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This article examines why some democracies and semi-democracies develop relatively stable party systems, while others continue to be roiled by high levels of electoral volatility. It is the first broadly cross-regional analysis of electoral volatility, and it is based on the most extensive data assembled on electoral volatility. Our most original finding is that competitive regimes inaugurated in earlier periods have much lower electoral volatility than regimes inaugurated more recently, even controlling for a variety of other factors that have been hypothesized to affect electoral volatility. Parties had very different functions according to when democracy was inaugurated, and these congenital differences had longterm effects on the stabilization of party competition. What matters for the stabilization of party competition is when democracy was born, not how old it is. Our results support social science approaches that emphasize historical sequences and path dependence.

Using a comparative approach, this book examines how political communication and the mass media have played an important role in the consolidation of democratic institutions.

ALMOST NO EFFORT HAS BEEN MADE BY POLITICAL SCIENTISTS TO INVESTIGATE THE INTERPARTY BARGAINING THAT IS DECISIVE FOR GOVERNMENT FORMATION AND GOVERNANCE IN MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACIES. THE QUESTIONS IN NEED OF ANSWERS ARE: 1. UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS AND WHY WILL SINGLE PARTY MINORITY, COALITION MINORITY, MINIMUM WINNING COALITION, AND OVERSIZED COALITION GOVERNMENTS BE FORMED? 2. WHAT WILL BE THE PARTY COMPOSITION OF THESE GOVERNMENTS? 3. WHAT KINDS OF POLICY PREFERENCES WILL BE DECISIVE IN THE CALCULI OF GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION THAT PARTY LEADERS MAKE? WHAT KINDS OF PREFERENCES WILL PARTIES BE WILLING TO SACRIFICE FOR THE SAKE OF PARTICIPATION IN A GOVERNMENT? AFTER FIRST SUMMARIZING THE EVOLUTION OF COALITION THEORY AND THE THEORETICAL THRUSTS OF DODD AND DE SWANN'S CONTRIBUTIONS, THIS PAPER PROPOSES A FUNDAMENTALLY NEW APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF GOVERNMENT FORMATION IN MULTIPARTY SYSTEMS.

In the relatively young democracies of Spain & Portugal, public funding plays a critical role in the financing of political parties, which generally lack the organizational capacity to generate their own income. The rules & practice of party financing show that, in addition to the overall heavy dependence on the state, by far the greatest part of the public money is assigned to the party central office. In this sense, they contradict the West European tendency, where it is the party in public office that has become the more privileged face of the party organization in recent times. 3 Tables, 32 References. Adapted from the source document.

"This second edition examines judicial independence as an aspect of democratization, based on the premise that democracy cannot be consolidated without the rule of law of which judicial independence is an indispensable part. It pays particular attention to the restraints placed upon judicial independence and examines the reforms which are being applied, or remain to be adopted, in order to guard against the different kinds of interference which prevent judicial decisions being taken in a wholly impartial way. Focusing on the growing authoritarianism in the new democracies of Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia and Africa, the book analyses the paradox of judicial activism arising from the independence endowed upon the judiciary and the rights bestowed on citizens by post-authoritarian constitutions. Finally, it asks how judicial accountability can be made compatible with the preservation of judicial independence when the concept of an accountable, independent judiciary appears to be a contradiction in terms. This book will be of key interest to scholars and students of judicial studies, democratization and autocratization studies, constitutionalism, global governance, and more broadly to comparative government/politics, human rights and comparative public law"--

Will women transform party politics? As a group of relative newcomers to parties, women may contribute to shaping parties' policy agendas and to changing party rules. A party-level perspective allows for examination of the national- and party-level contextual influences that condition the effect of women on party platforms. Systematic analysis of a broad range of 142 political parties in 24 post-industrial democracies from 1990 to 2003 illuminates the dynamic relationship between women's political power and party politics. Drawing on the Comparative Manifestos Project data and original party-level data, the multi-level analyses reveal that women's rising numbers among a party's parliamentary delegation and among its leadership committee contribute to an emphasis on social justice in the party programme, and to the adoption of gender quota policies. Furthermore, for welfare state expansion, the effect of women MPs is amplified by the presence of a women's organization within the party.

Will women transform Party Politics? As a group of relative newcomers to parties, women may contribute to shaping parties' policy agendas and to changing party rules. A party-level perspective allows for examination of the national- and party-level contextual influences that condition the effect of women on party platforms. Systematic analysis of a broad range of 142 political parties in 24 post-industrial democracies from 1990 to 2003 illuminates the dynamic relationship between women's political power and Party Politics. Drawing on the Comparative Manifestos Project data and original party-level data, the multi-level analyses reveal that women's rising numbers among a party's parliamentary delegation and among its leadership committee contribute to an emphasis on social justice in the party programme, and to the adoption of gender quota policies. Furthermore, for welfare state expansion, the effect of women MPs is amplified by the presence of a women's organization within the party. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

AbstractUsing Sartori's and Mainwaring and Scully's work on consolidation and institutionalization of party systems as touchstones, this article analyses the evolution of party systems with regard to stability and fluidity of legislative party configurations in Africa's democratic states. It examines the key issue of whether there is any stabilization of party systems in Africa today, and if so, under what circumstances such stabilization occurs. This article questions previous studies, arguing that we have not yet sufficiently solved the question of whether party systems as stable interactions exist in Africa. Providing a detailed analysis of elections in Africa's established and emerging democracies, and making a distinction between democratic and undemocratic countries, this study classifies Africa's 21 electoral democracies as fluid, de-stabilized, or stable party systems. A key finding is that institutionalization of these party systems has not occurred over an extended period, but rather, institutionalized party system configurations have been stable from the onset of multiparty elections. Conversely, the other large group of countries with non-institutionalized party systems seems to be perpetually fluid systems despite, in many cases, several successive multiparty elections.

Research frequently contends that support for democracy is a comparatively stable attitude. A previously neglected explanation for this finding is that regime preferences rest on deeply rooted psychological foundations. This article develops theoretical arguments about how the big five personality traits relate to democratic regime preferences in consolidated democracies, and presents empirical evidence using original survey data for six Western European countries. The results show that democratic regime support is substantively higher for more open, conscientious and agreeable individuals, but slightly lower for more extraverted and neurotic individuals. In addition, it highlights that it is important not to conflate support for democracy with authoritarianism, which the previous literature has frequently turned to for personality roots of anti-democratic sentiments. While authoritarianism also goes along with lower openness to experience, conscientiousness displays an opposite relationship, increasing pro-democratic attitudes but also individuals' levels of authoritarianism. Thus, findings on authoritarianism should not be automatically translated to regime preferences.

Abstract: Based on a new data set of democratizations occurring between 1960 and 2004, this paper explores the reasons for reversals in young democracies. Adverse initial conditions including poverty, inequality, and ethnic fragmentation are associated with the failure of democracy, but the relationship is not deterministic. Likewise, numerous young democracies have survived in spite of disastrous economic performance. Political institutions play a key role in preventing a return to authoritarianism, but the effectiveness of constraints on executive power appears more important than whether the regime is parliamentary or presidential in structure. These findings suggest a need for greater coordination between democracy promotion assistance and aid intended to foster economic development.

Party systems provide the essential structure of the coalition bargaining environment. Stability in party systems ensures that there are regularities that can be observed in government formation, but most empirical research focuses on established democracies. In new democracies party systems are less institutionalized and interactions between parties are less predictable. This has significant implications for coalition formation. This paper presents the first study of coalition formation in new democracies that employs an empirical design that is comparable to the leading research on Western Europe. It uses a new dataset of potential coalitions in Central and Eastern Europe to examine three explanations for government formation that arise when party systems are weakly institutionalized. The results show that: first, incumbency is a disadvantage for governments when formation occurs post-election. This is due to high levels of electoral volatility in new democracies caused by policy failure and clientalistic practices. Incumbents are advantaged when formation takes place mid-term as weak party system institutionalization leads to an inchoate pattern of interaction between opposition parties which therefore fail to provide a viable alternative. Second, the presence of former dominant parties influences government formation by stifling the development of programmatic competition. Instead, programmatic competition is subjugated to contestation based on historical enmities. Finally, established parties collude to exclude new parties from coalition formation which may be an indicator that party systems are becoming more institutionalized. Overall, this article provides new insights into the importance of routinized and stable political practices and institutions.

How do politicians in advanced democracies get away with violating political norms? Although norm violators confront a powerful establishment that can penalize them, norm violations currently occur in many advanced democracies. This article analyzes the conflicts between norm-violating challengers and established politicians and parties as norm defenders in multiparty systems to contribute to the discipline's understanding of norm erosion processes. Based on diachronic and synchronic comparisons of conflicts over norm violations in Austria and Germany, the article reveals how political challengers can already damage democratic norms from a position of institutional weakness. Norm violators that make ambiguous provocations and can leverage their previously acquired democratic credentials, can more credibly dispel attempts to stigmatize them as undemocratic. In doing so, they turn the tables on the political establishment and portray its sanctions as a form of 'excessive retaliation' that constitutes a norm violation in itself. The article concludes with the unsettling finding that (verbal) norm protection can facilitate norm erosion.

AbstractHow do politicians in advanced democracies get away with violating political norms? Although norm violators confront a powerful establishment that can penalize them, norm violations currently occur in many advanced democracies. This article analyzes the conflicts between norm‐violating challengers and established politicians and parties as norm defenders in multiparty systems to contribute to the discipline's understanding of norm erosion processes. Based on diachronic and synchronic comparisons of conflicts over norm violations in Austria and Germany, the article reveals how political challengers can already damage democratic norms from a position of institutional weakness. Norm violators that make ambiguous provocations and can leverage their previously acquired democratic credentials, can more credibly dispel attempts to stigmatize them as undemocratic. In doing so, they turn the tables on the political establishment and portray its sanctions as a form of 'excessive retaliation' that constitutes a norm violation in itself. The article concludes with the unsettling finding that (verbal) norm protection can facilitate norm erosion.