a genuine resistance movement in Uganda. Not by the many western scholars interested in Uganda, even though they have provided a wealth of data on the various permutations and combinations of factional politics there. And not by Mahmood Mamdani; even though his recent pioneering work (both in a recent article in the Review of African Political Economy(No. 4) and in his soon‐to‐be‐published book‐length manuscript) does represent an important contribution to the Marxist study of Uganda‐and of Africa. In short, much remains to be learned—not least by Marxists—about the nature of African politics. What follows is intended, therefore, to suggest some possible directions which further discussion might take.

Case study analysis has been used for many years across a variety of disciplines. One of the primary advantages of case study analysis is its ability to illustrate the nexus between theory and practice. This paper explores the use of case study analysis as a culminating experience in a large Master of Public Administration (MPA) program in the western United States. Case studies are examined using an established approach to determine the type, structure, and source of these cases. The project also examines alumni perspectives regarding the utility of case studies relative to their careers.

AbstractThe concept of late development is ubiquitous in political science. Scholars generally use the term to explain the state's role in the economy based upon the timing of a country's industrialization. Many consider Japan a quintessential example of state-driven late development. This article surveys the late development theories of Alexander Gerschenkron and Alice Amsden. It then appraises these theories based upon Japan's experience, demonstrating that neither accurately describes the state's role in Japan's industrialization.To be clear, the argument is not that the state played no part in Japan's economic development. The question is whether late development offers an effective conceptual tool for explaining the causes, content, and timing of state action. There are many possible explanations of Japan's industrialization. Late development is only one of them, and not a very good one.

Probably no part of the over-all US foreign aid program is as little known as is the international exchange of persons program. Appropriations for this program are only a pittance as compared with those for military & econ aid. Opposition to the program arises from apathy or the wistful hope that military & econ measures alone will solve the problems of the world. There is, however, an increasing awareness that all the tools & instruments will accomplish little without the skills & knowledge to use them, The underdeveloped countries of the world recognize this in their insistent demands for educ at any price. There is more to the need for educ than skills. Only through the elimination of ignorance can the mind of man be freed. The free mind & the dignity of human personality must be the ultimate objectives of all our efforts. AA.