Suchergebnisse

We propose a unified theoretical framework within which to interpret and evaluate the foundational principles of GATT. Working within a general equilibrium trade model, we represent government preferences in a way that is consistent with national income maximization but also allows for the possibility of distributional concerns as emphasized in leading political-economy models. Using this general framework, we establish that GATT's principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination can be viewed as simple rules that assist governments in their effort to implement efficient trade agreements. From this perspective, we argue that preferential agreements undermine GATT's ability to deliver efficient multilateral outcomes. (JEL F02, F13, F15)

I estimate a decomposition of productivity and hours into technology and non-technology components. Two results stand out: (a) the estimated conditional correlations of hours and productivity are negative for technology shocks, positive for nontechnology shocks; (b) hours show a persistent decline in response to a positive technology shock. Most of the results hold for a variety of model specifications, and for the majority of G7 countries. The picture that emerges is hard to reconcile with a conventional real-business-cycle interpretation of business cycles, but is shown to be consistent with a simple model with monopolistic competition and sticky prices. (JEL E32, E24)

This paper studies decision-making with rules of thumb in the context of dynamic decision problems and compares it to dynamic programming. A rule is a fixed mapping from a subset of states into actions. Rules are compared by averaging over past experiences. This can lead to favoring rules which are only applicable in good states. Correcting this good state bias requires solving the dynamic program. We provide a general framework and characterize the asymptotic properties. We apply it to provide a candidate explanation for the sensitivity of consumption to transitory income. (JEL E00, C63, C61, E21)

Although microeconomic studies find a positive relationship between R&D and skill premia, much of the recent rise in U.S. wage inequality was accompanied by slowing labor-productivity growth and relatively slow introduction of new technologies. These conflicting observations are consistent with the effects of a skewed distribution of "absorptive capacities"—the rate at which technology-specific skills can be acquired—in a model of endogenous technological change. The framework is used to assess whether the productivity slowdown and the rise in wage inequality can be jointly accounted for by the contemporaneous decline in the growth rate of labor quality. (JEL E24, J31, O3)

Recent articles have shown that contracts can support the efficient outcome for bilateral trade, even in the face of specific investments and incomplete contracting. These studies typically considered "selfish" investments that benefit the investor (e.g., the seller's investment reduces her production costs). We find very different results for "cooperative" investments that directly benefit the investor's partner (e.g., the seller's investment improves the buyer's value of the good). Most importantly, if committing not to renegotiate the contract is impossible, then contracting has no value, i.e., the parties cannot do better than to abandon contracting altogether in favor of ex post negotiation. (JEL C70, J41, K12, L22)

We analyze an economy that lacks a strong legal-political institutional infrastructure and is populated by multiple powerful groups. Powerful groups dynamically interact via a fiscal process that effectively allows open access to the aggregate capital stock. In equilibrium, this leads to slow economic growth and a "voracity effect," by which a shock, such as a terms of trade windfall, perversely generates a more-than-proportionate increase in fiscal redistribution and reduces growth. We also show that a dilution in the concentration of power leads to faster growth and a less procyclical response to shocks. (JEL F43, O10, O23, O40)

In skill-biased (de-skilling) technological revolutions learning investments required by new machines are greater (smaller) than those required by preexisting machines. Skill-biased (de-skilling) revolutions trigger reallocations of capital from slow- (fast- ) to fast- (slow- ) learning workers, thereby reducing the relative and absolute wages of the former. The model of skill-biased (de-skilling) revolutions provides insight into developments since the mid-1970's (in the 1910's). The empirical work documents a large increase in the interindustry dispersion of capital-labor ratios since 1975. Changes in industry capital intensity are related to the skill composition of the labor force. (JEL E23 J31 O33)

We examine self-control problems—modeled as time-inconsistent, present-biased preferences—in a model where a person must do an activity exactly once. We emphasize two distinctions: Do activities involve immediate costs or immediate rewards, and are people sophisticated or naive about future self-control problems? Naive people procrastinate immediate-cost activities and preproperate—do too soon—immediate-reward activities. Sophistication mitigates procrastination, but exacerbates preproperation. Moreover, with immediate costs, a small present bias can severely harm only naive people, whereas with immediate rewards it can severely harm only sophisticated people. Lessons for savings, addiction, and elsewhere are discussed. (JEL A12, B49, C70, D11, D60, D74, D91, E21)

Scale economies and agglomeration externalities are alleged to be important determinants of economic growth. To assess these effects, we outline and estimate a microfoundations model based on a dynamic cost function specification. This model provides for the separate identification of the impacts of externalities and cyclical utilization on short- and long-run scale economies and input substitution patterns. We find that scale economies are prevalent in U.S. manufacturing, cost savings and scale effects often attributed to internal inputs may be due to external factors, and supply-side agglomeration effects are greater than demand-side, especially in the long run. (JEL O47, E23)

We model a war of attrition with N + K firms competing for N prizes. In a "natural oligopoly" context, the K − 1 lowest-value firms drop out instantaneously, even though each firm's value is private information to itself. In a "standard setting" context, in which every competitor suffers losses until a standard is chosen, even after giving up on its own preferred alternative, each firm's exit time is independent both of K and of other players' actions. Our results explain how long it takes to form a winning coalition in politics. Solving the model is facilitated by the Revenue Equivalence Theorem. (JEL D43, D44, L13, O30)