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 There is never a boring year for a scholar of international relations, but, wow, this year was something.  The invasion of Ukraine was eclipsed by the Hamas attack and Israel's response.  The former created much consensus and unity except for the random tankie.  The latter has been incredibly divisive.  It was a year of expectations unmet and exceeded.  And it was an incredibly angering year as so much could have been avoided, and so much awful has been amplified.  I am lucky and privileged, so Musk turning twitter into a far right hellscape was annoying to me but only hurt my hit rate here at the spew.  For others, it was quite destructive with death threats and actual violence.  Seeing folks start to flee Substack due to tech billionaire greed -- hey, the Nazis pay! -- makes think I was right never to move, and then I have to remember that blogger is owned by google, and google has done a fair amount of evil via gaming its algorithms to get more hits via anger--youtube sending folks to the extremes.Anyhow, that is part of the context for this review.  The rest of the context: I blog far less than I once did, averaging a bit more than 2 posts a month, when I used post several times a day.  I theoretically have more time to blog as I have been on sabbatical since July, but I haven't.  Why not?  Partly I write on other social media--bluesky now instead of twitter.  Partly because my first reaction is to write something ... that I have written before.  I don't need to write a "GOP is the Party of Bad Faith" post since I have already written it.  Unto the year in review, which has at least one enthusiastic reader ;)One of the basic rules of legislative politics is not to hold a vote if you think you are going to lose it.  Yet Kevin McCarthy held how many rounds of votes to get to be Speaker of the House.... for a while?  It made me ponder the Humiliation Index--comparing various actors in how much humiliation they tolerate/encourage.One of my favorite parts of blogging is taking ideas from one place and adjusting them to apply elsewhere.  Also one of my fave parts of poli sci-ing and professing.  One reason I do media stuff and encourage the sharp people I know to do so is that, well, they and I are, in my not so humble opinion, better than the average pundit. This idea was in my head for sometime, but unlike most such ideas, I hadn't written about it before--value over replacement pundit.Speaking of media stuff, I vented my spleen about a particular journalist who considered himself above the fray, able to judge who is pure of heart (himself) and who isn't (pretty much everyone else).One of the consistent themes of this year, more than any except perhaps the year I went to Israel, was struggling with my Jewish identity as a non-believer.  In May, I realized that at least I remember the cardinal lesson of the Holocaust: never again.  Which makes me a better Jew than Republican Jews who align with white supremacists.The biggest change in my life this year was the absence of ultimate.  I stopped playing in 2022 due to aging out--I can still run, but changing speed or direction or both quickly pull one tendon or muscle too much.  So, I had chatgpt wax poetically about the end of my ultimate career and a summer sans ultimate.Another milestone was my first defence trade show!  I went to CANSEC thanks to a former participant of the CDSN Summer Institute.  No, I didn't buy anything, but I met sharper Carleton students who were part of the sales teams of various producers.  The amazing thing was the diversity of products from ammo and artillery and drones to food and clothing and cable (yes, the wires between things) and more.  Did going compromise my ability to criticize the defence industry and the government's messed up procurement system since I am a card carrying member of the military-industrial-academic complex?  I don't think so, but read my stuff to judge.Speaking about hanging out with the military, I joined a junket (does it count as a junket if my grant money pays and not the hosts?) to Latvia to see what was going in with Canada and with NATO and with the latest in Strategic Communications.  I had been there before so it was interesting to see what had changed both in the NATO setup and the base itself.  The Latvians were mostly open about stuff, and we all were waiting to be disappointed by the Canadian government (and it did disappoint) as the expected defence review didn't happen.  I did write about what I wanted to see in the review, so I got to be extra-disappointed.The highlight of the year was the trip to Spain. First time Mrs. Spew and I euro-tripped! Great food, amazing sights seen.  Oh, and a lot of sangria.One of the bigger disappointments of the year was the replacement of Anita Anand as the Minister of National Defence by Bill Blair.  Yes, Blair has made some progress on some of the important files, but the more people I talk to in the CAF and DND and the more my first impression was right--this was a hell of a bad signal to send.  And then the budget cuts, including those imposed by Anand from her new spot at Treasury Board, helped to demoralize folks further.  The P-8 decision--buying an existing plane rather than the vaporware that Bombardier was trying to flog--was the right one and surprising given the temptation to pander to Quebec voters.  But overall, people are pretty miffed about how sidelined DND/CAF are now in Canadian priorities at a time where the world is, yes, more threatening.  The CDSN highlight of the year is always the Summer Institute, which keeps getting better.  It is a great chance to hangout with sharp people from all over the Canadian defence and security community as we had both speakers and participants from the military, from DND, from academia, and from other parts of the government.  I get a lot out of it even as we tend to cover similar material from year to year.  Just a terrific group this year in large part due to the recruiting efforts of last year's visiting defence fellow--Colonel Cathy Blue.One of the strangest things of 2023 was how politicization of the military became all about ... me?  I get accused of thinking everything is about me, which is why I used to joke here about how I am a narcissist, but on this matter, well, oy.  It started by my writing about politicization of the US military, as analyzed by Michael Robinson, a very sharp military officer who is a hell of a social scientist (and with whom I have a long lingering project on Japanese public opinion and the Self-Defense Force).  It then led to an op-ed where I argued the Conservative Party of Canada should not give a platform at its convention to a cranky retired general.  The cranky retiree, Michel Maisoneuve then wrote an op-ed of his own, which was directly aimed at ... moi!  Because it was such a crappy argument, I could not resist the temptation to grade it.  Oh, and other folks responded as well so I discussed what could not fit into the op-ed.The other strange thing, consistent with the larger theme of "it didn't have to be this way" was the Musking of Twitter.  I finally had to leave--too much far right shit from the very top and too much empowering of the same bullshit from other folks.  So, I looked back and the moved on to bluesky.One of the best parts of the year was the new kitchen!!  The counters took much longer to arrive, but they look great and are easy to clean.  The rest of the kitchen was operational in June thanks to our great contractor--Ron.  My fave parts are the island with heaps of deep drawers for appliances and baking stuff and its shelves for Nigella and the rest; the double oven so I can make pitas and fillings for the pitas at the same time; the corners that now stow a heap of pots and pans in one and reserves of flour/sugar/chocolate/etc in the other; and the huge sink.  And the lighting!  Really thrilled with how it worked out with the planning and buying dominating the winter of 2023.  Oh, and it made the ever-growing cookiefest so much easier to execute, perhaps encouraging the madness.Heaps of travel towards the end of the year with only short breaks at home.  The biggest trip was Seoul and then Copenhagen.  First time one trip took me around the world as I flew across Asia from Korea to Denmark.  The research in Seoul was challenging--getting people to identify who is really running the military was not easy.  The case study remains only partially written due to the difficulty plus heaps of distractions--professional (Year Ahead conference, etc) and personal (skiing with my sister in Utah!).  The South Korea research definitely made it clear to me that we are onto something--a relevant, interesting topic.While surveys have shown that academics are censoring themselves about Israel-Palestine, my initial reluctance to write/talk about it was more about confusion/ambivalence/anger.  So, when I saw references by both sides to "From the River to the Sea," s, building on my old work on irredentism.  And then I just wrote angry.Another recurring theme for the past few years but especially this one: maybe there are two sides to the political spectrum, but one side is where the danger is coming from.  It is not close.The year ended with a special anniversary--30 years of being a PhD. I am increasingly aware of how long I have been doing this.  Earlier in the year, I was very conscious of how lucky I have been, how much I owe people, and just being grateful.  And, with a great ski trip crashing my sister's ski clinic and heaps of cookies, the year ended well and I am very, very grateful.  The next year will also be full of travel and skiing and three months of Europe.  Hopefully, a book contract too.  Enjoy your holidays and happy new year!

The influence of religion on politics is inherent not only to the Islamic world, however, none of political theorist should ignore the role of Islam in Muslims' public life, its impact on the policies of Muslim nations and the global geopolitical situation. Due to its historical uniqueness Modern Islam is not only a religion but also a way of life for the vast majority of Muslims and the basis of their civilizational and even national self-identification. Therefore, the role of religion in the Muslim world is different to that of countries, mostly populated by Christians, as Christianity is legally separated from the system of public administration in European countries. Islam, on the other hand, regulates not only the sociocultural sphere of society, including human relations, but also significantly affects the socio-political life of many Muslim countries, where Islamist movements have now become the major part this sphere.In Egypt, where authoritarian secular regime of Hosni Mubarak was overthrown during the revolution, Islamists took the lead in the protest movement, won the first democratic elections and used the opportunity to lead the country after nearly 60 years of underground activity. This paper examines the influence of the religious factor on the change of Egypt's political regime in 2011-2013 by conceptualizing the terms of "political Islam" and "Islamic fundamentalism." The author concludes that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and its Freedom and Justice Party should not be defined as "fundamentalists" because: 1. they don't try to return to a "righteous caliphate," Sharia, and a literal perception of the sacred texts; 2. the Brothers could not be viewed as the most conservative force among Islamists, while Salafists are properly rightly considered to be; 3. the association is considered as a part of moderate Islamism, an ideology that does not mandate any the use of armed methods of struggle. At the same time, the author argues that owing to the fact that Egyptian "Muslim Brotherhood" adhered to moderate Islamism as an ideological party basis, it became a decisive reason that provided them a venue at the top tier of the government in 2011-2013. ; Влияние религии на политику – явление, которое не ограничивается только исламским миром, однако, ни один политический теоретик не может игнорировать роль ислама в общественной жизни мусульман, его влияние на политику мусульманских народов и, соответственно, на мировую геополитическую ситуацию в целом. Современный ислам, благодаря уникальности своего исторического развития, является не только религией, но также образом жизни абсолютного большинства мусульман и основой их цивилизационной и даже национальной самоидентификации. Поэтому роль религии в мусульманском мире иная, чем в тех государствах, где исповедуют христианство, которое юридически отделено от системы государственного управления стран Европы. Ислам, напротив, регулирует не только социокультурную сферу общества, включая индивидуальные человеческие взаимоотношения, но также существенно влияет на общественно-политическую жизнь, частью которой во многих мусульманских странах сейчас стали исламистские движения. В Египте, где в ходе революции был свергнут авторитарный светский режим Хосни Мубарака, исламисты взяли на себя инициативу протестного движения, победили на первых в истории демократических выборах и использовали возможность возглавить страну после почти 60 лет подпольной деятельности. В этой работе исследовано влияние религиозного фактора на изменение политического режима в Египте в период 2011-2013 гг. путем концептуализации понятий «политический ислам» и «исламский фундаментализм». Автор пришел к выводу, что египетских «Братьев-мусульман» и их Партию свободы и справедливости не следует характеризовать понятием «фундаментализм» поскольку они: во-первых, не стремятся вернуться к «праведному халифату», шариату, и буквальному восприятию религиозных текстов; во-вторых, «Братья» не являются наиболее консервативной силой среди исламистов, которой справедливо считают салафитов; в-третьих, ассоциацию принято считать частью умеренного исламизма, идеологии, которая не предусматривает применения вооруженных методов борьбы. В то же время, автор утверждает, что использование египетскими «Братьями-мусульманами» именно умеренного исламизма, как идеологической основы для своей партии стало решающим фактором, обеспечившим им властные государственные места в период 2011-2013 гг. ; Вплив релігії на політику – явище, яке не обмежується лише ісламським світом, однак, жоден політичний теоретик не може ігнорувати роль ісламу в суспільному житті мусульман, його вплив на політику мусульманських народів та, відповідно, на світову геополітичну ситуацію в цілому. Сучасний іслам, завдяки унікальності свого історичного розвитку, є не тільки релігією, але також способом життя переважної більшості мусульман і в значній мірі основою їх цивілізаційної та навіть національної самоідентифікації. Тому роль релігії в мусульманському світі інша, ніж в тих державах, де сповідують християнство, яке юридично відділене від системи державного управління країн Європи. Іслам, навпаки, значною мірою регулює не тільки соціокультурну сферу суспільства, включаючи індивідуальні людські взаємини, але також істотно впливає на суспільно-політичне життя, частиною якого у багатьох мусульманських країнах зараз стали ісламістські рухи.У Єгипті, де в ході революції був повалений авторитарний світський режим Хосні Мубарака, ісламісти взяли на себе ініціативу протестного руху, перемогли на перших в історії держави демократичних виборах та використали можливість очолити країну після майже 60-ти років підпільної діяльності. У цій роботі досліджено вплив релігійного чинника на зміну політичного режиму в Єгипті у період 2011–2013 рр. шляхом концептуалізації понять «політичний іслам» та «ісламський фундаменталізм». Автор дійшов висновку, що єгипетських «Братів-мусульман» та їхню Партію свободи і справедливості не слід характеризувати поняттям «фундаменталізм» оскільки вони: по-перше, не прагнуть повернутись до «праведного халіфату», шаріату, та буквального сприйняття релігійних текстів; по-друге, «Брати» не є найбільш консервативною силою серед ісламістів, якою справедливо вважають cалафітів; по-третє, асоціацію прийнято вважати частиною поміркованого ісламізму, ідеології, яка не передбачає застосування збройних методів боротьби. Водночас, автор стверджує, що використання єгипетськими «Братами-мусульманами» саме поміркованого ісламізму, як ідеологічної основи для своєї партії стало вирішальним фактором, який забезпечив їм владні державні місця в період 2011–2013 рр.

"Deep South Dynasty: The Bankheads of Alabama, 1865-1946 is an epic family biography that reflects the complicated and evolving world inhabited by three generations of the extremely accomplished--if problematic--Bankhead family of northwest Alabama. The book traces the careers of five members of the family: John Hollis Bankhead (1842-1920); his sons, John Hollis Bankhead Jr. (1872-1946) and William Brockman Bankhead (1874-1940); his daughter, Marie Bankhead Owen (1869-1958); and, to a lesser extent, his granddaughter, Tallulah Brockman Bankhead (1902-1968). From Reconstruction through the end of World War II, the Bankheads served as the principal architects of the political, economic, and cultural framework of Alabama and the South. A Confederate veteran and the son of a slaveholder and a Confederate veteran, John Hollis Bankhead rose to prominence over a twenty-year period after the Civil War during which he played a key role in crafting a conservative political culture, legal code, and economic system that relied upon and perpetuated white supremacy in Alabama. With the consolidation of single party rule, he was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1886. He would serve in Congress-first the House, then the Senate-for 33 years in all, playing a pivotal role in the development of federal transportation policies and securing funds to build roads and harness waterways to aid economic opportunities for cotton farmers, coal barons, and emerging industries across the South. Two of Bankhead's sons, John Jr. and William, followed in their father's political footsteps, beginning with John Jr.'s participation in Alabama's 1901 constitutional convention and his subsequent work drafting the election laws which disenfranchised blacks and poor whites from political life in the state for decades to come. William's election to the House of Representatives in 1916 was followed by John Jr.'s election to the Senate in 1930. Both were key New Deal Democrats who were integrally involved in shaping federal agricultural reforms during the Depression. These policies weren't designed for an even playing field, however-the Bankheads and other Southern lawmakers saw to it that the New Deal's programs primarily benefitted white recipients. William's worldview expanded to some degree due to his adroitness in advancing President Franklin D. Roosevelt's legislative agenda in the House; shortly after assuming a leadership role as House Majority Leader, he was elected Speaker of the House in 1936, a position he held until his death in 1940. John Jr.'s death in 1946 marked the close of the Bankhead's political dynasty as the post-WWII era was beginning. Marie Bankhead Owen exercised her social capital in partnership with her husband, Thomas M. Owen, the first director of the Alabama Department of Archives and History, a position she assumed on his death in 1920. An outspoken arbiter of social norms and civic virtue, Marie wielded enormous power over the cultural landscape of Alabama, the South, and, in some ways, the white imagination at large. Working with the United Daughters of the Confederacy and other organizations, she was an instrumental advocate for the Lost Cause ideology that romanticized the antebellum era and rural life generally, legitimized secession, valorized the Confederate soldier, minimized poor whites' contributions to society, and all but erased African Americans from existence. After the death of her brothers, Marie continued working in a variety of capacities for another decade, including as keeper of the family legacy. In this, she was often challenged by William's daughters, especially her outrageous niece, actress Tallulah Bankhead, whose life diverged from the fold in so many ways and yet kept the family name in the public eye and memory long after her more august relatives had passed from the stage. Frederickson's meticulously-researched, expertly-crafted, examination of this once-powerful but now largely forgotten southern family provides a compelling way in which to tell the complicated story of the region and its relationship with the wider world over the course of eight decades, from the wreckage of the Civil War to the dawn of nuclear age"--

 A few days after the 2008 election, a USA Today/Gallup poll asked "In dealing with the problems facing the country, do you think Barack Obama will make a sincere effort to work with the Republicans in Congress to find solutions that are acceptable to both parties?" and parallel questions about whether the Republicans would make a sincere effort to work with the Democrats and Obama and whether the Democrats would make a sincere effort to work with the Republicans.  In March and September 2009 they asked about whether the various parties had made a sincere effort to work with each other, and in February 2010 they asked about working together on health care reform.  They also asked the forward-looking questions after the 2010, 2012, and 2016 elections.  The figure shows the percent who said that Obama, the Democrats, the Republicans, or Trump would (or had) worked with the other party:Obama consistently ran ahead of both the Democrats and Republicans in Congress, and the Democrats were generally somewhat ahead of the Republicans, but they all rose and fell together.   In principle, you might expect that they would move in opposite directions at least some of the time:  that people would see one side as being obstructionist and give the other side credit for trying, but that didn't happen with any of these surveys.  Rather, the public seemed to blame both sides about equally when there was disagreement (if anything, Obama's ratings might have fallen more than the Congressional parties).  I think this data helps to explain why Republicans turned against the Senate immigration deal.  If it had passed, Biden would have gotten some of the credit from the public, and most Republicans are unwilling to do anything that will make Biden more popular (several of them said as much).  A few years ago, I suggested that a strategy of uniform opposition had driven down Obama's popularity.   Republicans have continued with that under Biden.  Of course, there has been some important bipartisan legislation, like the American Rescue Plan Act, but they were mostly early in his term and my impression is that the Republicans have tried to avoid publicizing them.  It used to be that when popular legislation was passed on a bipartisan basis, both parties would talk about it and try to claim some of the credit.  But more recently, people seem to have realized that elections are more about the President than about Congress, so for an opposition party, denying credit to the President is more important than claiming credit for yourself.  And blocking potentially popular legislation might make your side less popular, but it will probably make the other side less popular as well.A few other observations:1.  The numbers expecting the parties to make a sincere effort to work with each other were higher than I expected. 2.  Just after the 2016 election, 58% expected Trump to make an effort to work with the Democrats, which was somewhat ahead of the number who expected the Republicans in Congress to work with the Democrats.  That might be because in 2016, many people saw Trump as a "dealmaker" rather than a traditional conservative, or it may be that there is a tendency to have hopes for a new president.  3.  It's not possible to be sure, but it seems that the questions that asked about the future produced more positive responses than those that asked about the past. 4.  Following from the previous points, it's unfortunate that this question hasn't been asked since 2016--I would like to see how expectations have changed.[Data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research]

From Eastern Europe to East Asia to across the Middle East, the United States is currently positioned on multiple tripwires that could pull our country into a new war the American people do not want. In 2024, it'll be more important than ever that Washington adheres to sound American principles, the most fundamental of which is the consent of the governed.The United States Constitution is clear and concise: "The Congress shall have Power...To declare War." That authority does not belong to the president (no matter their party), or the generals, or some unelected committee of unknown, faceless bureaucrats. Only the people's elected representatives assembled in the U.S. Congress can decide whether to bring our nation from a state of peace into a state of war.And yet, since World War II, their duty has been usurped by the executive branch in the form of the intelligence "community," the military-industrial complex, and the White House.According to the Costs of War Project at Brown University, since Joe Biden's inauguration, American soldiers have been in combat and under enemy fire in eight countries: Afghanistan (prior to Biden's delayed withdrawal), Iraq, Syria, Mali, Kenya, Somalia, Yemen, and the United Arab Emirates.The Global War on Terror has proven that without the support of the citizenry, expressed through their elected representatives, our country cannot continue these endless wars across the globe.Like most Americans, my constituents in New Hampshire's Hillsborough District 1 are tired of forever war and permanent overseas occupation. They have no further tolerance for the expenditure of their money, their blood, or their honor in places like Iraq, where I deployed twice as a Marine Corps rifleman.With a motivation to restore the Founding Fathers' intended separation of powers, I cosponsored H.B. 229, the Defend the Guard Act, in the state legislature. This bill would prohibit the deployment of the New Hampshire National Guard into combat overseas unless Congress has first voted to declare war. Last week, with bipartisan support from both conservatives and progressives, H.B. 229 passed the New Hampshire House of Representatives in an 187-182 vote.This bill, which is only an added enforcement mechanism to Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, drew active opposition. In other states where this legislation has been introduced, lawmakers have been made to feel intimidated by men in uniform, mainly senior officials from the Department of Defense who lobbied aggressively against it. The threats are always the same; don't rock the boat, or else.But our soldiers deserve better than complacency. Defend the Guard will not prevent our National Guard units from participating in overseas training in places like El Salvador — with which New Hampshire has a State Partnership Program — or from fulfilling their domestic tasks like disaster relief in other states. It will only ensure that New Hampshire's National Guardsmen are only sent to fight wars that their representatives have voted for. Isn't that how our republic is meant to work?For all the opposition's big talk, they were drowned out by the immense grassroots backing for the Defend the Guard Act. I know that many of my colleagues' phones blew up with calls from constituents informing them that they should support this common sense fix to our broken foreign policy. I'm incredibly proud of the gratitude I've received from Granite Staters for championing this legislation, and for the help of fellow co-sponsors John Potucek, Michael Granger, and Matthew Santonastaso — all of us veterans.H.B. 229 will now move to the state Senate. Furthermore, more than half the states in the union will have Defend the Guard legislation introduced in their legislative bodies in 2024. In March 2023 the Arizona Senate became the first legislative body to pass this bill.This measure could potentially keep our National Guardsmen out of an unconstitutional war. Their lives are worth that effort, and our Constitution is worth saving.

The last batch of campaign finance reports prior to
this week's election reveal for candidates running in Bossier Parish that
existing legislators may be pulling away from their opponents, all in contests
that will be settled this weekend.

This last span of raising and spending importantly
gives clues as to the direction of a candidacy at a crucial period. Unlike with
the governor's race, where five to two weeks out most voters have made up their
minds, other contests remain in flux as these typically have had little or no information
delivered not only by media and sources independent of campaigns but also by
the campaigns themselves. Ramping up efforts in this period produces the most
impact. Further, donations in this period tend to display a front runner
effect, where gifts go to candidates who donors believe will win so they can
have access to whom they think eventually will win.

By that metric, Republicans state Sen. Robert Mills in District
36 and state Rep. Dodie
Horton in District 9 took best advantage of their opportunities. Mills outraised
his opponent GOP Bossier Parish School Board member Adam Bass by
$50,000 and outspent him by $130,000. Both have about $100,000 left for the stretch
run. Mills has leaned more towards using electronic means to entice voters,
while Bass has taken a more hands-on approach without much indirect voter
contact. A Senate district is of such size that either approach could work, but
the latter takes much more campaigning effort.

Horton appeared to have even more momentum over
her opponent GOP businessman Chris Turner. While
he raised only around $10,000 and hardly spent anything, Horton pulled in
$60,000 and spent most of that, leaving her with almost $100,000 for the home stretch
or about $25,000 more than him. She spent on both instruments of direct voter
contact and indirect means through electronic media.

Another sitting legislator but running for a different
office, Senate District 31, Republican state Rep. Alan Seabaugh also
seized an advantage over his opponent, GOP retired basketball coach Mike McConathy.
Seabaugh raked in close to $60,000, beating McConathy by about $20,000, but
drawing on a huge war chest shelled out over $170,000 or about $100,000 more
than McConathy. Seabaugh has more than double McConathy's $120,000 available
for the run home. He spent across all campaigning platforms while McConathy
relied mostly on television advertising.

This contest, however, can't be judged entirely on
the candidate's efforts because so much outside money is pouring into it. Here
also Seabaugh seems to have a leg up, as particularly Americans for Prosperity
Louisiana and the Louisiana Committee
for a Conservative Majority have sent multiple mailers, with the Louisiana Republican
Party chipping in. McConathy has had mailers on his behalf from Watchdog PAC, a
dark money group recently taken over by Baton Rouge Republican maverick Scott
Wilfong who through
another organization has campaigned on McConathy's behalf, and Keep the
Lights On PAC, a climate alarmist dark money group that spent
heavily to elect far leftist Democrat Davante Lewis to the Public
Service Commission.

Donor data reveal that Turner is drawing money
disproportionately from unions and the Bossier political establishment. McConathy
also is getting action from the Bossier good old boys and additionally much from
trial lawyers.

Finally, in the one parish contest without a
sitting legislator involved, recent reports show a continuing divergency trend
in the House District 2 contest between Democrat Caddo Parish Commissioner Stevem Jackson and Democrat
Caddo Parish School Board member Terence Vinson. Jackson
leans heavily on a more traditional direct voter outreach approach, while Jackson
spends more and heavily on electronic-based indirect contact.

The outcome of this one should be telling. At the
House level, typically Vinson's approach is the most effective, and Jackson
faces reputational problems. So, if Jackson's higher spending and more
electronic-media based strategy works, it could signal changing dynamics in campaigning.

This article explores the political communication of José Mujica during his presidency (2010-2015) in Uruguay and seeks to answer why, contrary to what happened with the others governments of the "Left-turn" in South America, he managed to participate in the mainstream national media in ways that he found beneficial. The work, which arises from an extensive investigation that includes interviews with 32 key actors of the relationship between media and politics in Uruguay, indicates that two main issues converged for this. First of all, the configuration of the Uruguayan media system. Both because of the strong relative weight of the State regarding media companies and because of the "journalism of declaration", which considers that its main task is to obtain the statements of the actors of institutional and party politics. This allows the president to define several conditions of his media appearances. Secondly, Mujica's artisanal handling of political communication, characterized by his direct and atypical style and his audience success, but also by a prior relationship of trust with four political journalists who worked in conservative media. It was a relationship of mutual convenience that allowed the president to reach an audience that he considered strategic and that allowed journalists to get scoops and distinguish themselves within their field. ; Este artículo explora la comunicación política de José Mujica durante su presidencia (2010-2015) en Uruguay y busca responder por qué, a contramano de lo que sucedió con los gobiernos del llamado "giro a la izquierda" sudamericanos, logró participar en los grandes medios comerciales de maneras que le resultaron beneficiosas. El trabajo, que surge de una investigación extensa que incluye entrevistas con 32 actores clave de los vínculos entre medios y política en Uruguay, señala que para ello confluyeron dos cuestiones principales. La primera, la configuración del sistema mediático nacional uruguayo. Tanto por el peso relativo fuerte del Estado ante las empresas mediáticas como por el periodismo de declaración, que considera que su tarea principal es obtener las declaraciones de la política institucional y partidaria. Eso permite que el presidente defina varias de las condiciones de sus apariciones mediáticas. La segunda cuestión fue el manejo artesanal de la comunicación política que hizo Mujica, caracterizada por su estilo directo y atípico y su éxito de audiencias, pero también por una relación previa de confianza con algunos periodistas políticos que trabajaban en medios de línea editorial conservadora: una relación de mutua conveniencia que permitió al presidente llegar a un público que consideraba estratégico y que a los periodistas les permitió conseguir primicias y distinguirse. ; Este artigo explora a comunicação política de JoséMujica no período em que esteve na presidência doUruguai (2010-2015) e busca responder porque, ao contrário do que passou com os governos da chamada "virada à esquerda" sul-americana, conseguiu aparecer na grande mídia comercial de forma benéfica para seu governo. Este trabalho, que se origina de uma extensa pesquisa que inclui entrevistas com 32 atores-chave nos vínculos entre mídia e política no Uruguai, destaca que para isso confluíram questões principais. Em primeiro lugar, a configuração do sistema midiático uruguaio. Tanto pelo peso relativamente forte do Estado frente às empresas midiáticas e pelo jornalismo declaratório, que considera que sua tarefa principal é obter as declarações da política institucional e partidária. Isso permite que o presidente defina várias das condições de suas aparições midiáticas. Em segundo lugar, o manejo artesanal que Mujica fez da comunicação política, caracterizada por seu estilo direto e atípico e seu êxito de audiências, mas também por uma relação prévia de confiança com quatro jornalistas políticos que trabalham em mídias de linha editorial conservadora: uma relação de mútua conveniência que permitiu ao presidente chegar a um público que considerava estratégico e aos jornalistas permitiu obter furos e distinção.

This article explores the political communication of José Mujica during his presidency (2010-2015) in Uruguay and seeks to answer why, contrary to what happened with the others governments of the "Left-turn" in South America, he managed to participate in the mainstream national media in ways that he found beneficial. The work, which arises from an extensive investigation that includes interviews with 32 key actors of the relationship between media and politics in Uruguay, indicates that two main issues converged for this. First of all, the configuration of the Uruguayan media system. Both because of the strong relative weight of the State regarding media companies and because of the "journalism of declaration", which considers that its main task is to obtain the statements of the actors of institutional and party politics. This allows the president to define several conditions of his media appearances. Secondly, Mujica's artisanal handling of political communication, characterized by his direct and atypical style and his audience success, but also by a prior relationship of trust with four political journalists who worked in conservative media. It was a relationship of mutual convenience that allowed the president to reach an audience that he considered strategic and that allowed journalists to get scoops and distinguish themselves within their field. ; Este artículo explora la comunicación política de José Mujica durante su presidencia (2010-2015) en Uruguay y busca responder por qué, a contramano de lo que sucedió con los gobiernos del llamado "giro a la izquierda" sudamericanos, logró participar en los grandes medios comerciales de maneras que le resultaron beneficiosas. El trabajo, que surge de una investigación extensa que incluye entrevistas con 32 actores clave de los vínculos entre medios y política en Uruguay, señala que para ello confluyeron dos cuestiones principales. La primera, la configuración del sistema mediático nacional uruguayo. Tanto por el peso relativo fuerte del Estado ante las empresas mediáticas como por el periodismo de declaración, que considera que su tarea principal es obtener las declaraciones de la política institucional y partidaria. Eso permite que el presidente defina varias de las condiciones de sus apariciones mediáticas. La segunda cuestión fue el manejo artesanal de la comunicación política que hizo Mujica, caracterizada por su estilo directo y atípico y su éxito de audiencias, pero también por una relación previa de confianza con algunos periodistas políticos que trabajaban en medios de línea editorial conservadora: una relación de mutua conveniencia que permitió al presidente llegar a un público que consideraba estratégico y que a los periodistas les permitió conseguir primicias y distinguirse. ; Este artigo explora a comunicação política de JoséMujica no período em que esteve na presidência doUruguai (2010-2015) e busca responder porque, ao contrário do que passou com os governos da chamada "virada à esquerda" sul-americana, conseguiu aparecer na grande mídia comercial de forma benéfica para seu governo. Este trabalho, que se origina de uma extensa pesquisa que inclui entrevistas com 32 atores-chave nos vínculos entre mídia e política no Uruguai, destaca que para isso confluíram questões principais. Em primeiro lugar, a configuração do sistema midiático uruguaio. Tanto pelo peso relativamente forte do Estado frente às empresas midiáticas e pelo jornalismo declaratório, que considera que sua tarefa principal é obter as declarações da política institucional e partidária. Isso permite que o presidente defina várias das condições de suas aparições midiáticas. Em segundo lugar, o manejo artesanal que Mujica fez da comunicação política, caracterizada por seu estilo direto e atípico e seu êxito de audiências, mas também por uma relação prévia de confiança com quatro jornalistas políticos que trabalham em mídias de linha editorial conservadora: uma relação de mútua conveniência que permitiu ao presidente chegar a um público que considerava estratégico e aos jornalistas permitiu obter furos e distinção.

The main factors of the growing popularity and influence of undemocratic regimes are considered. In the modern world, in the context of geopolitical turbulence, the geopolitical centers of power and actors in the adoption of global management decisions are changing. But there is a need to manage socio-political and economic processes for the stable development of society. Therefore, the conditions of chaos only strengthen the attempts to search and create fuses for the uncontrollability of the development of the political regime.Especially in the conditions of the crisis of theformalinstitutions of liberal democracy, a clear proof of which was the emergence of post-democracy as a phenomenon and process of evolution of «modern» democracies. Several factors reinforce this trend. First of all, the reverse wave of democratization (S. Huntington), which lasts several decades. Secondly, the crisis of American hegemony and the completion of the next cycle of political hegemony.We must add the completion of the macrohistorical cycle of the internal political development of the political system of the USA itself (A. Schlesinger) with a number of crises throughout the entire first half of2020. The weakening of the global hegemon resulted in the process ofeasternization and the emergence of new geopolitical centers (primarily,Asia, namely China with a powerful economy, which is a prerequisite for the formation of a new hegemon). The third factor is the growth of right-wing extremism and right-wing populism in countries of sustainable democracies and new democracies. The wave of populism is supported by a conservative turn in the form of legal consolidation of nationalism, the legitimation of the dominance of the collective over the individual.Another factor of destabilization is the crisis of traditional institutions of democracy, primarily political parties, party leaders who can refuse program promises and turn into lawyers of the «expression of the will of the people».Amid growing mistrust of traditional democratic institutions and the values of liberalism, there is a growing demand for leaders and institutions that can ensure the safe and stable development of society. And the actual uniqueness of the current development is the search for new forms of coexistence of authoritarian and democratic institutions within the same political regime. ; Розглядаються основні чинники зростання популярності та впливовості недемократичних режимів. У сучасному світі в умовах геополітичної турбулентності змінюються геополітичні центри сили та актори прийняття глобальних управлінських рішень, тому є нагальна потреба у керуванні суспільно-політичними та економічними процесами для стабільного розвитку суспільства. Умови хаосу лише підсилюють намагання пошуку та створення запобіжників некерованості розвитку політичного режиму. Тим паче в умовах кризи сталих інститутів ліберальної демократії, наочним доказом чого стала поява постдемократичності як явища та процесу еволюції «зразкових» демократій. Виокремлюються чинники, що підсилюють зазначений тренд. По-перше, зворотна хвиля демократизації (С.Гантінгтон). По-друге, криза американської гегемонії та завершення чергового циклу політичної гегемонії, завершення макроісторичного циклу внутріполітичного розвитку політичної системи США (А.Шлезінгер) із низкою криз протягом лише першої половини 2020 р. Акцентується увага на тому, що наслідком послаблення світового гегемону став процес істернізації та поява нових геополітичних центрів (в першу чергу, в Азії, а саме Китаю з потужною економікою, що є передумовою формування нового гегемона). Третім чинником є зростання правого екстремізму та поширення правого популізму як в країнах сталих демократій, так і нових демократій. Хвиля популізму підкріплюється консервативним поворотом у вигляді правового закріплення націоналізму, легітимацією домінування колективного над індивідуальним. Четвертим чинником дестабілізації є криза традиційних інститутів демократії, в першу чергу, політичних партій, лідерів партій, які можуть відмовитися від програмних обіцянок і перетворитися на адвокатів «волевиявлення народу». Доводиться, що на тлі зростання недовіри до традиційних інститутів демократії та цінностей лібералізму зростає попит на лідерів та інститутів, здатних забезпечити безпековий та стабільний розвиток суспільства. Фактична унікальність поточного розвитку – це пошук нових форм співіснування авторитарних та демократичних інститутів в межах одного політичного режиму.

This episode is the second in our Brexit series, and we are joined by Lucian Ashworth, Professor of International Relations at Memorial University of Newfoundland, and author of the influential text 'A History of International Thought' (Routledge, 2014).

Back before Christmas, in Episode 14, we heard Lee Jones offer what was perhaps not exactly a 'Lexit' (or 'left exit') position on Brexit, but nevertheless a progressive position very much in favor of a full Brexit. At the core of Jones's arguments was, I think, the view that the EU is an essentially anti-democratic and unreformable project. The only way to address the problem, he claimed, was to restore British sovereignty. In this sense, Jones was critical not only of the deal Theresa May proposed, last December, but also the position of the Labour Party, with its now infamous six tests — that is, essentially, the idea that whatever deal the UK should pursue, it should be one that results in the "exact same benefits" as as those currently enjoyed by the UK, as a member of the Single Market, but with special additional provisions, including "fair management of migration."

Since we spoke to Jones, there have been a number of important developments, but little by way of clarity as to how the drama will end. On January 15, in the greatest parliamentary defeat of any PM in British history, the British Parliament rejected Theresa May's deal. Since then, following the terms of the so-called Brady amendment, passed on January 29, she returned to Brussels in order to try to negotiate "alternative arrangements." She plans now to present her new deal to Parliament on March 12, just two weeks before the deadline March 29. This is very close to the wire, but May hopes to be able to get the EU to budge on the backstop — something she must do, if she is to persuade Tory Eurosceptics to support her plan.

In this episode, you will hear Ashworth engage with a number of Jones's key points, including the 'WTO rules' issue, the importance of not overstating the power of the Far Right in Europe, and the history of reactionary politics, on the British left. But Ashworth's core arguments stem from his concerns about the future of the Irish border, and the unacknowledged costs of a return to the fantasy of 'the sovereign people' — especially in an era where complex global flows of capital have made it harder and harder for the Left to leverage the state, as it pursues its mission of defending labour and democracy, from the interests of the global financial elite.

Importantly, this episode with Lucian Ashworth was recorded on February 16. Due to technical issues, it wasn't ready for broadcast until today, February 28. This delay does not significantly effect the value of the interview, since our discussion focused mainly on the historical context of Brexit, and abstract questions about globalization, and its complex consequences for our traditional models of politics and economic life.

That said, it is worth mentioning that on Tuesday, February 26, Theresa May announced that, should her deal fail to pass the house, she is going to allow a vote on an extension of Article 50. The pressure is on, however, as we have also begun to see rebellion breaking out, and the creation in Parliament of a new 'Independent Group,' composed of rebels from both Labour and the Conservatives. Corbyn, for his part, announced his support for a second referendum — putting before the people a choice between whether to remain in the EU, or to pursue Labour's alternative vision of a Brexit deal, which includes a permanent customs union.

If you have any questions or comments about the show, you are welcome to reach out to us via Twitter: @occupyirtheory — equally, feel welcome to leave us a positive rating on iTunes, or your favorite podcast software.

Thanks for listening!

La democracia brasileña, como en la gestación anembrionaria – en la que los aparentes síntomas de embarazo debidos a la acción de las hormonas no se corresponden con la presencia de un embrión – no ha encontrado en las instituciones formales constituidas valores y prácticas capaces de resguardar el desarrollo de una democracia sustancial. En distintos períodos de la historia del país, el impulso inicial en dirección a una mayor participación política e inclusión social se ha visto interrumpido por movimientos abruptos de intervención en el curso de la democracia. En 2016, una combinación de intereses de la oposición partidaria, del oligopolio de la comunicación y de sectores del poder judicial, creó las condiciones para el impeachment de la presidenta Dilma Rousseff por incumplimiento de las leyes presupuestarias. Bajo el rito formal de las instituciones, el golpe parlamentario aseguró el retorno de los conservadores al poder y puso en marcha una agenda de regresión social y de autoritarismo, con amplio apoyo de sectores ideológicamente contrarios al gobierno anterior. Como resultado, el proyecto democrático en Brasil se presenta una vez más amenazado y las señales de ello repercuten en el agravamiento de los problemas sociales. En este trabajo, analizamos los factores que determinaron el deterioro de la democracia brasileña y la profundización del golpe parlamentario que impide la fecundación de una democracia sólida en el país. ; A democracia brasileira, como na gestação anembrionária, em que os sinais aparentes causados pela ação de hormônios não correspondem à presença de um embrião, não encontrou nas instituições formais constituídas, valores e práticas capazes de resguardar o desenvolvimento de uma democracia substancial. Em distintos períodos da história do país, o impulso inicial na direção de maior participação política e de inclusão social foi interrompido por movimentos abruptos de intervenção no curso da democracia. Em 2016, uma combinação de interesses da oposição partidária, do oligopólio de comunicação e de setores do poder judiciário, criou as condições para o impeachment da presidenta Dilma Rousseff por descumprimento de leis orçamentárias. Sob o rito formal das instituições, o golpe parlamentar assegurou o retorno dos conservadores ao poder e pôs em marcha uma agenda de regressão social e de autoritarismo, com amplo apoio de setores ideologicamente contrários ao governo anterior. Como resultado, o projeto de democracia no Brasil se apresenta mais uma vez ameaçado e os indicadores disso repercutem no agravamento dos problemas sociais. Neste trabalho, analisamos os fatores que determinaram a deterioração da democracia brasileira e o aprofundamento do golpe parlamentar que impede a fecundação de uma democracia sólida no país. ; Brazilian democracy, as in anembryonic gestation - in which the apparent signs caused by the action of hormones do not correspond to the presence of an embryo - did not find in the formal institutions constituted, values and practices capable of safeguarding the development of a substantial democracy. In different periods of the country's history, the initial impetus towards greater political participation and social inclusion was interrupted by abrupt intervention in the course of democracy. In 2016, a combination of interests from the party opposition, the oligopoly of communication, and sectors of the judiciary created the conditions for President Dilma Rousseff's impeachment for non-compliance with budget laws. Under the formal rite of the institutions, the parliamentary coup ensured the return of the Conservatives to power and set in motion an agenda of social regression and authoritarianism with broad support from sectors ideologically opposed to the previous government. As a result, the democracy project in Brazil is once again under threat and the indicators thereof have repercussions on the aggravation of social problems. In this work, we analyze the factors that determined the deterioration of Brazilian democracy and the deepening of the parliamentary coup that prevents the fecundation of a solid democracy in the country.

This series deal with a particular foreign country, describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelationships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by historical and cultural factors. ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 379-420) and index. ; Chapter 3: Economy / Roberto Steiner and Hernan Vallejo -- Economic history, 1819-1999 -- Growth and structure of the economy, 1819-1989 -- 1990s: a decade of economic reform -- Economic structure and sectoral policies -- Agriculture -- Mining and energy -- Industry -- Services -- Transportation and telecommunications -- Air transportation -- Inland waterways -- Ports -- Railroads -- Road transportation -- Telecommunications -- Financial regulation and financial markets -- Trade policy and trade patterns -- Foreign investment regulation and outcomes -- Illegal drugs -- Macroeconomic policies and trends -- Monetary policy and inflation -- Exchange-rate policy and the balance of payments -- Fiscal policy and public finances -- Labor, the informal economy, social spending, and pensions -- Labor markets -- Informal economy -- Social expenditure -- Pension system -- Outlook -- Chapter 4: Government And Politics / Arlene B Tickner -- Governmental system -- Executive -- Territorial government -- Legislature -- Electoral system -- Judiciary -- Attorney General's office -- Public administration -- Political dynamics -- Weakening of the bipartisan system -- Other parties and political movements -- Political party reform -- Corruption -- Societal institutions -- Colombian interest groups -- Internal armed conflict and peace negotiations -- Foreign relations -- General foreign policy traits -- Primary doctrines of foreign policy -- Foreign policy decision making -- Diplomatic relations -- Outlook -- Chapter 5: National Security / Ann C Mason -- Military -- Historical background -- Modernization of the military -- Constitutional authority -- Organization of the armed forces -- Conscription and military service -- Military education system -- Military judiciary -- Uniforms, ranks, and insignia -- Defense and security spending -- Law enforcement -- National police -- Administrative security department -- Judicial police -- Penal system -- National security background -- Nineteenth-century civil unrest -- International security affairs -- La Violencia and the emergence of insurgency -- Drug trafficking and the origins of paramilitarism -- Current national security panorama -- Internal armed conflict -- Human rights -- Violence and crime -- National security doctrines and policies -- Counterinsurgency strategies and emergency decrees -- Peace processes -- Antidrug strategies -- United States-Colombia Security Cooperation and Plan Colombia -- Democratic Security Policy -- Negotiations in 2007-8 -- International and regional security relations -- Agreements and treaties -- Regional relations -- Outlook -- Appendix: Tables -- Bibliography -- Glossary -- Index -- Contributors -- Published country studies. ; Foreword -- Acknowledgments -- Preface -- Table A: Selected Spanish abbreviations and acronyms -- Table B: Chronology of important events -- Country profile -- Introduction -- Chapter 1: Historical Setting / David Bushnell -- Early Colombia -- Spanish conquest and colonial society -- Exploration and conquest -- Colonial government -- Colonial society and economy -- Religion and culture -- Breaking the Spanish connection -- Antecedents of independence -- Struggle for independence, 1810-19 -- Development of the nation, 1819-1904 -- Great Colombia experiment, 1819-32 -- New Granada: weak state, strong parties, 1832-63 -- Failed federalist utopia, 1863-85 -- Continuity and change in social relations -- Political centralization and the church-state alliance -- War of the thousand days and loss of Panama, 1899-1903 -- New age of peace and coffee, 1904-30 -- Presidency of Rafael Reyes -- Growth of the coffee industry -- Relations with the United States -- Decline of the conservative hegemony -- Reform under the liberals, 1930-46 -- Things come apart, 1946-58 -- La Violencia -- Growth amid mayhem -- National front, 1958-78 -- Instituting the coalition government -- Sociocultural changes -- Contemporary era, 1978-98 -- Rise of drug-trafficking organizations -- Spread of leftist insurgencies -- New departures and continuing problems -- Chapter 2: Society And Its Environment / David Bushnell and Rex A Hudson -- Physical setting -- Geology -- Geography -- Climate -- Environment -- Race and ethnicity -- Indigenous peoples -- Racial distinctions -- Population and urbanization -- Population growth trends -- Immigration -- Regionalism -- Urbanization trends -- Population displacement -- Emigration -- Demography -- Social strata division -- Family -- Income distribution -- Rural poor and urban poor -- Income effects of narco-trafficking -- Health and welfare -- Resources and organization -- Current health overview -- Pension conundrum -- Religion -- Church, state, and society -- Growth of Protestantism -- Other religious expressions -- Education -- Basic education -- University, technical, and vocational education -- Continuing problems -- Social movements -- ; This series deal with a particular foreign country, describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelationships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by historical and cultural factors. ; Mode of access: Internet.

La LOGSE o Ley Orgánica de Ordenación General del Sistema Educativo de 1990 -producto del gobierno socialista de entonces- impulsó importantes cambios discursivos y programáticos en torno a la igualdad, la integración sociocultural y la democratización del sistema educativo. Sin embargo, cuando apenas se ha finalizado el proceso de implantación de esta reforma, el actual gobierno conservador se dispone a lanzar una «contrarreforma », desafiando así la educación comprensiva plasmada en la LOGSE. Pero mientras los proponentes dominantes de una reforma o la otra pugnan por el control ideológico y material de la escolarización en un Estado Español cada vez más diverso y recontextualizado, otras voces cruciales quedan silenciadas. Una de las grandes tragedias e ironías de este proceso de negación es que, justamente en el actual contexto histórico en que la presencia demográfica en la escolarización de dichas voces silenciadas -sobre todo las que proceden de colectivos inmigrantes y gitanos- ha experimentado un incremento significativo, la Ley de Calidad en la Enseñanza amenaza con cerrar las puertas al proyecto democratizador del sistema educativo. El cometido de este trabajo es, pues, revelar los vacíos, las negaciones y las preferencias culturales en esta encrucijada legislativa, en la que las identidades colectivas son filtradas por políticas educativas enfrentadas. Como veremos, los intentos a veces sesgados aunque loables de la LOGSE por mitigar este proceso de criba sociocultural sólo se han encontrado con una palpable resistencia hegemónica. ; La LOGSE o Llei Orgànica d'Ordenació General del Sistema Educatiu de 1990 -producte del govern socialista d'aleshores- va impulsar importants canvis discursius i programàtics entorn a la igualtat, la integració sociocultural i la democratització del sistema educatiu. Malgrat tot, quan gairebé s'ha finalitzat el procés d'implantació d'aquest reforma, l'actual govern conservador es disposa a treure una contrareforma, desafiant així l'educació comprensiva plasmada en la LOGSE. Però mentre els diferents bàndols que proposen una o una altre reforma pugnen pel control ideològic i material de l'escolarització en un Estat Espanyol cada vegada més divers, altres veus queden silenciades. Una de les grans tragèdies i ironies d'aquest procés de negació és que, justament en l'actual context històric en que la presència demogràfica en l'escolarització de les veus silenciades -sobre tot els que procedeixen dels col·lectius d'immigrants i gitanos- han experimentat un increment significatiu, la Llei de Qualitat en l'Ensenyament amenaça amb tancar les portes al projecte democratitzador del sistema educatiu. L'escomesa d'aquest treball és, doncs, aflorar els buits, les negacions i les preferències culturals en aquesta cruïlla legislativa, en la que les identitats col·lectives són filtrades per polítiques educatives enfrontades. Com veurem, els intents a vegades esbiaixats tot i que lloables de la LOGSE per mitigar aquest procés de sedàs sociocultural només s'ha trobat amb una palpable resistència hegemònica. ; The «LOGSE» -an ambitious educational reform law of 1990 set forth by a then Socialist- Party majority government- reflects some important discursive and programmatic shifts regarding sociocultural equality and integration, and the democratization of Spanish schooling. Yet no sooner has the reform been fully implemented than an impending «counter-reform», launched by the current conservative government, already poses a challenge to comprehensive education, as instated by the LOGSE. And tragically, as the dominant proponents of one reform or another battle over the ideological and material control of schooling in a newly situated and increasingly diverse Spanish State, certain other voices remain unheard or silenced. One of the great ironies of this process of negation is the fact that, in the present historical context, when many such silenced voices -especially those belonging to immigrants and Gypsy/Roma collectives- have come to participate in Spanish schooling in ever-increasing numbers, the «Quality in Teaching Law» threatens to close the doors to the democratization of the educational system. The task of this paper, then, will be to draw out the cultural voids, negations and preferences at this legislative juncture, as group identities are filtered through competing educational policies. For, as we shall see, the LOGSE=s at times biased but laudable attempts to mitigate this cultural weeding-out process have only met with palpable hegemonic resistance.