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We examine 'heuristic' and 'systematic' candidate-appraisal strategies within a presidential election context. Controlling for political knowledge, we determine whether individual differences in the capacity for ideological thought condition voters' reliance on the major determinants of candidate choice, increasing reliance on policy considerations and decreasing reliance on the heuristic cue of party identification and on perceptions of candidate character when ideological capacity is high, and exerting the opposite effect - decreasing the role of issues and increasing the role of party identification and candidate qualities - when such capacity is low. Using American National Election Studies data from the 1984-2000 period, we find that ideological thinking consistently heightens voters' reliance on issues and decreases their reliance on candidate cues, but only among voters who report being concerned about the outcome of the election. In contrast, the effect of partisanship is stable across levels of ideological thinking and concern about the campaign.We discuss the cognitive processes by which ideological thinking regulates political choice, and assert its centrality in the political decision-making process. Adapted from the source document.

We examine 'heuristic' and 'systematic' candidate-appraisal strategies within a presidential election context. Controlling for political knowledge, we determine whether individual differences in the capacity for ideological thought condition voters' reliance on the major determinants of candidate choice, increasing reliance on policy considerations and decreasing reliance on the heuristic cue of party identification and on perceptions of candidate character when ideological capacity is high, and exerting the opposite effect – decreasing the role of issues and increasing the role of party identification and candidate qualities – when such capacity is low. Using American National Election Studies data from the 1984–2000 period, we find that ideological thinking consistently heightens voters' reliance on issues and decreases their reliance on candidate cues, but only among voters who report being concerned about the outcome of the election. In contrast, the effect of partisanship is stable across levels of ideological thinking and concern about the campaign. We discuss the cognitive processes by which ideological thinking regulates political choice, and assert its centrality in the political decision-making process.

Straipsnyje nagrinejamas partines tapatybes reiskinys Lietuvoje, remiantis 2012 m. porinkimines gyventoju apklausos duomenimis. Pirmoje straipsnio dalyje aptariamos skirtingos partines tapatybes teorijos ir sufor-muluojamos hipotezes apie partine tapatybe Lietuvoje galincius lemti veiksnius. Antroje dalyje aptariamos metodologines partines tapatybes matavimo problemos ir analizuojamas partines tapatybes Lietuvoje lygis. Trecioji dalis skirta partines tapatybes formavimosi aiskinimui. Tikrinamos trys pagrin-dines hipotezes - 1) partine tapatybe lemia politine socializacija seimoje; 2) partine tapatybe susiformuoja politiniu skirciu pagrindu; 3) politine tapa-tybe priklauso nuo dalyvavimo demokratiniame procese patirties kaupimo laiko. Straipsnyje pristatomi logistines regresijos rezultatai vercia koreguoti partines tapatybes teorija The article analyses the formation of party identification in Lithuania, using the data of post-election survey of 2012. In the first part, the two rival theories of party identification are introduced and hypotheses about the factors of party identification formation are presented. In the second part, the methodological issues of the measurement of party identification are discussed and the level of party identification in Lithuania is examined. The third part of the article focuses on the determinants of party identification. Three main hypotheses are tested: 1) party identification derives from the political socialisation in a family; 2) party identification is formed on the basis of social cleavages; 3) party identification depends on the length of democratic experience of electorate. The results of the logistic regression presented in the article impel to revise the theory of party identification. Adapted from the source document.

ObjectiveThis article utilizes national polling data to identify factors driving Tea Party membership.MethodsFirst, in order to clearly define the Tea Party movement, the researchers will report Tea Party demographics drawn from the Blair‐Rockefeller Poll, which includes a national sample of 3,406 respondents. Second, the researchers will create a logit model to predict Tea Party membership.ResultsIn addition to party identification and ideology, Tea Party membership (10.6 percent of the sample) is impacted both by fiscally conservative policy preferences and by presidential approval. To a lesser degree, age and a belief in biblical literalism are also significant indicators in the model.ConclusionsThe Tea Party is a distinct entity from the Republican Party and is triggered, not only by current economic attitudes, but, specifically, by opposition to President Obama.

The Northern Irish party system is plausibly represented as two systems, in which party competition occurs within nationalist and unionist blocs. Social and ideological divisions within these blocs constrain parties' electoral strategies and thus facilitate or inhibit cross-communal compromise. Using Northern Irish Social Attitudes data, various accounts of these intracommunal divisions are tested and their political implications assessed. Contrary to expectations concerning the effects of cross-communal contact, neighbourhood integration is found to have no relationship with partisanship although, consistent with political socialization theory, young people on both sides of the divide are more likely than those who are older to support the more recently introduced parties. Most significantly, however, there are noticeable asymmetries in the patterns of cleavage within the unionist and nationalist blocs. Among Protestants, left-right ideology has a far stronger impact than constitutional position on patterns of partisanship; and social class has considerably stronger effects than does denomination. Most Protestants, whatever their partisanship, also express strongly unionist constitutional preferences. In clear contrast, on the nationalist side party support is polarized along constitutional lines, there is no cross-cutting ideological division over economic inequality, and a majority of Catholics adopt a moderate stance on nationalism. It is argued in consequence, that within the unionist bloc the pattern of intra-communal party competition militates against constitutional compromise as a solution to 'the troubles', whereas among nationalists the unidimensional structure of competition for electoral support and the distribution of attitudes towards the constitutional issue are likely to have influenced the adoption of compromise strategies by Sinn Fein. (British Journal of Political Science / FUB)

According to some scholars, racial issues have transformed US politics by shaping the development of partisan identification among voters who have entered the electorate since 1964. This theory of `issue evolution' argues that the racial attitudes of Democratic and Republican supporters have become increasingly polarized over the last 30 years, and that this transformation can largely be attributed to generational displacement. Others have challenged this conclusion, arguing that the evidence connecting racial attitudes and partisanship is much less conclusive than has been suggested. This research note addresses the controversy from a different angle. Instead of focussing on the direct effects of racial issues on partisanship, it attempts to illustrate how issue positions on social welfare and economics work together as composite indicators of underlying racial attitudes. The extent to which these social opinions are reflections of latent racial feelings is explored using NES data from the years 1980-92 and creating an index of composite racial attitudes. The data ultimately illustrate how issues concerning race have indeed influenced partisan identification during the period studied, although not in the direct manner that was previously assumed.

Une récente démonstration britannique indique que les différents attitudes de la classe ouvrière vers les classes et la politique sont liès aux différences dans la structure de classe de la communauté, au condition de travail et de parenté ll a était prouvé que les différences communautaires influencent minimement dans la catégorie ouvrière masculine de IOntario. D'autre part les faits attestent que I'adhésion a un syndicat est lié soit à I'identification dans la classe ouvrière qu'à I'appui au Nouveau Parti Démocratique; tandis que le marriage avec un cadre dirigeant de la bourgeoisie moyenne encourage les travailleurs á s'identifier à cette derniére et àépouser des partis politiques non gauchistes. La conclusion est donc que I'absence d'une forte communauté ouvrière, le niveau relativement peu élevé d'inscription a un syndicat et I'apparente quantité de mariages à des sujets appartenant à des classes sociales différentes sont les facteurs qui determinent un manque d'identification de la classe ouvrière de l'Ontario.British evidence suggests that variations in working‐class attitudes toward class and politics are related to differences in community class structure, work situation and kinship. It was found that community differences play only a minimal role in such variation among male blue‐collar workers in Ontario. Union membership was found to be related to both working‐class identification and support for the New Democratic Party, while marriage to a woman with a middle‐class occupational background inclined workers toward middle‐class identification and support of nonsocialist parties. It is concluded that the absence of strong working‐class communities, the somewhat low level of union membership, and the seemingly high degree of marriage across class lines are factors contributing to the relatively low level of working‐class consciousness in Ontario.

It is now a more or less established feature of Canada's political life that many sectors of the Canadian electorate are disposed to reject the two "major" political parties in favour of "minor" party alternatives. Recently, the New Democratic party, one of these so-called minor parties, has received substantial electoral support especially in urban English Canada, to such an extent that it is now bidding either to replace one of the major parties or to join both of them in a position of relative equality. Until now, the rather scanty commentaries attempting to account for this "deviant" electoral behaviour of some Canadians have tended to be highly speculative.This article analyses survey findings that shed some light on the NDP phenomenon in the 1960s in four cities in English Canada. It begins by examining the economic and social elements in partisan choice, emphasizing religion and class identification. Next it deals with political habits and attitudes and with party identification and issue orientation. Following this, some of the characteristics of people switching to the NDP are probed. Finally, the findings are related to other research on the topic and some limited comments about the future are made.

THIS ARTICLE QUESTIONS ASSUMPTIONS IN THE LITERATURE DEALING WITH PARTY DECLINE. FIRST, EUROPEAN AGGREGATE MEMBERSHIP DATA DO NOT SUPPORT A GENERAL CONCLUSION OF PARTY DECLINE. SECOND, INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL DATA FOR NORWAY DEMONSTRATE THE COMPLEXITIES OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MEMBERSHIP, PARTY IDENTIFICATION, ACTIVITY IN PARTIES, AND MEMBERSHIP STABILITY. THIRD, WE DISCUSS SOCIETAL CHANGES COMMONLY ASSOCIATED WITH PARTY DECLINE, SUCH AS THE RISE OD CORPORATISM, THE NEW POLITICAL MOVEMENTS, AND THE RISE OF THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA. THE AUTHORS ARGUE THAT THESE DEVELOPMENTS CHANGE THE STRUCTURAL POSITION OF PARTIES (EXTERNAL) AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIFFERENT LEVELS OF THE PARTY ORGANIZATION ITSELF (INTERNAL). WHILE SUCH DEVELOPMENTS MAY LEAD TO PARTY DECLINE, THEY ALSO GIVE PARTY ORGANIZATIONS NEW POLITICAL MANEUVERABILITY. FURTHERMORE, THE GROWTH OF NEW PARTIES, THE POLITICIZATION OF NEW ARENAS, AND THE NATIONALIZATIONS OF PARTY APPARATUSES COUNTERACT THE FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH PARTY DECLINE.

This cohort-sequential panel study on Dutch youths ( N = 3394) and their parents examined the formation of party preference between age 12 and 25. Specifically, it aimed to pinpoint the most formative component and age in a multiparty context. Opinionation, stability and correlates were examined for three components of party preference: party identification, voting intention and left-right identification. Results revealed that most youths formed a preference at some point during their early life. The 6-year stability of party preference was already substantial during early adolescence and increased until early adulthood. Party preference became increasingly related to youths' social characteristics and issue attitudes with age, but parents remained important. Whereas studies from two-party systems emphasized the importance of party identification, this study suggested that left-right identification may instead predominate the early formation, intergenerational transmission and life-course stability of party preference in the Netherlands. The most formative period was around age 18.